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Introduction to the
Baker Center Journal for applIed puBlIC polICy, 
Volume 3  
Welcome to the third issue of the Baker Center Journal for Applied Public Policy. I am pleased that this issue, as its predecessors, evidences the vibrancy 
of the Baker Center’s governance and public policy programs and makes a contribution to 
our collective understanding about  a variety of policy issues currently being discussed in 
America.    Relating to our system of governance, Jess Hale Jr. examines a proposal for a 
uniform state approach to reining in renegade presidential electors and Professor Glenn 
Reynolds reviews Jack Goldsmith’s book The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment Inside 
the Bush Administration.  Relating to media and foreign affairs and the role of the media 
in political life, Dr. Mike Fitzgerald and two of his students provide us with “A Compara-
tive Study of Images Created by Press Coverage of the United States and the Republic of 
Belarus.”
 Relating to health policy, Dr. David Mirvis, recently appointed as a Senior Fellow for 
Health Policy at the Center, explores the public policy implications of viewing health as an 
engine of economic growth.  
 Relating to energy and environmental policy, Drs. Bruce Tonn and Amy Gibson and 
Baker Scholars Stephanie Smith and Rachel Tuck explore U.S. Attitudes and Perspectives 
on National Energy Policy.  I am also very pleased that this issue includes a report of an 
excellent conference – “Formulation of a Bipartisan Energy and Climate Policy: Toward 
and Open and Transparent Process “- that was co-sponsored by the Baker Center and the 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.  This issue also includes the result of 
another successful collaboration between the Baker and Wilson Centers that focused on 
“Five Public Policy Ideas for Building Obama’s New Economy.”   I look forward to further 
productive collaborations between the Baker and Wilson Centers.   
  Relating to global security policy, this issue includes a Student Symposium on 
National Security.  Although the Baker Center Journal has provided an outlet for publica-
tion of student scholarship since its inception, I am particularly pleased that the student 
co-editors - Baker Scholars Elizabeth Wilson Vaughan and Bradford A. Vaughan - took 
the initiative to expand upon the efforts of their predecessors and to provide us with an 
expanded  set of excellent students essays each of which addresses an important national 
security policy issue.   It is an important part of the Baker Center’s mission to engage UTK 
students in the political and public policy process, and I applaud our student authors for 
their contributions to this symposium.   
 I hope you find this issue of the Baker Center Journal for Applied Public Policy to be 
both interesting and thought-provoking and that it will encourage you to participate in 
America’s unique and wonderful political and policy processes.  
  Howard H. Baker Jr.
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A Uniform State Approach
Jesse O. Hale Jr. 
Introduction 
As we begin our meditation on one specific aspect of how U. S. citizens govern 
themselves in electing the President of the United States, let us gaze into the fu-
ture.1  It is just after Election Day in November 2016 and the nation has just held 
a contentious presidential election.  In the popular vote the candidate of one party 
has a comfortable margin of 53% to 46% over her challenger from the other party. 
The challenger, however, has a narrow lead of 271 to 267 in the media’s estimate 
of votes in the Electoral College.  In the contentious partisan atmosphere of the 
past two decades, the media are looking to see whether the popular vote winner will 
concede or wait until the final tally of the Electoral College.  The cable networks are 
almost nonstop reminding their viewers that it is the Electoral College not the popu-
lar vote, which determines the election of a U. S. President.  Half the blogosphere is 
attempting to whip up a frenzy over the prospect that the will of the people will be 
overturned by an anachronistic and elitist institution such as the Electoral College. 
All it would take for the popular vote winner to have a real chance to assume the 
presidency in January 2017 would be for three renegade electors to switch their votes 
to that candidate when the Electoral College meets in state capitols in December. 
Only two renegade electors would throw the election into Congress.  Journalists are 
desperately attempting to interview various talking heads as Al Gore and George 
W. Bush maintain media silence.  This is not quite the 2000 election and no one 
wants to lose.  If the three renegade electors violate the almost universal unit rule of 
“winner-take-all” for a state’s electoral votes, will Congress accept those votes when it 
counts them?  Who is going to be President of the United States?  The protests are 
getting ugly.  Are we heading to a constitutional crisis?  
In 2000, 2004, and even 2008,2 there were discussions of the Electoral College in the 
mass media.  We were told that the Democratic and Republican parties put party loyalists 
in these positions so the votes would be safe partisan votes.  Party loyalty is almost like a 
wedding vow.  It is sacred, not to be violated.  Yet people are capable of betrayal or disloyalty. 
Could a Democrat elector be a Judas to his party and vote for a Republican and switch par-
ties afterwards with expectations of a reward?  Could a Republican elector commit political 
adultery and vote for a Democrat on the principled belief that the nation is better served by 
electing the clear popular vote winner or that upon deliberation on the matter that the other 
party’s candidate was just the best person for the job?  
1 The author’s views do not represent the views of the Office of Legal Services or of the Tennessee General Assembly. The 
author would like to thank Susan Nichols, Robert Bennett, James Bopp, Jack Davies, Doug Himes, Paige Seals, Emily Urban, 
and Carl Pierce for their comments on the lecture or the text.  Of course, the author alone is responsible for any errors in the 
final product. This article was originally delivered as a lecture at the Howard H. Baker Jr. Center for Public Policy at the Uni-
versity of Tennessee-Knoxville, on October 20, 2009
2 Michael Cooper, “A Blowout? No, But a Clear-Cut Win for a Change, New York Times, 7 November 2008.
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In the 2000 contest between Al Gore and George W. Bush, when the expected outcome 
was for Bush to win the popular vote and Gore to prevail in the Electoral College, it was 
reported that the Bush campaign explored the possibility of encouraging some Democratic 
electors to defect to Bush---of course that was not the way it turned out as we went down 
the road of hanging chads in Florida.3  There were also rumors that Gore had looked into the 
possibility of Republican defectors.4   Similarly, in 1977 Bob Dole acknowledged that after 
the 1976 election the Republican ticket had looked around for electors to defect.5  With ap-
proximately nine electors having been faithless over the course of presidential elections since 
1948, a faithless elector is not an unheard of occurrence.6  
The Electoral College and Other Faithless Electors 
Yet the possibilities for problems associated with the Electoral College are real ones 
even if the College has not produced a full-blown crisis of electoral legitimacy in the last 
two elections.  While some question the continued desirability of retaining the Electoral 
College, for the foreseeable future retention appears likely as the American people continue 
to respect its place in the Constitution,7 though the National Popular Vote Initiative or 
scholars such as Stanford Levinson might dissent on that point.8  Given its continuing place 
in American presidential elections, those committed to making American democracy work 
with a degree of legitimacy need to address genuine practical problems with the Electoral 
College before a political train wreck finally occurs.  The two most significant practical is-
sues are (1) what happens if an election is thrown into Congress for resolution and (2) the 
problem of the faithless elector.  Former Northwestern law school dean Robert Bennett’s 
Taming the Electoral College provides an excellent treatment of the range of issues relating to 
the College, including the College’s history and options for solutions.9  Some solutions are 
more practical than others, but there are options to deal with these issues.  However, in this 
paper, we only address the problem of renegade or rogue electors.  
One problem that has occurred over our nation’s history is that of the strange case of 
the renegade elector or the “faithless elector” as those souls are more commonly known.  A 
faithless elector is an elector who refuses to cast his or her ballot for the presidential ticket 
that wins the popular vote in that elector’s state, or district in some cases.  The average voter 
3 Robert Bennett, Taming the Electoral College (Palo Alto: Stanford, 2006): 100-101.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid, n31, 231.
6 Eight such electors are identified by L. Paige Whitaker and Thomas H. Neale, ”The Electoral College: An Overview and 
Analysis of Reform Proposals,” CRS Reports for Congress, 5 November 2004: 12.  Bennett, Taming the Electoral College: 96, 
identifies one such elector in the 2004 election.
7 For a survey of the periodic reform proposals concerning the Electoral College, see Whitaker and Neale, ”The Electoral 
College: An Overview and Analysis of Reform Proposals,” CRS Reports for Congress, 5 November 2004.
8 See, http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/ and Sanford Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution: Where the Constitu-
tion Goes Wrong (And How We the People Can Correct It (New York: Oxford, 2006).
9 See Robert W. Bennett, Taming the Electoral College (Palo Alto: Stanford, 2006).  Bennett served as the official reporter 
for the Uniform Law Commission’s Drafting Committee on Faithful Presidential Electors.  Bennett also has supported the 
National Popular Vote Initiative.  For a perspective that is both supportive of the Electoral College and more aligned with the 
approach of the Federalist Society, see Tara Ross, Enlightened Democracy: The Case for the Electoral College (Dallas: Colonial 
Press, 2004).
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probably does not realize that he or she is only voting for a slate of electors who in turn will 
vote for the president and vice-president.  In the 2000 election, two or three faithless electors 
could have reversed the outcome of the election or put the election into the House of Repre-
sentatives. The problem has infrequently arisen in elections and really causes a problem only 
in razor-close elections. As I have noted, however, we do have such elections.  
Relatively little law exists regarding the Electoral College and the voting of electors.  In 
the U. S. Constitution there are requirements for each state to appoint electors as its leg-
islature directs (Article II, Section 1, Clause 2); for Congress to determine a time for both 
choosing electors and for the electors to vote (Article II, Section 1, Clause 4), and for the 
meeting of the electors to vote by ballot for President and Vice-President.  The Constitution 
directs that those votes will be transmitted to the President of the Senate who in the pres-
ence of both houses of Congress presides over the count of the electoral votes.  If one person 
obtains a majority of the electors, then that person is elected President.  If one person does 
not receive a majority, then the House of Representatives elect the President under a special 
voting arrangement required by the 12th Amendment.10  After difficulties arose with the 
1876 election, Congress enacted the Electoral Count Act in order to provide procedures to 
govern the appointment, voting, certification and counting of the votes of electors.11  Finally, 
in Ray v. Blair the U.S. Supreme Court offered the only decision that arguably addresses 
the issue of the elector selection and voting in the Electoral College.  The case concerned 
an elector voting under the unit rule approach produced by the ascent of political parties. 
The opinion arose out of a case where an Alabama primary candidate for elector refused the 
pledge requirement of the Democratic Party in that state.  The Court held that the pledge 
requirement in the primary was not unconstitutional.12  The Court did not address the issue 
of a properly chosen elector who violated the pledge in his or her vote for a candidate.  
In our federal system, some issues are entrusted to the states and the election of presi-
dents is one of those issues---at least initially. Congress has a limited and secondary role 
in this critical endeavor.  The current discussions of federalism 13 can be seen to revolve 
around the separate state and federal spheres approach envisioned by the Supreme Courts 
led by Rehnquist and Roberts Supreme Courts.14  As compared to the more cooperative 
approach to state and federal relations envisioned by the so-called “blue federalism.”15  Both 
10 The 12th Amendment supersedes Article II, Section1, Clause 3 of the Constitution.  It corrected a difficulty arising from 
the original arrangement when the person with the most votes became President and the one with the second highest total 
became Vice-President.  The 12th Amendment adopted the current arrangement of separate votes for President and Vice-
President.  The 23rd Amendment also provides for electors for the District of Columbia. 
11 3 U.S.C. Sections 1-18.
12 Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952).
13 For two general discussions representing “liberal” and “conservative” viewpoints in the context of constitutional law gener-
ally see Richard Fallon, The Dynamic Constitution (New York: Cambridge, 2004), 157-172), and Charles Fried, Saying What 
the Law Is: The Constitution in the Supreme Court (Cambridge: Harvard, 2004),13-48.
14 Dan Schweitzer, “Federalism and Separation of Powers: The Different Approaches of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Alito on the Scope of State Power,” Engage, 9/1:52-58 (February 2008).
15 See David J. Barron, “Foreword: Blue State Federalism at the Crossroads,” Harvard Law and Policy Review, 3/1: 1-8 
(2009); Robert Schapiro, “Not Old or Borrowed: The Truly New Blue Federalism, ”Harvard Law and Policy Review, 3/1: 33-
57 (2009), and Judith Resnick, “What’s Federalism For?” in Jack M. Balkin and Reva B. Siegel, eds. The Constitution in 2020 
(New York: Oxford, 2009), 269-284.
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 approaches, however, may find a constitutional common ground in addressing the issue of 
faithless electors.  The College is clearly a state activity and Congress’ cooperative role enters 
in the counting of electoral votes in accordance with the Electoral Count Act, so there are 
both separate spheres and cooperation.  Further, specific constitutional provisions rather 
than the 10th Amendment govern the problem of faithless electors, so federalism debates 
associated with that amendment are not relevant. 
Under the Constitution, each state has a number of electors set as equal to the state’s 
number of representatives in the House of Representatives and the Senate.  Although elec-
tors were originally selected by state legislatures as a general practice, the method of selec-
tion has varied over the years.  States now select electors through election of slates of electors 
nominated by political parties.  Because the names of the presidential electors do not appear 
on the Election Day ballots in November, the ordinary American voter often unwittingly 
casts a ballot for a slate of electors rather than directly for the candidate.  Because most 
states allocate their votes based on the principle of winner-take-all,16 where the popular vote 
winner in a state receives all of that state’s electoral votes, elections tend not to be close in 
the Electoral College.  However, they can be.  Originally, before political parties, the electors 
were to deliberate and had discretion in casting their ballots.  With the development of po-
litical parties, states have sought to remove elector discretion and tie the votes of their elec-
tors to the winners in the political party system by selecting party loyalists for each party’s 
slate of electors.  Instances of renegade or faithless electors who vote against their party are 
rare, but they happen as one renegade vote in both the 2000 and 2004 elections demon-
strate.  In 2000 one Gore elector from the District of Columbia abstained and in 2004 a 
Minnesota elector voted for John Edwards instead of John Kerry.17  In addition to those rela-
tively recent elections the list of examples includes a 1948 Truman elector in Tennessee who 
voted for Strom Thurmond, a 1960 Nixon elector in Oklahoma who voted for Harry Byrd 
of Virginia, and a 1968 Nixon elector from North Carolina who voted for George Wallace.18
The problem of the faithless elector is one difficulty to which there is a fairly practical 
resolution.  A faithless elector violates the common trust of the voters by “faithlessly” not 
voting for the candidate who won the particular state’s popular vote. I n our party dominated 
system, as Robert Bennett notes, “faithless electors” are “electors who vote for presidential or 
vice-presidential candidates other than the candidates for those offices of the political party 
that nominated the electors.”19  Several states have recognized this problem and have tried 
to address it in a variety of ways.  Pledges to vote according to party and the results of the 
election, with and without penalty, and criminal statutes are among the ways that states have 
sought a solution. However, lying in the background is the historical intention for the elec-
tors to exercise independent deliberation, which or 200-year old system of developed politi-
cal parties has turned on its head by requiring electors chosen from the party faithful to vote 
as robots. Also it is the object of some concern that this hodgepodge of statutes in place in 
16 See Matthew J. Fiesta, “The Origins and Constitutionality of State Unit Voting in the Electoral College,” Vanderbilt Law 
Review 54: 2009-2155 (2001).
17 Bennett, Taming the Electoral College, 96.
18 Whitaker and Neale, “The Electoral College: An Overview and Analysis of Reform Proposals,” 12.
19 Robert Bennett, “Background Memorandum, Uniform Faithful Presidential Electors Act,” 1.
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about thirty states20 may not actually address the problem.21  Even if an elector is penalized 
for voting faithlessly, the faithless vote may still be counted.  A number of faithless votes have 
been counted, though what was counted at the counting sessions were the votes forwarded 
by the state “presumably with the governor’s imprimatur.”22  
So what is needed is a workable solution that comes out of the states that actually is 
faithful to the Constitution even as it makes contemporary election machinery work in the 
changed environment occasioned by political parties. But how might states make a workable 
solution?  Enter the possibility of a unified approach by states to faithless electors in the 
form of a uniform state law.23  A statute enacted by the individual states that is constitution-
ally defensible and workable would be faithful to the federalism underlying the constitu-
tional structure of the Electoral College.  
The Uniform Law Conference
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, also known as the 
Uniform Law Commission (ULC) 24 is a group that for over a century has brought states 
together to respond to many issues through consensus on state legislation.  The ULC now 
has taken on the task of devising a uniform state law concerning faithless electors.  Since 
1892, the ULC has sought to improve state law by providing well-drafted and nonpartisan 
legislation to states for each state to enact.  The ULC consists of more than 300 practicing 
lawyers, law professors, legislators, judges and government attorneys who come together 
without compensation to craft legislation.  Such legal luminaries as Karl Llewellyn and Ros-
coe Pound, and future U.S. Supreme Court justices, such as William Rehnquist and David 
Souter, have been members.  While lawyers know the Uniform Commercial Code as prob-
ably the organization’s most famous work product, the ULC crafts a variety of uniform and 
model legislation for states,25 including: the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act and the Uniform 
Interstate Family Support Act.  The ULC produces draft legislation pertaining to a wide 
spectrum of the law, including family law, corporate law, estate law, international law, prop-
erty law, and health care.  The ULC’s legislation seeks to reduce federal preemption brought 
about by inconsistent state laws while sustaining state independence.  For legislation to be 
adopted by the ULC, the “subject matter must be appropriate for state legislation in view of 
the powers granted by the Constitution of the United States to the Congress. . . . [and]. . . the 
subject . . . shall be such that uniformity of law among States will produce significant benefits 
20 See National Conference of State Legislatures, “The Electoral College,” http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=16555.
21 See Beverly J. Ross and William Josephson, “The Electoral College and the Popular Vote,” Journal of Law and Politics, 12: 
665-747 (1996) and Vasan Kesevan, “The Very Faithless Elector?” West Virginia Law Review 104:  123-141 (2001).
22 Bennett, “Background Memorandum,” 8.
23 Bennett recognized this possibility before the drafting committee was appointed. See Taming the Electoral College, 117-
118.
24 See National Conference of State Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=16082.
25 As a general matter, “uniform” is used for legislation, which anticipates a large number of enactments, and uniformity 
of the proposed provisions is a principal objective of the legislation. On the other hand, “model” describes legislation that has 
uniformity only as a desirable objective and its desired objectives can be attained even if a significant number of jurisdictions 
do not adopt the legislation in its entirety.  See Uniform Law Commission, “Statement of Policy Establishing Criteria and 
Procedures for Designation and Consideration of Acts,” [1/13/2001],ULC Reference Book 2008-2009, 120-121.
HALE, JR. 72010
to the public through improvements in the law . . . or will avoid significant disadvantages 
likely to arise from diversity of state law . . ..”26
The ULC works through its annual meeting where the commissioners gather for a week 
to read and debate line by line the legislation under consideration.  Throughout the year, 
the ULC also works through its drafting committees, which generally produce a model or 
uniform act for approval by the entire Conference over a two-year (or longer) period.  The 
Committee on Faithful Presidential Electors is one of those committees.27  
Through its Drafting Committee on Faithful Presidential Electors Act,28 the ULC is in 
the process of crafting a legislative proposal that would require an elector to pledge to vote 
for the popular vote winner in the elector’s state, provide for alternate electors and certifica-
tion of slates of electors, and establish a procedure for counting votes that would disqualify 
faithless votes and substitute faithful votes for casting.  The current draft of the act29 still has 
one more year of consideration by the ULC before the Conference votes on whether to send 
it out to the states with its recommendation that the act be adopted as either a uniform or 
model act. The drafting committee and the ULC are striving for a workable consensus pro-
posal. This proposal seeks to make the existing system avoid a significant potential problem 
and it takes no position on the question of whether the existing Electoral College should 
continue or be abolished.  
The Santa Fe Draft 
In 2009, the Drafting Committee presented a proposal to the ULC’s annual meeting 
in Santa Fe, New Mexico.30  The only significant opposition to the proposed act came from 
the National Popular Vote initiative.  The group opposed the act because it did not view the 
proposal as neutral with respect to the enactment of National Popular Vote legislation, and 
considered it harmful to its efforts.31  The proposed Act hopefully will be finalized and ap-
proved by the whole Conference at its July 2010 annual meeting in Chicago.
In essence, the committee proposed an Act that requires each of a state’s electors to 
pledge to cast his or her ballots for the winning presidential and vice-presidential candidates. 
The pledge requirement is augmented with a specific procedure for counting ballots at the 
December meeting of the electors in each state that refuses to count a ballot marked in 
violation of the pledge as cast, deems the offering elector’s position as resigned, substitutes 
an alternate elector until the ballot is marked for a candidate in accord with the pledge, and 
only then accepts the ballot as cast.  By this mechanism, a correctly voted set of votes are 
26 Uniform Law Commission, “Statement of Policy Establishing Criteria and Procedures for Designation and Consider-
ation of Acts,” [1/13/2001] ULC Reference Book 2008-2009, 119.
27 The drafting committee is in part the fruit of efforts to address this issue with a uniform state law over a period of years 
by long-time ULC Commissioner Jack Davies.
28 The author is a member of the drafting committee.
29 http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fpe/2009am_draft.htm
30 For both the draft and the “Background Memorandum,” the Committee owes a tremendous debt of gratitude to the 
Committee’s Reporter, Robert W. Bennett, who brought his wealth of scholarship to our task with kind grace and hard work. 
I am fortunate to have had Bennett’s admirable products to draw on in developing this paper.
31 See, Letter of Dr. John R. Koza, Chair, National Popular Vote to Mrs. Susan Kelly Nichols (Chair of the ULC Drafting 
Committee on Faithful Presidential Electors), “Comments on ‘Draft Uniform Act on Faithful Presidential Electors,” 16 June 
2009.
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forwarded to Washington, D.C. under the Electoral Count Act and the problem of a faith-
less elector is avoided.  One significant motivation for states to adopt this act is to avoid the 
political havoc that would ensue from more deeply embroiling the courts in a controversial 
election where a candidate might attempt to swing an election with the defection of a faith-
less elector.  
Walking through the proposed act, after a set of introductory definitions,32 the Act 
requires the submission of a list of electors and alternate electors to the Secretary of State 
of every state for each slate of presidential and vice-presidential candidates on the state’s 
ballot under the state’s applicable election statutes.33 34
  
Each individual on the list of electors 
and alternates is required to sign a pledge to vote for the winning presidential and vice-
presidential candidate in that state.  The signed pledge is attached to the list submitted to the 
Secretary of State.  The Governor of the state includes these electors and alternates on the 
certificate of ascertainment required under 3 U.S.C. Section 6.  If a vacancy occurs, the Gov-
ernor is to submit an amended certificate.35  At the meeting of the electors in December, the 
Secretary of State presides and fills any vacancy created by absent electors from the alternate 
electors, by a specified procedure.36  All electors must sign the pledge.  The Secretary of State 
provides each elector with presidential and vice-presidential ballots.  Each elector completes 
the ballot and presents the completed ballot to the Secretary of State who examines the bal-
lots and records as cast only those ballots that comply with the pledge.  If an elector presents 
a ballot that does not comply with the pledge, then the elector is deemed to have resigned.  A 
vacancy is thus created and filled by a substitute from the alternate electors.  The substitute 
elector then votes in accordance with the pledge or another vacancy is created.  A ballot 
is not counted as cast by an elector unless it conforms with the elector’s pledge---by this 
mechanism a renegade or faithless elector is prevented from casting his or her ballot.37  After 
all votes are cast, the Governor submits to the appropriate officials an amended certificate 
of ascertainment if it is required do to vacancies.38  The Secretary of State also prepares a 
certificate of vote for the electors to sign for transmittal in accord with the Electoral Count 
Act.39  The properly cast votes are counted in January by the President of the Senate and 
faithless votes are avoided.  
One of the controversial matters that the Santa Fe draft did not address was whether 
to bind electors to their pledge if the popular vote winner in the vote for President dies or 
becomes disabled between election day in November and the meeting of the Electoral Col-
32 Section 2.
33 Section 3.
34 In states such as Mississippi, or in Maine and Nebraska where electors are selected in districts, this approach would have 
to be modified.
35 Section 4.
36 Section 5.
37 Section 6.
38 Section 7.
39 Ibid.
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lege in December.40  Should an elector be bound to vote for a dead person?  Should political 
parties be authorized to select a substitute candidate for whom electors would be bound to 
vote?  In Tennessee, an elector is bound to vote, without a stated penalty, for the candidate of 
the political party that selected the elector if the candidates are alive.  But, if that is not the 
case, then “the electors may cast their ballots in the Electoral College as they see fit.”41  Not 
everyone agrees that Tennessee’s approach is the right one.  In Santa Fe several felt that the 
draft needs to address that issue—even if it raises practical difficulties for enacting the legis-
lation in state legislatures.  The pragmatic concern for enactability often arises in developing 
uniform acts.  
A significant issue lurking behind this proposed act is its constitutionality.42  Would it 
survive a constitutional challenge?  Given that at the beginning, electors had discretion in 
their voting, could a pledge to vote a certain way be upheld?  In terms of earlier law, Ray v. 
Blair upheld a pledge requirement in the primary selection context, but did not address the 
issue of whether the pledge itself would be enforceable on a faithless elector when the Elec-
toral College actually votes.  From a pragmatic assessment of consequences, in order for our 
current mechanism built around political parties to work with legitimacy, a pledge would 
have to be enforceable.  A return to unfettered elector discretion is not contemplated even 
by many members of the Federalist Society and may call for application of Justice Scalia’s 
invocation of “faint-hearted originalism.”43  If the courts were to overturn a pledge statute 
on originalist grounds, or on other grounds, political havoc would ensue beyond that havoc 
already present in an election debacle that had become embroiled in the courts.  Since Ray 
v. Blair does not mandate elector discretion and upholds some form of a pledge and since 
the practical consequences of invalidating a pledge statute could be significant, there is a 
fair, but not certain, argument that the pledge approach used by the draft act could survive 
a constitutional challenge. 
  
Conclusion
By attending to the reality of political parties in elections and the constitutional struc-
ture that has electors cast ballots,44 the Faithful Presidential Electors Act seeks the “consti-
40 The Constitution does make provision for what happens when a candidate dies after there is a President or Vic-President 
elect, but not before.  See the 20th Amendment, Sections 3 & 4.
41 Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 2-15-104(c).
42 For Bennett’s assessment of the constitutionality of this approach, on which I significantly rely, see Bennett, “Background 
Memorandum,” 5-8.
43 See the use of the notion in Antonin Scalia, “Originalism: The Lesser Evil,” University of Cincinnati Law Review, 57: 849 
at 864 (1989).  The quote is “I hasten to confess that in a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted originalist.” 
44 Despite his dissent in Ray v. Blair, Justice Jackson’s words in his famous concurring opinion in the Youngstown Steel deci-
sion, though arising out of questions about executive power in wartime, may also have application in attending to the reality of 
political parties in American elections:
The Constitution . . . must be understood as an Eighteenth-Century sketch of a government hoped for, not as a blue-
print of the Government that is. . . .  Subtle shifts take place in the centers of real power that do not show on the face 
of the Constitution.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), at 653 ( Jackson concurring).
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tutional fidelity”45 to an Electoral College mechanism that remains faithful to the federalism 
in its operation.  By means of a balloting mechanism that binds electors with a pledge to 
vote for specified candidates, the problem of faithless or renegade electors can be solved. 
By remaining faithful to the Constitution in American democracy as it has evolved, the Act 
still takes seriously the original intent of electors who vote even if it has moved beyond the 
originalism of independent deliberation by electors.  The approach taken in the Faithful 
Presidential Electors Act in some sense represents common ground between liberals and 
conservatives, between the American Constitution Society and the Federalist Society,46 and 
between those committed to originalism and constitutional fidelity.  Many interested parties 
genuinely seem to want our party-based system to work without an unnecessary consti-
tutional crisis occasioned by a faithless or renegade elector.  In an age of sometimes bitter 
partisan politics, both judicial and otherwise, workable common ground is something to be 
valued.  And, if we can avoid a constitutional crisis in the process that may well be priceless. 
45 See, e.g., Goodwin Liu, Pamela S. Karlan, and Christopher H. Schroeder, Keeping Faith with the  Constitution (Washing-
ton D.C.: American Constitution Society for Law and Policy, 2009.
46 The drafting committee included members of both organizations.
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Introduction 
The United States is facing a number of significant challenges to its energy 
supply. Rising and highly volatile energy costs, energy supply uncertainties, and 
increasing concerns about the environmental impacts of energy production (Gilman 
2006, IPCC 2007)  and use have created the growing realization that cheap, plentiful 
energy is something that can no longer be taken for granted. International relations 
concerning energy are strained, as worldwide demand for energy in countries like 
China and India is surging and distress about the Middle East is high. 
Controversies plague many energy options open to the United States (Pew 
2008).  For example, nuclear energy policy and use has been shaped by negative 
public perceptions and attitudes about safety and reliability that are a result of the 
events at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and in Japan (MIT 2003; Rosa and Rice 
2004). Public awareness of global warming issues has brought unfavorable attention 
to carbon-based energy sources such as coal – long regarded as safe and politically 
acceptable. In a relatively short period of time, the biofuels industry has gone from 
basking in wide public acceptance to public excoriation in the food versus fuel debate. 
Similarly, the rise and fall of energy supply and demand since the oil crisis during the 
1970s has contributed to public perception that energy supply may not be a “real” 
issue, making it difficult to gain public acceptance of certain policies regarding the 
management of supply or reduction of demand. Building new transmission lines 
(Gerlach 2004) and drilling for oil offshore (Freudenburg and Gramling 2004) have 
also proven to be controversial. Even relatively benign sources of energy such as wind 
face negative public scrutiny in the form of NIMBYism and concerns over aesthetics 
and bird strike ( Johansso and Kaike 2007). 
This paper presents the results of a national survey of Americans about their 
attitudes and perspectives on U.S. energy policy. Previous research explored U.S. 
energy policy from seven perspectives (see Appendix I for descriptions of these 
perspectives) and found that despite significant differences in values and goals 
represented by the perspectives, many commonalities exist among the perspectives 
around which national energy policy could be developed (Tonn et al. 2009).1 The 
seven perspectives were designed to represent influential voices in the national energy 
policy debate. This survey was designed, in part, to provide insights to what extent 
the American public holds views similar or dissimilar to these seven perspectives. 
1  The previous Perspectives research was supported by collaboration between the Howard Baker Center for Public 
Policy and Deloitte Touche.  We wish to thank KC Healy, Deloitte Touche, and the Howard H. Baker Jr. Center for Public 
Policy for providing financial support for this research.
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This research contributes to the literature because the survey addressed national 
energy policy from a portfolio perspective. As noted above, many previous surveys 
and polls have focused on one or just a few particular aspects of national energy policy 
(e.g., nuclear power or off-shore oil drilling) (Greenberg 2009; Polling Report 2008; 
Bolsen and Cook 2008). Other social science research has focused on classifying 
types of energy consumers (Lutzenhiser 1993; Stern and Aronson 1984) and how 
different people perceive energy (Sovacool 2008). 
The next section presents the survey methodology used in this research. The 
results section is broken into four sub-sections that address perceived seriousness of 
the energy problem, who is responsible for national energy problems, attitudes and 
perspectives towards a range of energy policy issues, and personal responsibilities for 
helping to contribute to solutions of national energy problems, respectively. 
Survey Methodology
A web-survey firm, MarketTools, was contracted to administer the survey to a 
representative sample of Americans. This firm has access to a sample of 2.5 million 
Americans, known as TrueSample, which has undergone rigorous quality control. 
The survey was administered to a random sub-sample of TrueSample respondents 
that are representative of Americans throughout the United States. MarketTools 
estimated that 384 respondents from the TrueSample would meet our stipulation 
for a 95% confidence interval around the means of the questions responses. At 
the end of the survey period, which was conducted during summer 2009, a total 
of 402 respondents completed the entire survey. The sample of respondents is 
diverse over the important variables of age, gender, ethnicity, number of children 
and grandchildren, domestic status, education, employment status, and income. We 
believe that this sample is representative of the U.S. population.2
Results
As mentioned above, this section is broken into four sections that address: 
perceived seriousness of the energy problem; who is responsible for national energy 
problems; attitudes and perspectives towards a range of energy policy issues; and 
personal responsibilities for helping to contribute to solutions of national energy 
problems, respectively. 
Seriousness of Energy Problem  
To begin the survey, respondents were asked about their perceptions as to 
the degree of severity of the energy problem for the United States. As indicated 
in Table 1, 80% of the respondents believe that the energy problem is at least a 
very large problem. Less that 3% dismiss energy as a problem requiring national 
attention. Thus, a first firm conclusion is that Americans believe that energy is a 
serious problem. This is not a surprising finding as polls since the 1970’s have shown 
Americans consistently concerned about energy (Bolsen and Cook 2009). 
2  The detailed demographics for these respondents are described in Appendix Table A1.
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Respondents next were asked a general question about important issues that 
may be linked to energy production in the United States. Table 2 shows that long 
standing environmental problems, air and water pollution, were judged by 74% and 
73% of the respondents to be at least large problems linked to energy production, 
respectively. The survey results support other recently administered surveys that 
significant portions of the American public do not perceive climate change to be 
a problem, much less caused by energy production (Nisbet and Myers 2007). It 
was expected that many Americans would be unfamiliar with the regional issue of 
mountain top removal, which is an important issue in the environmental community. 
The most surprising finding in Table 2 is the last result: over 80% of the respondents 
believe that increasing food prices is a large to extremely large problem linked to 
energy (presumably corn ethanol) production. That energy is a pocketbook issue 
surfaces frequently throughout the rest of the survey.  
The respondents were asked how optimistic or pessimistic they are about the 
world’s energy problems for eight different time periods, from one year from now 
to over one hundred years from now. The results presented in Table 3 suggest that 
the American public is almost equally split between being pessimistic, optimistic or 
neither. The large number of those unable to express their opinions may reflect the 
high level of uncertainty that they have about energy futures. Many paths could turn 
out well; many paths could be disastrous. It all depends upon a bewildering array of 
factors. Extreme pessimism is somewhat higher than extreme optimism in the very 
near-term. Interestingly, those who are just pessimistic seem to become extremely 
pessimistic as the time frame extends into the future and those who are optimistic 
also become more so as the time frame is extended. 
Table 1
Size of U.S. Energy Problem 
(% Respondents) 
 Not a problem at all 1.7
 A small problem 1
 A moderate problem 17.2
 A large problem 24.9
 A very large problem 32.1
 An extremely large problem 23.1
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Table 2 
Size of Problems Linked to Energy Production 
(% Respondents)
  An
  extremely A very  A  Not a
  large large A large moderate A small problem Don’t
 Statements problem problem problem problem problem at all Know
 Global
 Climate
 Change 23.4 19.9 17.9 19.9 9.2 8.7 1.0
 Air
 Pollution 25.9 23.4 24.9 18.2 6.7 0.7 0.2
 Water
 Pollution 23.1 23.6 26.6 17.7 7.7 1.0 0.2
 Mountain Top
 Removal for
 Coal 13.7 15.4 17.7 23.1 14.2 4.2 11.7
 Increasing
 Food Prices 27.9 28.4 25.6 14.7 1.5 1.0 1.0
Table 3
Optimism-Pessimism About World Energy Future by Timeframe 
(% Respondents)
  Up to 1 1 to 2 2 to 5 5 to 10 10 to 20 20 to 50 50 to 100 Over 100
 Statements year years years years years years years years
 Very Pessimistic 13.7 13.7 9.7 9.5 11.5 13.5 15.9 18.2
 Somewhat
 pessimistic 21.4 19.7 21.1 17.4 15.4 14.2 13.7 11.9
 Neither optimistic
 nor pessimistic 34.1 33.6 34.1 36.6 35.8 39.3 38.6 38.8
 Somewhat
 optimistic 23.9 27.1 26.6 26.6 25.6 21.1 15.9 12.7
 Very Optimistic 7.0 6.0 8.5 10.0 11.7 11.9 15.9 18.4
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Who is responsible? 
The results presented above indicate that Americans think that energy is a 
serious problem and has serious consequences. Who is responsible for the nation’s 
energy problems? Table 4 addresses this question. The results indicate that many 
are to blame. Congress receives the most blame (decades of polling data consistently 
support this finding, Bolsen and Cook 2008), followed by lobbyists, industry and 
the executive branch. Educators are least responsible, although over 80% of the 
respondents ascribed some blame to this group in any case. Citizens, the media, 
and even scientists and technologists are all seen by the overwhelming majority of 
the respondents as being at least somewhat responsible for energy problems. Thus, 
it can be concluded that Americans view their energy problems as being extensively 
systemic. 
Table 4
Responsibility for Contributing to Energy Problems 
(% Respondents)
  Not at all Not very Somewhat  Very
 Statements responsible responsible Responsible Responsible responsible
 Congress 2.0 2.7 14.9 26.6 53.7
 The Administration 2.2 4.2 18.4 29.6 45.5
 Industry 1.7 3.5 15.9 32.6 46.3
 Citizens 3.2 6.7 24.4 33.6 32.1
 Educators 5.7 13.4 30.8 26.4 23.6
 Scientists and
 Technologists 2.2 11.7 28.6 28.6 28.9
 Media 6.2 10.0 21.6 24.9 37.3
 Lobbyists 5.5 7.2 15.4 21.9 50.0
Consistent with this logic, as is apparent in Table 5, the public views almost every 
sector of society as sharing responsibility for solving the nation’s energy problems. 
Responsibility is lead by Congress, the executive branch, industry, citizens, educators, 
and scientists and technologists, the latter shouldering maybe the most responsibility. 
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Policy Attitudes and Perspectives 
A series of questions were posed to respondents to further explore the importance 
of various goals linked to U.S. national energy policy, attitudes towards a portfolio 
of energy sources, and opinions about a set of frequently discussed national energy 
policies. With respect to the first point, energy policy is often linked to various 
national and strategic goals, such as increasing energy independence and energy 
security and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Table 6 reports the responses to a 
question about how important these types of goals are to the respondents. 
The most important issue with respect to national energy policy is the cost of 
energy for consumers (less than 5% of respondents place low or no importance on 
this issue). This is another confirmation that energy is a pocketbook issue. Another 
personal issue, safety, is also seen as very important, along with energy independence 
and energy security. Other issues of importance are greenhouse gas emissions, other 
environmental issues, energy infrastructure costs, job creation, and technological 
feasibility. Of least importance are foreign relations. 
Table 5
Social Sector Responsibility for Solving Energy Problems 
(% Respondents)
  Not at all Not very Somewhat  Very
 Statements responsible responsible Responsible Responsible responsible
 Congress 5.2 5.5 13.9 23.4 52.0
 The Administration 5.0 5.2 12.9 27.1 49.8
 Industry 3.0 5.0 12.7 28.4 51.0
 Citizens 3.0 5.5 25.6 31.3 40.5
 Educators 5.5 7.7 25.6 29.1 32.1
 Scientists and
 Technologists 2.2 2.7 17.4 29.4 48.3
 Media 14.4 13.4 19.4 21.9 30.8
 Lobbyists 16.9 10.7 16.9 22.1 33.3
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These results are interesting from a couple of viewpoints. First, almost all 
respondents seem to believe that almost all of the issues are important. There may 
be some who favor the environment, some who favor pocketbook issues, others who 
favor everything, and others who do not care about energy as an issue. however, 
the general public may not possess highly distinctive Perspectives as hypothesized 
by previous research. Second, because of this, many attitudes held by the public 
may seem contradictory, at least at first blush. For example, one could argue that 
increasing energy independence (presumably by importing less low cost oil) would 
necessarily increase costs of energy for consumers.  how respondents are dealing 
with this situation is illustrated in Table 7. Respondents were asked how much they 
support a range of energy sources. 
Table 6
Importance of Aspects of U.S. Energy Policy 
(% Respondents) 
  Don’t Care/ Low Medium High
 Statements Indifferent Importance Importance Importance
 Energy independence 2.2 5.5 25.4 66.9
 Energy security 1.5 7.5 27.6 63.4
 Greenhouse gas emissions 4.7 18.7 36.8 39.8
 Other Environmental Impacts 4.0 18.4 40.8 36.8
 Cost of investment for energy
 infrastructure 3.5 12.2 49.8 34.6
 Cost of energy for consumers 0.2 3.0 27.6 69.2
 Technological feasibility 3.5 13.9 45.3 37.3
 Convenience to consumers 1.7 13.7 42.5 42.0
 Social acceptance of energy
 technology risks 7.2 19.7 43.5 29.6
 Job creation 1.7 9.5 30.3 58.5
 Time to deploy new technologies 3.2 12.2 38.8 45.8
 Foreign relations 7.2 24.6 40.0 28.1
 Safety 0.2 7.7 26.6 65.4
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First, the two most favored energy sources are wind and energy efficiency.3 These 
two energy sources, if cost effective, can help to increase both energy independence 
and energy security, and create new jobs. Technology needs to be in place, however, 
to make these solutions cost effective, although as seen below, respondents are 
much more willing to pay more for electricity (which is produced by wind turbines 
and is frequently the target of new efficiency technologies) than for gasoline. The 
respondents do not greatly support coal or any type of oil. Their concerns about 
food prices are reflected in a lack of support for corn ethanol, but this lack of support 
3  Greenberg (2009) and Bolsen and Cook (2008) summarize recent polling data that support many of the findings 
in Table 8: that Americans support wind and solar; conventional hydropower; and energy efficiency. Polling data also 
indicate split opinions about nuclear power and drilling for more oil on U.S. territory, whereas the results from Table 8 
suggest there is not a great deal of opposition to these energy sources. Farhar (1996) found that Americans consistently 
support renewable and energy efficiency. 
Table 7
Support for Energy Sources 
(% Respondents)
     Neither
  Unfamiliar Greatley  Support nor  Greatly
 Statements with opposed Opposed Oppose Support  Support
 Conventional Oil 3.2 4.7 10.4 31.8 38.1 11.7
 Unconventional Oil 10.0 4.5 8.2 37.1 28.4 11.9
 Coal 3.2 8.0 11.4 37.3 30.3 9.7
 Conventional
 hydroelectric power 4.7 1.0 1.0 18.2 48.5 26.6
 Nuclear 3.7 9.7 9.5 26.4 28.1 22.6
 Biomass 17.7 2.0 5.5 33.1 27.1 14.7
 Corn Ethanol 5.7 9.7 13.9 24.9 31.3 14.4
 Cellulosic ethanol 21.6 6.0 8.5 31.8 20.4 11.7
 Wind 1.2 0.5 2.0 11.4 29.4 55.5
 Biodiesel 9.2 2.0 6.2 31.1 32.8 18.7
 Concentrated solar plants 7.5 0.5 2.0 18.7 32.8 38.6
 Roof Top Photovoltaics 16.9 1.0 2.5 21.1 24.6 33.8
 Municipal waste 13.9 1.5 5.7 31.3 27.4 20.1
 Unconventional
 hydropower 8.5 1.0 4.0 22.9 33.1 30.6
 Deep geothermal energy 14.7 1.5 3.5 27.4 28.9 24.1
 Energy efficiency 2 0.5 1.3 8.5 30.1 57.6
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seems to have also produced negative attitudes towards cellulosic ethanol, bio-diesel, 
and biomass in general. Even with these differences of opinion among the list of 
energy sources, most of the respondents do not oppose any energy source. Thus, 
in addition to casting a wide net for placing responsibility for solving our energy 
problems, almost all options for solving our energy problems must be considered as 
well.  
Americans are fairly knowledgeable about a wide range of energy sources 
and policies, which is reflected in Tables 8 and 9.  There are, however, some areas 
where additional educational efforts are needed. Biomass is one area. The results 
also suggest that Americans could increase their familiarity with the ins and outs of 
important potential national energy policies, including a carbon tax, cap & trade, and 
a national renewable electricity portfolio standard. Relationships between energy 
use and existing environmental laws, such as the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air 
Act, need to be better explained to the public as well. 
Respondents were asked about how much they would support various energy 
policies that could help achieve national energy goals and promote favored energy 
sources. The results presented in Table 8 demonstrate that one substantial area of 
opinion that still separates Americans is related to the environment. Policies that 
could have direct environmental impacts have a wider range of opinion than those 
that do not. Flashpoints among the respondents include drilling in ANWR, opening 
Yucca Mountain, loosening federal coal surface mining regulations, and expanding 
offshore drilling for oil. The split is also seen with respect to a potential carbon tax 
and potential cap & trade legislation. Almost all the respondents support policies 
that could support new efficiency and renewable technologies, such as increases in 
federal energy technology R&D, federal energy efficiency standards, and renewable 
energy tax credits. In general, these results are consistent with recent polling results 
(Bolsen and Cook 2008). 
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Table 8
Support for Different Energy Policy Options 
(% Respondents)
     Neither
  Unfamiliar Greatley  Support nor  Greatly
 Statements with opposed Opposed Oppose Support  Support
 Drilling in ANWR 9.0 22.4 12.9 19.4 19.2 17.2
 Oil shale production 17.7 4.0 8.5 26.9 27.9 15.2
 Expanded Offshore Drilling 6.2 10.0 10.9 20.1 30.6 22.1
 Increase federal R&D for
 new energy technologies 4.5 1.2 3.0 17.7 37.3 36.3
 Loosen federal coal surface
 mining regulations 10.4 12.2 19.4 33.6 14.4 10.0
 National tax on carbon
 consumption 13.4 17.7 19.4 27.1 15 7.2
 National cap and trade for
 greenhouse gas emissions 16.2 13.4 8.2 31.1 22.4 8.7
 National renewable electricity
 portfolio standards 20.9 3.5 5.5 25.9 28.1 16.2
 Tax credits for renewable
 energy technologies 7.5 2.5 4.7 14.7 40.0 30.6
 Accelerated nuclear power
 plant approval processes 11.4 6.7 7.2 31.6 20.9 22.1
 OPEN Yucca Mountain
 nuclear waste repository
 without state approval 17.9 19.9 17.2 23.4 9.2 12.4
 Amend Clean Air Ac
  to force plants to remove
 carbon emissions  11.2 7.2 6.0 25.6 31.3 18.7
 Amend Clean Water Act
 to allow increase hot water
 discharges into water  16.4 14.7 15.4 24.9 15.7 12.9
 Federal appliance energy
 efficiency standards 9.0 3.7 5.2 25.4 32.6 24.1
 Federal requirements to allow
 new vehicles to run on
 gasoline and ethanol 9.2 9.7 7.7 26.9 29.6 16.9
 Increase funding of transfer
 programs to offset increases
 in energy prices from
 above policies 17.7 8.7 9.0 29.1 22.4 13.2
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As mentioned earlier, this survey is the first to explore attitudes and perspectives 
about energy from a portfolio approach. In addition to asking respondents about 
their opinions about energy policy goals, energy sources, and specific energy policies, 
respondents were also asked to construct their preferred energy source portfolios 
to produce electricity and to fuel the nation’s transportation sector. With respect to 
the electricity portfolio, respondents were given twelve different sources to produce 
electricity and asked to check cells in a matrix so that the mix of sources they chose 
to produce electricity would add up to approximately 100%. Table 9 presents these 
results. In some sense, the respondents’ portfolios are all over the board, suggesting 
that many did not understand the question’s guidelines, but a few important 
observations can be made. First, wind and energy efficiency are highly favored, along 
with concentrated solar and other renewables such as ocean energy, hydropower, and 
roof-top photovoltaics. Coal’s portion of the portfolio is low to non-existent, belying 
its mainstay status currently. There is little support for shale oil & tar sands and 
support for nuclear power is diverse, as could be expected. The results also suggest 
additional educational challenges, as it is technically impossible to meet all electricity 
needs with wind or roof-top photovoltaics or energy efficiency, for example.  
Table 9
Future Energy Source Preferences (% Respondents)
    10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
   Under to to to to to to to to Above
 Statements None 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 90%
 Coal 14.8 21.3 17.5 12.8 6.3 9 5.8 4 1.5 2.8 4.3
 Nuclear 15.3 12.5 11 11 6.3 10.8 8.8 5.5 4.8 4.5 9.5
 Natural gas 4.8 12.3 13.3 14 9 10.8 8.3 5.5 7.8 5.5 8.8
 Conventional
 hydropower 5 8.3 10.3 10.8 10.8 11.3 9.3 7.8 9.5 6 11
 Geothermal 12.3 12.5 10 7.8 7.5 9.3 12 7.3 7.8 6 7.5
 Waste/biomass 15.5 12.5 10 8.5 7 10.3 8.8 7.8 6.8 4.5 8.3
 Wind farms 2.3 5.8 9 8.5 5 11 8.8 10.5 9 10.3 19.8
 Concentrated
 Solar 4 6.8 9 10.5 4.8 9.5 7.3 9.5 10 8.8 19.8
 Shale oil & tar
 sands 22.1 17 13 8.5 7.5 9 4.5 6.3 4 3.3 4.8
 Roof top
 Photovoltaics 12 13.5 9.3 8.3 6.8 10.8 6.5 7.3 8.8 5 11.8
 Ocean 9.3 12.5 10 7.8 6.5 10 8.8 7.3 8.3 7.8 11.8
 Energy
 efficiency 3.5 7.3 4.8 6.8 4.5 9.8 6.3 4.8 9 13.5 29.8
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The results with respect to the transportation fuel portfolio are more 
straightforward. Respondents would like to see a drastic reduction in imported 
oil to be off-set by major increases in fuel efficiency and reductions in the demand 
for transportation. Bio-fuels are much less heavily weighted, although substantial 
fractions of the respondents see a significant role for these fuels. Many also see a 
growing place for new electric vehicles. 
Personal Responsibilities
Respondents indicated that citizens, presumably including themselves, should 
shoulder a good deal of responsibility for solving the nation’s energy problems. 
The respondents also indicated their support for renewable and energy efficiency 
technologies and for major reductions in transportation demand. This section 
explores to how respondents might be meeting their responsibilities. 
Table 11 presents a list of actions that Americans could be taking to reduce their 
energy use. The majority of respondents have already taken most of these actions. 
The most widely taken action is turning lights off when not in a room. Other popular 
actions include turning down the heater thermostat in the winter and up the AC 
thermostat in the summer, buying compact fluorescent lights, buying energy efficient 
appliances, and driving less. Americans are much less likely to take, and indeed more 
likely will not take, these actions: car pooling, walking or riding bikes more often, and 
Table 10
Future Energy Transportation Source Preferences (% Respondents)
    10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
   Under to to to to to to to to Above
 Statements None 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 90%
 Domestic oil 8 7 10.8 10.8 9 12.8 7 8 6 7.3 13.3
 Imported oil 33.3 24.1 12.8 11.5 5 5.8 1.8 1.3 2 0.5 2
 Corn ethanol 14.3 13.8 11.8 10.3 10 11.3 4.5 5.3 7.5 4 7.3
 Cellulosic
 ethanol 17.5 14 14.3 10.5 6.3 11.8 4.8 6.5 6 3.8 4.5
 Electricity 4.8 7.8 10.8 10.3 9.3 13.8 9 8.5 8.3 7.5 10
 Natural gas 10.3 9 16.3 9.5 8.8 10.3 7.3 6.3 7.3 7.8 7.3
 hydrogen
 fuel cells 10 7 11.8 10.8 8.8 9.8 8.8 7.8 9.8 6.5 9
 Biodiesel 12 7.8 15.5 11 10.5 8.3 7.5 7.5 6 7 6.8
 Fuel efficiency 3.5 3.5 9.8 5 5.8 8 5.5 9 10 10.8 29.1
 Reduce
 transportation
 demand 10.3 6.8 9 6 8 10 5.3 7 8.8 8.8 20.1
TONN, GIBSON, SMITh, TUCK 232010
living in smaller homes.4 These three actions can be seen as tying together with their 
desire for suburban living in detached single family homes and the resultant urban 
sprawl that makes one very reliant upon personal automobiles. Significant changes 
in home preferences, land uses, and mass transit availabilities and quality would be 
needed to help reduce transportation demand by the levels suggested in Table 10. 
Increasing prices for electricity and gasoline can also work to reduce demand for 
both. Table 12 suggests that many respondents are willing to pay more for electricity 
per month to help them achieve the renewable dominated portfolio expressed in 
Table 10. This is not the case, however, with respect to gasoline as Table 13 shows. 
Over half of the respondents are not willing to pay any more for gasoline to help 
achieve their transportation portfolios. There is virtually no support for increasing 
gasoline prices beyond two dollars per gallon. Thus, the price of gasoline is a very 
important pocketbook issue for Americans, with electricity much less so. 
4  Recent polling data support the findings in Table 11 with respect to driving less, buying more fuel efficient vehicles, 
carpooling, and in-home temperature control (Bolsen and Cook 2008). 
Table 11
Actions in Response to Energy Issue Concerns (% Respondents)
  have not  May
  heard of Will not consider  Planning on have already
 Statements before take taking  taking taken
 Drive Less 0.0 12.7 10.0 12.7 5.5 59.2
 Buy more fuel
 efficient vehicles 0.0 9.5 20.6 22.4 23.6 23.9
 Car pool 0.7 32.1 23.1 14.9 5.0 24.1
 Walk or ride bike
 more often 0.5 25.4 25.6 13.9 5.7 28.9
 Buy compact
 fluorescent lights 1.0 5.7 11.4 8.5 8.0 65.4
 Buy energy efficient
 appliances 1.0 2.2 7.5 10.4 14.9 63.9
 Turn lights off
 when not in room 0.0 1.2 3.0 3.2 5.0 87.6
 Live in a smaller
 home 2.0 26.6 16.4 11.2 7.2 36.6
 Turn Thermostat
 down in winter 1.0 4.2 7.0 9.5 7.5 70.9
 Turn thermostat
 up in summer 3.7 5.7 6.5 9.0 8.7 66.4
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Finally, respondents were asked three questions dealing with relationships 
between energy sources and residential issues. First, respondents were asked if they 
would be willing to have a new nuclear power plant located within 10 miles of their 
homes. Forty-two percent reported yes, fifty-eight percent said no. Along these lines, 
respondents were asked if they would be willing to have a tall wind turbine located 
in their neighborhoods. Seventy-eight percent said yes and only nine percent said 
no (the reminder suggested that wind turbines could not be installed where they 
Table 12
Amount Per Month to Achieve Preferred Energy Source of Electricity 
(% Respondents)
 $0  19.9
 $1 - -$5 20.4
 $6 - $10 17.4
 $11 - $15 10.4
 $16 - $20 10.2
 More than $20 11.9
 This question is not applicable to me 9.7
Table 13
Amount Per Gallon of Gasoline to Achieve Preferred Energy Transportation Source
(% Respondents)
 $0  54.7
 $1  17.9
 $2  16.2
 $3  2.0
 $4  0.5
 More than $4 1.7
 This question is not applicable to me 7.0
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live).5 Finally, respondents were asked if they would be willing to let homes in their 
neighborhoods have solar panels on their roofs. Ninety-six percent said yes. These 
are good results for renewables but suggest that siting new nuclear power plants in 
populated regions is still a politically charged issue. 
Conclusions
This paper reports the results of a nationally representative survey of Americans 
on their attitudes and perspectives on national energy policy. The respondents agree 
that energy is an important problem and place blame throughout society. They also 
expect almost all sectors of society to shoulder responsibilities for solving the nation’s 
energy problems. 
Most respondents believe that energy policies should achieve a wide range of 
goals. Some may favor environmental goals, some may favor economic issues, and 
a very few may not believe that energy is an issue worth worrying about.  One can 
tentatively conclude, however, that there may not exist in substantial numbers within 
public the seven clearly defined Perspectives identified in previous research (and 
described in Appendix B). 
Americans are placing great hope on wind and other renewable technologies and 
energy efficiency. These solutions do not engender the political disputes seen with 
oil, coal, and nuclear power. The exception is biomass, which does not receive much 
support amongst the respondents. Corn ethanol in particular is seen as leading to 
increasing energy prices and the respondents will not support any increases in prices 
at the pump or in the grocery store to achieve any national energy goals. 
Educational issues abound. Many respondents reported a lack of knowledge 
about biomass technologies and important potential national energy policies, such 
as cap & trade and carbon taxes. Also, when asked about their preferred portfolios, 
many respondents envision meeting electricity and transportation fuel needs with 
technically infeasible solutions. 
5  These results are consistent with other recent research and polling results which shows a diversity of opinion about the 
siting of nuclear power plants (Greenberg 2009; Ansolabehere and Konisky 2009; Bolsen and Cook 2008) and support for 
wind turbines (Firestone et al. 2009). 
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APPENDIX A
Table A1  
Demographics 
(% respondents, N=402)
   Between Greater
 Age Less than 31 31 and 50 than 51    
  16.9 37.4 45.5    
 Gender Female Male     
   53.5 46.6     
 Ethnicity   African Pacific
 Race Indian Asian American Islander White hispanic Other
   0.5 1.5 5.2 .5 85.8 5.0 1.5
 Number of
 Children 0 1 to 2 3 to 4 5 to 6 7 or more  
   32.3 43.3 18.6 4.2 1.4  
 Number of
 grandchildren 0 1 to 2 3 to 4 5 to 6 7 or more  
   66.2 15.4 7.4 5.5 5.0  
 Domestic
 Status Single Married Co-habitating Divorced Widowed Other 
   16.9 57.5 8.5 11.4 4.5 0.7 
       Some Post
  Less than  Associate  College post college
 Education high School high School Degree Some college degree college degree
   2 19.2 10.7 29.9 19.9 6.5 11.9
 Employment  Work Work part-
 Status Student full-time time Disabled Unemployed Retired Other
   6.2 42.0 12.2 4.2 10.9 19.2 5.2
 household Under $20,000 to $35,000 to $58,000 to $95,000 and
 Income $20,000 $35,000 $58,000 $95,000 above  
   14.4 20.6 25.9 25.1 13.9  
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APPENDIX B
The seven Perspectives included in the previous research (Tonn et al. 2009) are these:
•	 America-Firsters – The primary goal of this Perspective is energy 
independence;  
•	 Bottom-Liners – This Perspective is composed of industrialists who prefer 
a secure and low-cost national energy portfolio, regardless of its GhG 
emissions or energy import profile;  
•	 Entrepreneurs – This Perspective represents American marketplace 
ingenuity in solving our energy problems;  
•	 Environmentalists – The primary goal of this Perspective is to reduce 
GhG emissions;  
•	 Individualists – The primary goal of this Perspective is to maintain the 
high quality of life in the United States;  
•	 Politicians – The dominant theme of this Perspective is to be as 
accommodating to as many interests as possible in the implementation of 
national energy policies;  
•	 Technophiles – This Perspective advocates a ‘big engineering’ approach to 
achieving energy independence and GhG emissions.
National energy portfolios for the year 2030 were developed for each Perspective, 
as illustrated in Figure A.1. Notice that there are commonalities across perspectives 
in the areas of biomass and nuclear energy. The first column represents a baseline 
forecast prepared by the U.S. Energy Information Administration. 
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Health as an Economic Engine:
Public Policy Implications
David M. Mirvis, MD
“… It is still not unusual to find that those who make financial decisions 
about allocation to health think about health in general terms only as a 
good thing, but not grasping the importance of investing in a healthy pop-
ulation as a mechanism for stimulating or promoting economic growth.”
-- UN Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, 2001
Health and wealth are profoundly interconnected.  Countries and individuals 
with higher average incomes have better overall health conditions than do poorer 
ones (Preston 1975).  For example, overall infant mortality, life expectancy, and gen-
eral health improve as per capita income in a nation rises.  A 1% increase in per capita 
income in developing countries may result in as many as 33,000 fewer childhood 
deaths each year (Commission on Macroeconomics and Health 2001).  Within na-
tions, including the United states, people with higher incomes and better overall 
socioeconomic conditions have, on average, better health outcomes than do less af-
fluent persons.  Men in the United states with family incomes in the top 5% of the 
income distribution have life expectancies that are 25% longer than do those in the 
bottom 5% (sorlie, Backlund, & Keller 1995).
This relation is commonly considered only in the direction from wealth to 
health.  That is, better personal or national economic conditions will lead to better 
personal or population health.  More recently, the impact of the reverse direction of 
this health-economics relationship has gained attention.  in this newer model, health 
is an ‘economic engine’.  That is, better health leads to and may, in certain cases, be a 
necessary prerequisite for economic development (Bloom & Canning 2000; Com-
mission on Macroeconomics and Health 2001; Mirvis & Bloom 2008).
These bidirectional relationships between health and wealth have been recog-
nized and incorporated into policy by numerous international organizations.  The 
World Health Organization (WHO) through its Commission on Macroeconomics 
and Health (CMH) (CMH 2001), the international Monetary Fund, the European 
investment Bank, and the World Bank have all included health promotion as a spe-
cific policy objective in meeting their goals of poverty reduction.  Most recently, the 
European region of WHO (2008a) stated that “beyond its intrinsic value, improved 
health contributes to social well-being through its impact on economic development, 
competitiveness, and productivity” and that “high-performing health systems con-
tribute to economic development and wealth.”
Much of the interest in this model has been directed toward developing nations. 
The implications of this model of ‘health as an economic engine’ for public policy in 
developed nations, including the United states, are commonly underestimated, and 
health is generally not included in their economic development plans.  in this re-
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view1, we will examine the evidence that supports the ‘health as an economic engine’ 
paradigm and argue for the importance of these concepts to public policy within the 
U.s.
Impact of Health on Personal and Family Finances
The impact of health on wealth can be examined from two broad economic per-
spectives.  First, the relation can be evaluated on the microeconomic level, that is, 
the relation between personal and family health status and personal, household, and 
business income.  second, the macroeconomic view evaluates the relationship be-
tween country or regional population health status and income levels or economic 
growth rates.  Both have public policy implications, and the evidence for each will be 
reviewed.
Poor health has substantial microeconomic effects.  The costs of poor health 
include the direct costs to the health care system of prevention, diagnosis and treat-
ment; the costs of loss of labor productivity; and the intangible costs of, for exam-
ple, the psychological impacts of illness on patients and their families.  These occur 
through numerous channels, including the direct impacts on wages and earnings and 
the indirect effects of reduced educational attainment and skills.  Additional impacts 
include the special effects on children.
Health Care Costs 
High health care costs, including the costs of insurance and out-of-pocket costs, 
represent major drags on the microeconomy.  According to the Millman index (Mill-
man 2009), the total health care cost to a typical American family of four in 20009 
was $16,771, representing 32% of the median U.s. income.  increases in insurance 
premiums and out-of-pocket costs for health care have outstripped increases in 
wages (Kaiser Family Foundation 2009a), and increases in employer costs for em-
ployer sponsored coverage may reduce future wage increases.  A December 2009 poll 
(Kaiser Family Foundation 2009b) indicated that 30% of Americans had problems 
paying medical bills and that 16% had problems paying other bills because of medi-
cal care bills.  These health care costs are a major, if not the major cause of personal 
bankruptcies in the United states (Himmelstein, Warren, Thorne, & Woolhandler 
2005).
Wages and Earnings  
The quality and duration of life directly impact a person’s ability to generate 
income.  Better health with better quality of life may increase income by raising the 
economic output of each year of life, that is, by increasing productivity by increas-
ing “vigor, strength, attentiveness, stamina, creativity and so forth” (Howitt 2005). 
improved health that prolongs working years promotes income growth by extending 
the duration of economic productivity.  indeed, illness or death is the main cause of 
1  The review is intended to include representative studies and not to provide an exhaustive, critical review of the literature. 
For a more complete literature review, the reader is referred to suhrcke et al. (2005).
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new or increasing poverty in the world (World Bank 2006).
Numerous studies in the United states and other developed nations have quan-
tified the impact of illness on wages.  U.s. studies suggest that poor health reduces 
wages by as much as 48%, with the greatest impact among those who are continu-
ously in poor health and when chronic diseases emerge among those under 50 years 
of age (suhrcke et al. 2005).
Labor Market Participation and Retirement  
Poor health impacts both entry into and participation in the labor market.  Na-
tional surveys have reported that one-fourth of workers have at least one workday 
per month in which they are either absent from work or exhibit reduced productiv-
ity at work because of a health condition (Burton et al. 2004).  One study reported 
that, in the United states in 2003, workers took 407 million sick days and that ab-
senteeism because of health issues accounts for the equivalent of approximately two 
million full-time equivalent employees per year (Davis et al. 2005).  Diabetics, for 
example, have absenteeism rates 1.9 workdays per diabetic worker per year greater 
than nondiabetics (American Diabetes Association 2008).
Poor employee health has an even greater impact by increasing presenteeism, 
that is, reducing productivity when at work.  Over three-fourths of the business 
losses due to pain (stewart et al 2003a) and depression (stewart et al 2003a) are 
due to presenteeism.  The overall economic impact of absenteeism and presenteeism 
from common chronic diseases exceeded $1 trillion in 2003 (Devol & Bedroussian 
2007).
in addition, poor health and premature death increases employee turnover, with 
high replacement costs and loss of the benefits of long-term experience.  A pre-em-
ployment history of a single hospitalization due to a chronic illness correlates with a 
20% increase in early job turnover (Kolstad & Olsen 1999).  Unhealthy workers also 
tend to retire early, before they are eligible for full pensions (suhrcke et al. 2005), re-
ducing personal income and increasing the loss of trained and experienced workers.
A sudden change in health status, or a ‘health shock’, can have severe implica-
tions for workforce participation.  in one report from West Germany (suhrcke et al. 
2005), a health shock increased the probability of converting from full-time employ-
ment to part-time employment by 60% and of leaving the workforce by 200%.
Businesses are also impacted as illness increases employee benefit costs.  Health 
benefits are the most rapidly growing segment of employee benefits, with a rate of 
growth exceeding the rate of growth of wages by almost than 3 to 1 (28% vs. 10%) 
since 1991 (United states General Accounting Office 2006).  Poor employee health 
may be expected to increase these costs, by increasing direct outlays for care and by 
increasing risk ratings for insurance coverage.
Impacts on Children
  Poor childhood health may limit a child’s future economic productivity by di-
rect effects of health and indirectly through the relation between poor health and low 
Mirvis 332010
educational attainment.  in addition, poor health reduces the incentive for pursuing 
education by reducing the number of years over which the investment in education 
provides economic returns.  One additional chronic disease at age 16 is associated 
with a five percentage point reduction in the probability of employment at age 42 
(Case, Fertig, & Paxson 2005).
inhibited growth in utero and early-life are associated with a range of negative 
adult outcomes, including high blood pressure, reduced respiratory function, schizo-
phrenia, and other chronic diseases (Heckman 2007), all of which reduce labor mar-
ket productivity in adults.  raising the average birth weight of low birth weight ba-
bies to the mean birth weight of all U.s. babies would increase their lifetime earnings 
by 26% (Behrman & rosenzweig 2004).
Poor child health also impacts education (Low et al. 2005).  Lower education-
al attainment is linked to both lower adult economic productivity and lower adult 
health status which, in turn, also reduces wages, etc.  Unhealthy children are not pre-
pared for school, miss more days of school, and learn less when in school.  Children 
in poor health have a 25% lower likelihood of being enrolled compared to healthy 
children (suhrcke et al. 2005) and a 1% increase in average longevity is associated 
with a 1% increase in length of schooling (Kalemi-Ozcan, ryder, & Weil 2000). 
Low birth weight children have a 79% lower probability of graduating from high 
school in a timely manner and are less likely to have managerial jobs than are others 
(strully & Conley 2004).
The impact of ill health also span generations.  The health of the children impacts 
the productivity of parents.  Parents commonly miss work to care for sick children. 
in 2001, approximately 20% of the workforce reported missing work because of an 
illness in the family, with an average loss of 4.5 days per person per year (rhoades 
2004).
On the other hand, parental illness may decrease emotional as well as fiscal sup-
port for children.  Children commonly miss school or drop out of school to enter 
the job market, reducing later economic productivity.  in one study in the United 
Kingdom, for example, death of a parent before the age of 8 years was correlated with 
a significant reduction in cognitive ability through the age of 15 years and a lower 
probability of obtaining advanced educational degrees (richards & Wadsworth 
2004).  in addition, poor parental health commonly results in childhood malnutri-
tion as family income and ability to obtain food fall (steinberg, Johnson, schierhout, 
& Nagawa 2002).
Impacts of Population Health on Economic Growth
Poor health of the community may also limit macroeconomic growth through 
many paths (Mirvis & Bloom 2008).  At a basic level, better population health re-
flects the improved health and, hence, the economic productivity of many individu-
als.  The aggregation of these individual effects to the community level translates into 
better macroeconomic performance.
However, the overall impact exceeds the simple sum of the effects on individu-
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als.  Poor overall population health also impairs the economic well-being of the en-
tire community or nation beyond the cumulative impacts on individuals and specific 
businesses.  The aggregate or macroeconomic effects of improved health are large in 
magnitude, and they impact everyone in a community - not just those who are ill.
Expanding health systems directly promotes local economic growth through the 
production of goods and services and through capital investment.  indeed, currently 
almost 16% of all goods and services produced in the United states, that is, the gross 
domestic product (GDP), is linked to health care.
This direct impact is dwarfed by the size and implications of the indirect macro-
economic impacts of health conditions.  Poor health reduces the personal savings that 
provides capital for investment.  Citizens in poor health spend more of their available 
funds for current health care needs and are concerned less with future needs.  A ten-
year increase in average population life span is associated with a 4.5 percentage point 
increase in national savings rates (Bloom, Canning, & Graham 2003).
Poorer population health also discourages outside investment largely by predict-
ing the absence of a capable and productive workforce.  One additional year of aver-
age life expectancy is associated with a 7% increase in foreign investment (Alsan, 
Bloom, & Canning 2005).  The fall in foreign investment reduces capital, technology 
transfer, and access to global markets.  in addition, poor population health limits the 
likelihood of successful implementation of new technology if it became available.
Poor population health may also disrupt various social structures and functions, 
leading to lower economic growth.  Governmental funds are reduced as tax collec-
tions fall, and the remaining communal funds are diverted to health-related services 
and away from other needed community and infrastructure projects.  Community 
cohesion and social capital are also lost as illness disrupts family and societal struc-
tures.  in developing countries, health shocks have led to general dissatisfaction with 
government resulting in political instability and even to civil war (Haacker 2004).
A final powerful long-term macroeconomic effect of health on economic devel-
opment is mediated through the association between poor health conditions and 
high birth rates (Bloom, Canning, & sevilla 2003a).  Less healthy societies have 
higher birth rates than do healthier ones, possibly as a means to compensate for high 
infant mortality rates.  This, in turn, reduces parental investment per child in, for ex-
ample, education, and reduces per capita economic development.  improved health, 
in contrast, leads to lower birth weights that increases per child support and may also 
allow greater participation of women in education and in labor force.  A 1 percentage 
point growth in the population under age 15 years is associated with a 0.4% reduc-
tion in per capita GDP, and as much of one-third of the rapid economic growth of 
east Asia during the late twentieth century can be attributed to this ‘demographic 
dividend’ (Bloom, Canning, & sevilla 2003a).
Quantifying the Economic Impacts of Population Health  
Numerous studies have estimated the economic value of improved population 
health.  While the absolute amounts and the proportion of economic growth attrib-
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utable to health vary widely from study to study, they demonstrate that health is a 
robust and substantial predictor of future economic growth.
several types of studies have reported estimates of the role of population health. 
Historic studies have documented the contribution of health improvements on na-
tional economies over time.  in one classic study, Nobel laureate robert Fogel (1997) 
estimated that improvements in nutrition accounted for 30% of Britain’s income 
growth in the 200 years from 1790 to 1979, as result of both a fall in population that 
was too malnourished to work and an increase in productivity of those who were 
working.  More recently, similar studies have estimated that the value of the increase 
in longevity from 1965 to 1995 to be the equivalent of 28% of the overall growth in 
per capita income in the U.s. over that period (Becker, Philipson, & soares 2003).
Cross-national studies have shown that differences in health conditions among 
nations contribute substantially to the differences in their economic conditions. 
Based on estimates from several sources, the WHO (CMH 2001) estimated that 
the 28 year difference in the life expectancy between a typical low-income and a typi-
cal high-income country is responsible for 1.6 percentage points per year in annual 
economic growth rates.  These impacts become very large, especially when compared 
to the average rate of increase in GDP among all nations of 2.3% between 2004 and 
2005 and when compounded over many years.
Other cross national studies have estimated the relative potency of health and 
other factors that promote economic development.  Most notably, the impact of 
health on economic development may be as great as the impact of education.  For 
example, the predicted  return on investment for childhood immunization is 18% by 
2020, a value exceeding the 11-13% return for higher education (Bloom, Canning, 
& Weston 2005).
Others have used labor market data to assess the impact of improved health 
on labor market productivity.  results have estimated that a one-year increase in a 
population’s average life expectancy leads to a 4% increase in overall economic out-
put (Bloom, Canning, & sevlla 2003b), and that health improvements from 1970 
through 1999 increased the net annual total labor market value of human capital by 
$1.48 trillion (Battacharya & Lakdawalla 2005).
Finally, many economic studies have estimated the value of improving popula-
tion health to national economies using ‘willingness to pay’ models.  These are based 
on the concept that the economic value of a product can be measured by the amount 
a consumer is willing to pay for it or to avoid it.  Thus, the economic value of im-
proved health may be estimated by the amount that people would pay to avoid ill 
health.  This approach includes the important intrinsic value of health to people 
and to society, in addition to its role in producing goods and services as measured 
by GDP.
The results document the large economic value of improved health to society. 
The institute of Medicine has suggested that each additional quality adjusted year of 
life in the United states has an economic value of $160,000 (institute of Medicine 
2003).  Using these methods, “the total lifetime value (willingness to pay) of these 
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gains [in life expectancy] for an individual born in 1995 correspond to more than 3 
times the value of GDP per capita” and “correspond to permanent increases of more 
than 10% in annual income in the Us….” (Becker, Philipson, & soares 2003).
The economic gains from new health care interventions are also substantial. 
They are multiplied as current health advances impact future as well as current pop-
ulations.  Estimates suggest that health improvements from all sources and at all ages 
over the 20th century yielded additional life years to newborns that have a present 
discounted value of $2 million per person (Murphy & Topol 2005).
Implications of the Health as an Economic Engine Model
The ‘health as an economic engine” model differs substantially from the classical 
model in which economic growth drives health improvement.  The classical model 
argues that primary and direct investment in financial and business infrastructure 
will improve health, while the newer paradigm argues for direct investment in health 
and that economic improvements may follow.  Health is not simply a valued output 
or a consumption good resulting from health care expenditures; it is an important 
input or an investment in economic development.  And whereas the classical model 
suggests, as summarized Bloom and Canning (2000), that “health is a luxury only 
rich countries can afford,” the newer model suggests that health is what helps make 
countries rich.
Health as Human Capital  
The appreciation that health is a major contributor to economic growth repre-
sents an extension of the concept of human capital (Becker 1993).  Human capital 
includes, as summarized by Adam smith (1776), “all of the useful abilities of people” 
that lead to “real income”.  According to Nobel laureate Theodore schultz (1961), 
its magnitude, although more difficult to measure than physical capital and not in-
cluded in most measures of overall economic power, is “vastly larger than all other 
forms of wealth taken together”.
Economist Michael Grossman (1972) suggested that health is a long-lasting and 
durable form of human capital which produces, as its product, “healthy time” that 
increases productivity to stimulate economic growth.  People are born with a certain 
level of health capital that declines with age and with disease; it can be increased, as 
with other forms of capital, with “purposive investment”, that is, through interven-
tions that increase the length and quality of life.
Traditional studies have focused on education as the primary measure of human 
capital.  The impact of health on productivity at the individual and at the communal 
levels, as described above, places health as an equivalent determinant of human capi-
tal.  The WHO (CMH 2001) concluded that “health is the basis for job productiv-
ity, the capacity to learn in school, and the capability to grow intellectually, physically, 
and emotionally.  in economic terms, health and education are the two cornerstones 
of human capital.…”  Health is thus “an asset”.
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Health Care as an Investment  
if health is a form of capital, expenditures to increase the stock of health capital 
are investments.  This is then analogous to investments aimed at increasing oth-
er forms of capital, including physical and financial capital, required for economic 
growth.
investing in health may have a substantial economic return and are thus good 
investments.  Devol and Bedrossian (2007) estimated that realistic improvements 
in prevention and treatment for common chronic conditions would add $905 billion 
to the U.s. economy annually.  The costs of new technology for treating myocardial 
infarction, low birth weight infants, depression, and cataracts, while high, are much 
smaller than the economic gains resulting from the resulting improvement in health 
status (Cutler & McClellan 2001).  One study (Goetzel, Hawkins, Ozminkowski, & 
Wang 2003) estimated that outpatient treatment costs for 10 common health condi-
tions were only 11% of the productivity costs of these conditions; that is, treatment 
results in a return on investment of 9:1, a substantial ‘treatment dividend’.  in con-
trast, activities that impair health reduce health capital and have negative economic 
returns; cigarette smoking has an economic cost of up to $222 per pack (viscusi & 
Hersch 2007).
Virtuous Cycles and Traps  
This role of health as an economic engine extends rather than supplants the con-
ventional role of economic development as a precursor to improved health.  The two 
models interact to result in either a ‘health-poverty trap’ or a ‘virtuous cycle’ (Bloom 
& Canning 2000).  On one hand, poor health limits economic growth that, in turn, 
prevents improvements in health.  A health shock to a family or a community may 
result in an economic ‘trap’ that is difficult to escape.  On the other hand, improved 
health contributes to greater economic development, with the resulting increase in 
wealth contributing to a further increase in health that leads, parri passu, to more 
economic development, etc., to produce a virtuous cycle.  These cycles were described 
by Gunnar Myrdal (1952) as “if any one of the composite factors in the plane of 
living, say, the health conditions of the population, is induced to change, this will 
cause a change in all other factors, too, and will start a process of interaction, where 
the change in one factor will continuously be supported by the reactions of all the 
other factors, and so forth.  The whole system will be moving in the direction of the 
primary change, but much farther.”
While one could, based on this virtuous cycle model, intervene in a region with 
both health and economic poverty with either a primary economic or a primary 
health intervention, a health intervention may be more beneficial.  An unhealthy 
workforce may be unable to support the needs of an economic industrial stimulus. 
As described by schultz (1961), when investment in infrastructure is not balanced 
by investment in human capital, “human capabilities do not stay abreast of physical 
capital, and they become limiting factors in economic growth.”
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Health as an Intrinsic Goal  
The above arguments make a compelling case that improving health is an in-
strumental goal, that is, it leads to another, intrinsic goal – economic development. 
improving health remains a critically important intrinsic goal in itself.  As stated in 
the Alma Ata declaration of the World Health Organization (WHO, 1976), “the 
Conference strongly reaffirms that health … is a fundamental human right.…”  No-
bel laureate Amartya sen summarized this role (sen 1987) by stating that “value of 
the living standard lies in the living, and not in the possession of commodities.”
Applications to the United States
As described above, much of the research underpinning these concepts and con-
clusions are based on conditions in developing nations with poor health outcomes 
and low economic productivity.  To be relevant to the United states (and other de-
veloped nations), several conditions must be met.
Unhealthy and Poor Regions and Populations in the United States  
Bringing this knowledge to bear on health and wealth within the U.s. depends, 
in some large degree, on the similarities between regions in the United states and the 
underdeveloped nations.  various studies have shown that segments of the United 
states population have health statistics that are comparable to those in underde-
veloped nations.  rural African Americans, especially those in the southern states 
(including Tennessee) have higher young and middle age mortality rates than do 
people in the worst OECD nations (Murray, Kulkami, Michaud, & Ezzati 2005). 
The range in life expectancy among groups within the U.s. exceeds the difference 
between healthy and unhealthy nations, making results of international studies rel-
evant.
in addition, mapping studies have shown that unhealthy places tend to cluster 
into regional patterns within the United states that correlate with poor economic 
conditions (Cossman, Cossman, Jackson-Belli, & Cosby 2003).  For example, of 
the 240 counties of the Mississippi river Delta, 63% have life expectancies that are 
among the lowest 20% of all counties in the United states, and 55% have poverty 
rates that are among the highest 20% in the nation (Cosby & Bowser 2008).  Hence, 
the relation between health and economics in underdeveloped nations is relevant in 
the U.s.
Determinants of Health and Economic Growth in the U.S.  
Although the concepts underlying the role of health in economic development 
appear to apply to any region, there are reasons to be cautious.  Health and wealth 
dynamics may differ in a poor region of a relatively wealthy nation than in a poor 
nation as a whole.  The poor in a wealthy nation may be better off than even more 
relatively affluent people in a poor nation.  in addition, the relative wealth and health 
of much of the remainder of the nation may buffer the impact of health on economic 
development in any one region, so that the characteristics of the nation as a whole 
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may dominate over the features of the region alone.  For example, the flows of re-
sources, information, and technology from richer to poorer regions within a nation 
may be substantially better than flows between nations.
in addition, the mechanisms that link health to economic growth may be dif-
ferent.  Much of the improvement in health in developing nations has been related 
to expanding the basic public health infrastructure that is already present in many 
of the poorest regions of an otherwise wealthy nation; in richer nations the role of 
social deprivation may be more potent than material ones (Marmot 2002).  Whereas 
the health challenges in developing nations center on infectious diseases, maternal 
and perinatal disease and nutritional deficiency, those of developed nations center 
on chronic diseases.
studies have demonstrated the relation to remain among industrialized nations. 
For example, in a sample of 26 developed nations, a 10% reduction in cardiovascular 
disease mortality between 1960 and 2000 was associated with a 1% greater increase 
in GDP (suhrcke et al. 2005).  And, among developed nations, international differ-
ences in health spending account for more of the difference in economic develop-
ment that do education (16-27% vs. 3%) (Beraldo. Montolio, & Turati 2005).
Implications for Public Policy
These findings demonstrate that improved individual and population health 
is a powerful engine of individual and national economic development.  The large 
potential impact of health improvement on economic conditions and growth have 
substantial implications for both business and government.
Role of Businesses  
For businesses, incentives for employers to provide health insurance to employ-
ees are commonly based on the desire to promote recruitment and retention, to take 
advantage of certain tax advantages of providing benefits rather than direct wages, 
and, perhaps, to advance the ethical value of promoting well-being (Fronstin & Wer-
ntz 2004).
The ‘health as an economic engine’ model extends the rationale with a business 
investment case.  Providing health care to employees is an investment in human capi-
tal that creates added value for the firm as increased productivity, analogous to de-
veloping other forms of capital and infrastructure, rather than being simply or solely 
a benefit expense.  Examples of successful interventions by employers to improve 
productivity by improving employee health have been described (Burton & Conti 
2000).  in addition, businesses may gain from the community-wide increase in eco-
nomic development that may result from investments in population health.
However, the role of businesses in promoting population health has been limited 
(Easterlin 2006) by several features.  These include the delay between health inter-
ventions and the economic gain, the uncertainty of a positive return, and externali-
ties.  A specific company, for example, can gain from the investment of others as a 
‘free rider’ even if it does not contribute.
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Role of Public Policy  
Public policy interventions then become critical in taking advantage of the role 
of health in economic development.  indeed, the positive relation between GDP and 
health is linked to effective governance.  The WHO Commission on social Deter-
minants of Health (WHO 2008c) has emphasized that “nations that have high life 
expectancies and low infant mortality rates are also those where … government lead-
ers and policies address the key social determinants of health.”
Government intervention in health has been promoted or justified by several 
compelling although, at times, contentious arguments.  WHO has promulgated the 
case that health care is a basic human right with primary responsibility falling largely 
on the government.  A constitutional right to health care has been argued to exist in 
the U.s. (Daniels 2002; Gosten 2000a), although this has not accepted by the U.s. 
supreme Court except in certain special circumstances (Curran 1998).
Governments also intervene to protect the rights of others and of those not com-
petent to act on their own behalf, to protect people from harming themselves (Gos-
ten 2000b), to promote social justice and equity (Gosten & Powers, 2006; Geier 
2008), and to correct for market failures related to health care (Cutler 2002).  some 
argue that interventions that improve population health, such as clean air, are “public 
goods” that cannot be denied to some in a society; government intervention is needed 
because, as in the case of all public goods, there may be little incentive for individuals 
to act on their own rather than benefit as free riders (shaeffer et al. 2009).  Others 
(ryan et al. 2008) raise the role of government to an affirmative obligation – not just 
an authority – on governments to act to improve public health.
Public policies aimed at promoting health have been more widely developed in 
other Western countries than in the United states.  This relative lack of attention 
may reflect basic differences the attitudes of governments toward health.  such dif-
ferences, as noted by ethicist Daniel Callahan (Callahan & Wasunna 2008), reflect 
differences in a “way of life”, “are deeply embedded”, and express “different ways of 
looking at health care and the relationship between the individual and society”.
The macroeconomic impacts of health outlined above provide another compel-
ling reason for public policy support of health.  societal support of health care is 
warranted not only because of the communal and humanitarian responsibilities to 
promote well-being, etc., but because the economic consequences of health improve-
ment are reaped by the community as a whole.  Governmental support of health care 
becomes directly analogous to governmental support and subsidy of other forms 
of infrastructure development that promote community business and economic de-
velopment.  This argument may be most potent among nations, such as the United 
states, that have an entrepreneurial rather than a social rights basis for their health 
care systems.  indeed, the economic argument for health improvement has been 
identified as a potent force for policy makers in developed nations (WHO 2008b).
The public policy approach is particular important for children and the poor. 
Deaths in childhood or young adulthood, before individuals enter the economic 
market as productive workers, represent large, long-term economic losses as the 
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gains from investments in education, training, and development are forgone.  This 
impact has been recognized as far back as 1842 when Edwin Chadwick (1842) ar-
gued for more spending on sanitation because it would reduce the economic loss 
created by the death of poor children.
The poor are a second population of special public policy interest.  They have the 
highest disease burden, are less likely to have the resources to participate in voluntary 
interventions to improve health, and exhibit greater impacts of poor health because 
of their greater reliance on physical labor.  As noted by Angus Deaton (2002), “when 
low income and poor health go together, the poor are doubly deprived and thus have 
a greater claim on our attention than is warranted from their incomes alone.”  studies 
suggest that if life expectancy in 31 poor counties had been 10% higher in 1990 and 
if this difference continued to 2025, there would be 30 million fewer people living 
in poverty (Bloom, Canning, Graham, & sevilla 2006).  Based on these arguments, 
international organizations including the OECD, WHO, and the World Bank have 
adopted a ‘pro-poor’ approach to reducing poverty in developing nations.
several broad categories of public policies to enhance health have been suggested 
(Lurie 2002; McGinnis et al. 2002).  These include policies that alter the scope and 
emphasis of the overall policy program (including promoting intersectoral policies to 
improve health with the involvement of multiple government); policies that promote 
broad sociocultural improvement; policies that focus on the disadvantaged such as 
the poor, mothers, young children; and policies that directly impact health care ser-
vices.
Examples of successful public policy interventions have been described (Kohn 
2009).  These include bans on cigarette smoking in public places; free screening pro-
grams to detect and treat sexually transmitted diseases; promoting healthy nutrition 
by requiring disclosure of nutritional information in restaurants, banning of harmful 
food contents (e.g., transfats), and providing incentives for neighborhood stores to 
carry fresh fruits and vegetables; and building safe, health-promoting physical en-
vironments.  it has also been shown that a 10% increase in public health spending 
leads to a 7% reduction in infant mortality and a 4% reduction in cardiovascular 
mortality, both major causes of reduced economic productivity in the U.s. (Mays & 
smith 2009).  Enrollment in the Low income Home Energy Assistance Program 
that subsidizes energy costs for the poor is associated with improved child nutrition 
and growth (Frank et al. 2006).  And interventions such as extended early childhood 
programs may result in higher rates of full-time employment and lower rates of be-
ing on public assistance as adults (reynolds et al. 2007).
The application of this model of economic development, however, is not without 
challenges.  The economic impact of on health intervention may not be realized for 
many years; when health improves, income adjusts slowly.  For example, improving 
child health may not produce economic gains until the child reaches adulthood.
Also, clearly, increasing financial support for health-related interventions is not 
the sole solution to poor health, and health gains are not an inevitable solution for 
poverty.  Many other barriers to health improvement must also be overcome, and 
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other nonhealth problems must be addressed for the health effects to translate into 
economic gain.  For example, introducing changes that expand a healthy workforce 
will be meaningless if there are no jobs available.  The outcome depends on the po-
litical commitment for improving health, the political and policy decisions that are 
made, and the prioritization of needs and deployment of resources within a society.
What is important is that primary efforts to improve health be part of national or 
regional economic development plans.  As summarized by schultz (1961), “Granted 
that (the elements of human capital) seem amorphous compared to brick and mor-
tar, and hard to get at compared to the investment accounts of corporations, they are 
assuredly not a fragment; rather they are rather like the contents of Pandora’s box, 
full of difficulties and hope.”
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Introduction 
Over the past ten years relations between the United States and the Republic of Belarus 
have been tense, distant, and deteriorated considerably as the decade proceeded.  The Bush 
administration called Belarus “the last dictatorship of Europe,” (Dapkus, 2005) and the Be-
larusian leadership called the U.S. “the most alienated state in the world” (Ioffe, 2008). To 
gain support both inside and outside their countries, each side formed and promoted nega-
tive images of the other. The main instrument of this process was mass media.  This research 
note explores how the tensions between the U.S. and Belarus were reflected in the print 
media of both nations.  We are concerned with the images of each country as these emerged 
from the mass media and how these images might impact future relations.1
The Republic of Belarus is by no means the international equal of the United States and 
is not ordinarily considered a major player in U.S.-European relations.  Nonetheless, due 
to geopolitical circumstances, Belarus serves as a sort of  “testing ground”  (Ioffe, 2008) for 
clarification of U.S. relations with global players such as Russia, China and others dream-
ing about reinstating a “multi-polar world.” (Manaev, 2005; Ioffe, 2008).  Thus, by studying 
U.S.–Belarus relations we may to some extent better understand, and perhaps anticipate the 
further development of U.S. relations with these major global players. 
Belarus today is a typical 21st Century authoritarian regime.  The way the Belarusian 
press portrays the United States helps understand how authoritarian regimes around the 
world portray the U.S. to their citizens.  Similarly, the image of Belarus projected through 
the American press, helps understand how such regimes are viewed by the public and estab-
lish the channels within which U.S. foreign policy must operate.
In Belarus most of the mass media are state-owned, especially the broadcast media 
(IREX, 2009).  In effect there are only a dozen independent newspapers to offer alternative 
viewpoints.  State-run media tend to assume only one perspective, which is pro-Lukashenko 
and pro-regime.  Similarly, the government maintains an unwavering grip on the press dis-
tribution channels and telecom infrastructure.  The circulation numbers of independent and 
state-run press are nowhere near parity.  The major state-run newspaper Sovetskaya Belarus-
siya has a weekly circulation of approximately 2.5 million.  The top independent newspaper 
Narodnaya Volya has an estimated weekly circulation of only 30,000. 
Already tense, relations between Belarus and the United States spiraled downward 
in 2006.  In June the Bush administration imposed sanctions on the state-controlled oil 
processing and chemicals company, Belneftekhim, which accounted for approximately one-
third of Belarus’ foreign currency earnings (U.S. Treasury/Office of Foreign Assets Control, 
2006; Scollon, 2008).  President Bush’s executive order froze the property and financial 
1  This research was funded in part by the Howard H. Baker Jr. Center for Public Policy and the Department of Political 
Science of the University of Tennessee.
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assets in the U.S. of numerous Belarusian citizens and government officials—including 
President Alexander Lukashenko.  American companies and individuals, under the order, 
were barred from engaging in transactions with the targeted persons.  The sanctions were 
designed to punish government for its heavy-handed treatment of critics and intolerance of 
dissent.  Relations failed to improve leading to  additional U.S. sanctions in 2007.  In re-
sponse, Belarus removed its ambassador from Washington, and the U.S. Ambassador Karen 
Stuart left Minsk soon thereafter.  The U.S. State Department eventually ordered Belarus 
to close its embassy in Washington and its consulate in New York (Lee, 2008;Ria Novosti, 
2010).  
In September 2008, after the release of a number of political prisoners and following 
Belarus’ mild support of the Russian invasion of georgia, the Bush administration removed 
sanctions against two Belarusian companies (Scollon; 2008;).   Since 2009, both govern-
ments have expressed a desire to improve relations, although this has proven easier said than 
done (Ria Novosti, 2010). 
Data and Methods
The method used to study the image of Belarus in the American press and the image of 
the U.S. in Belarusian press is content analysis. To obtain data about the American press, we 
analyzed the top ten newspapers in the United States by daily circulation: USA Today, The 
Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Daily News, New York Post, The 
Washington Post, Chicago Tribune, Houston Chronicle & The Arizona Republic (Burrelles-
Luce, 2009).  The Factiva Data Base3 was used to find articles with key words “Belarus”, 
“Belarusian”, “Minsk”, “Lukashenko” & “Lukashenka” (different spelling variation).  
To obtain data from the Belarusian press, we analyzed the two state-run newspapers 
with the largest circulation Sovetskaya Belorussiya and Respublika, and the two independent 
newspapers with the largest circulation  BelGazeta and Narodnaya Volya (IREX, 2009). 
google Advanced search on newspapers web sites was used to find articles with key words 
“USA”, “United States”, “America”, “American”, “Washington” & “Bush” in both Russian and 
Belarusian languages.  The research period for the study was October 2007 through March 
2008, a time period between Presidential elections in Belarus and during which relations 
remained tense.2
Findings
The Image of Belarus in the American Press 
During the period under study, we found 75 articles about Belarus containing key 
words in ten American newspapers.  More than half of the articles described Belarus in 
very negative terms, describing its regime with words such as “dictatorship,” “authoritarian,” 
and “tyranny.”  Most of the articles covered violations of human rights in Belarus and the 
diplomatic controversy7 between Belarus and the U.S.  More than half of the articles in the 
last quarter of 2007 were concentrated on Russia, mentioning Belarus only in the context of 
Russia. As for the beginning of 2008, more articles were dedicated directly to Belarus with 
attention to the Belarus–U.S. diplomatic meltdown that led both nations to withdraw their 
2  This is a preliminary research effort that is designed as a pilot study eventually to be extended in time and to other 
countries.  
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ambassadors.  The average length of the articles was 761 words.  In 21% of the articles, Be-
larus was the main topic; in 33% it was a subtopic, and in 46% of the articles there was only 
a short reference to Belarus.  
Table 1 presents U.S. newspaper coverage in which Belarus was mentioned according 
topic.3  Belarus was the most likely to be mentioned in the context of its relations with other 
countries, including the U.S., with nearly one-half of stories (45%) focusing on this topic. 
It was the least likely to be mentioned in stories devoted to U.S. domestic affairs (12%). 
Including international relations, four out of five articles focus mainly on political and eco-
nomic affairs, with the rest focusing on culture and sports.  The primary focus of U.S. press 
coverage rarely focused on the domestic affairs of Belarus (12%). 
 
Table 1
U.S. Newspaper Coverage of Belarus by Topic (N=75)
Topic % 
Articles 
Belarus relations with other nations and the U.S. 45
Culture and sports 20
U.S.-Belarus political and economic relations 17
Belarus domestic political and economic affairs 12
U.S. domestic political and economic affairs 6
As shown in Table 2, Belarus was mentioned with regard to some kind of problem in 
nearly half (49%) of the articles.  Only about one-in-five (22%) articles discussed achieve-
ments and just under one-in-three were neutral (22%) as to focus.  Press coverage tended 
to focus on problems involving Belarus, which created the frame for a negative image.  The 
frame was filled by the tone of the articles, which is summarized in Table 2.   
Table  2
U.S. Newspaper Coverage of Belarus by Focus (N=75)
Focus % Articles
Problem 49
Neutral 30
Achievement 22
Equals 101% due to rounding
3  The category “topic of the article” means the main topic (or theme) of the article.  In some articles Belarus is the main 
topic (for example, U.S.-Belarus or Russia-Belarus relations).  In other articles Belarus is mentioned briefly, while the main 
topic is something different, like sports, culture or domestic US politics.
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Table 3 shows that news stories mentioning Belarus, while most likely to be neutral 
or balanced in tone (55%), were far more likely to be negative (35%) than positive (10%). 
This suggests that although U.S. press coverage offered the American public a negative im-
age of Belarus it was not overwhelming so during the period.  
Table 3
U.S. Newspaper Coverage of Belarus by Tone (N=75)
Tone % Articles 
Negative 35
Positive 10
Neutral or balanced 55
Image of the U.S. in the Belarusian Press
During the period under study, 172 articles mentioning the U.S. appeared in the Belar-
usian press.  Of these, 63 appeared in state-run newspapers, and 109 in independent news-
papers. The ratio of 1-to-2 (state-run-independent newspapers) indicates an important dis-
crepancy between state-run and independent press coverage of the U.S; the independent 
press was almost twice as likely to cover the U.S. as its state-run counterpart.  Important 
features of authoritarian regimes include ignoring and deemphasizing everything that does 
not fit into official ideology or is not advantageous to the regime. The official press used the 
principle of looking through the “reversed binocular” and ignored in particular the fact that 
the United States frequently criticized Lukashenko’s authoritarian regime.  On the other 
hand, a large number of the articles covering the U.S. in the Belarusian independent press 
provided a more pro-West and pro-American attitude.  
State-run Newspapers
Coverage of the U.S. by the Belarusian state-run proved limited; there were only 
63 articles during the period under study.  As is shown in Table 4, the U.S. was mentioned 
most frequently in the context of America’s relationship with other nations (37%) or the 
international economy (9%), with nearly half of stories mentioning these topics (46%).  The 
state-run press was more likely to cover U.S. domestic affairs (24%) than the U.S. press was 
to cover Belarusian domestic affairs (12%).  
Table 4
Belarusian State Newspaper Coverage of U.S. by Topic (N=63)
Topic % Articles 
U.S. relations with other nations with Belarus mentioned 37
Culture, science, and sports 13
Belarus-U.S. political and economic relations 13
U.S. domestic political and economic affairs 24
International economic affairs 9
Belarus domestic political and economic affairs 4
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State-run newspapers infrequently discussed the U.S. but when they did the focus was 
primarily on problems as can be seen in Table 5.  Over half (54%) of the articles focused on 
problems in the U.S. economy, domestic affairs, and foreign policy.  Only one-in-ten stories 
referred to U.S. achievements in these areas.  Thus, in emphasizing problems, the image of 
the U.S. in the Belarusian state-run press tended toward a negative image.  In most stories 
the U.S. was characterized as facing constant political and economic crises and as behaving 
aggressively on the international scene.  
Table 5
Belarusian State Newspaper Coverage of U.S. by Focus (N=63)
Focus % Articles
Problem 54
Neutral 37
Achievement 10
Equals 101% due to rounding
The tone of coverage reported in Table 6 shows that the majority of stories assumed 
a neutral or balanced tone.  Still, the projection of an unfavorable U.S. image in state-run 
newspapers is apparent since one-third of the stories were negative and only five percent 
were positive.  It is striking that the proportion of negative stories in the Belarusian state-run 
press (37%) essentially matches those found in the U.S. press about Belarus (35%).  
Table 6
Belarusian State Newspaper Coverage of U.S. by Tone (N=63) 
Tone % Articles
Neutral or balanced 59
Negative 37
Positive 5
Equals 101% due to rounding
Independent Press
A different picture emerges from articles in the Belarusian independent press, as 
shown in Tables 7 and 8.  Not only were articles about the U.S. almost twice as likely to 
appear in independent newspapers than the state press (109 compared to 63), but also the 
coverage was more evenly distributed across the spectrum of topics.  Independent newspa-
pers produced stories about U.S. domestic affairs at about the same rate as did the state-run 
papers, but paid more attention to the political and economic relations (21% as compared to 
13%) between the two countries.  More revealing, articles in the independent press were far 
more likely to be neutral in focus than those that appeared in the state-run press.
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Table 7
Belarusian Independent Newspaper Coverage of U.S. by Topic (N-109)
Topic % Articles
U.S. relations with other nations 30
Culture, science, and sports 12
Belarus-U.S. political and economic relations 21
U.S. domestic political and economic affairs 22
International economic affairs 8
Belarus domestic political and economic affairs 8
Equals 101% due to rounding
As Table 8 shows, the articles appearing in the independent press were remarkably 
balanced in focus as compared to the newspapers sponsored by the government.  The stories 
that covered U.S. domestic affairs were mostly about achievements in both economics and 
politics.  It was the articles that covered Belarus domestic politics or U.S.-Belarus relations, 
which dealt mostly with problems.  
Table 8
Belarusian Independent Newspaper Coverage of U.S. by Focus (N=109)
Focus % Articles
Problem 36
Neutral 37
Achievement 27
Table 9 presents the tone of the independent press coverage and the results are striking, 
especially in comparison to the government-sponsored newspapers.  The overwhelming ma-
jority of stories in these outlets were neutral or balanced in tone.  Although a third (37%) of 
the state newspapers were negative in tone, none of the independent newspaper stories were 
so.  To be sure, the tone of stories reported in both venues was equally unlikely to be posi-
tive in tone (5%).  The key difference between them was the highly balanced tone set in the 
independent press and its tendency to be less negative than its state-sponsored counterpart. 
Table 9
Belarusian Independent Newspaper Coverage of U.S. by Tone (N=109) 
Neutral or balanced 85
Negative 0
Positive 5
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Discussion 
Despite the importance of Belarus being a “testing ground,” American press coverage 
proved very limited during the period under study and most of the articles (67%) appeared 
in only three newspapers.4).  In most cases, Belarus was a subtopic of the article or a small 
reference.  Most of the articles covering politics described the actions of the Belarusian gov-
ernment with a neutral evaluation, but the majority of the articles covered violations of hu-
man rights in Belarus, the diplomatic scandal between Belarus and the U.S., or mentioned 
Belarus in the context of Russia.  Thus, even though the tone of these articles was not over-
whelmingly negative, the stories described Belarus in a negative context by focusing on prob-
lems and offering words such as “dictatorship” and “authoritarian” to characterize the regime. 
The results of this study show that the image of Belarus presented to the American people 
through the U.S. press lacks depth and detail.  The image is vaguely negative and seems 
largely set in the context of international affairs and U.S.-Russian relations.  
As for the Belarusian press, there are significant differences in the U.S. image depending 
upon whether independent or state-run newspapers project it.  In the state-run newspapers 
Sovetskaya Belarussiya and Respublika, the majority of articles covered U.S. economic and 
political problems and than a third offered negative evaluations of the United States.  In 
those articles, the U.S. consistently was presented as the enemy of Belarus, as an aggressive 
country that constantly sought to promote its interest and way of life all around the world, 
and as a meddler in the affairs of other countries.  
The independent newspapers Narodnya Volya and BelGazeta more extentively covered 
the United States. The most popular topics of the articles about the U.S. were relations with 
countries other than Belarus; U.S.-Belarus relations; and U.S. domestic politics, culture, and 
science. The independent press either tried to cover the U.S. impartially, or provided readers 
with a balanced evaluation by giving both sides of an argument.  Independent newspapers 
covered different aspects of life in the U.S. as well as its actions for promoting democracy all 
over the world, including American criticism towards Lukashenko’s authoritarian regime. 
Although limited in its circulation and therefore limited in its overall impact as compared to 
the state-run press, the independent press presented a positive image of the United States to 
the Belarusian people.  Taking into consideration the huge circulation advantage enjoyed by 
government-sponsored newspapers, however, that the image of the United States presented 
to the Belarusian people remains one-sided and incomplete. 
Conclusion
generally speaking, the image of Belarus presented in the American press was appro-
priate for the situation of “cold peace” between the United States and Belarus during the 
Bush administration (Manaev, 2000, 2008; Ioffe, 2008).  Today, however, despite the oft-
expressed desire of the Obama administration to rethink and restructure its foreign policy 
toward regimes such as Belarus and Russia, the old images and hard realities are difficult 
to change.  Popular support for better relations between Belarus and the U.S. surely will 
require the formulation of more complete and positive images of both nations that bet-
ter reflect the desired new political reality.  For example, the revision of Belarusian policy 
towards the U.S. will require the projection of a better image of the U.S. by the Belarusian 
state press; one more akin to that produced in the nation’s independent press.  Presumably 
4  The newspapers are the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Wall Street Journal.
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the state-run press coverage of the United States and the images thereby projected to the 
Belarussian people will reflect this attitude in the future. 
From the Belarusian side, recent statements by President Lukashenko indicate that 
Belarus is ready to reconsider its relations with the United States. In his interview with 
Reuters on May 5, 2009, President Lukashenko said: “I think we will have good relations 
with Americans in the future. god clearly wants us to stop fighting, it is enough. He [god] 
wants us to have better relations in the name of peace and our people.”  Lukashenko also 
announced that he was ready to restore diplomatic relations with the United States once 
the sactions originally imposed by the Bush administration was lifted (Centre for Research 
on globalization, 2010).  
On the American side, however, President Obama in June 2010 extended the sanctions 
on Belarus for another year.  In his message to Congress the President observed that: 
The actions and policies of certain members of the government of Belarus and 
other persons to undermined Belarus democratic processes or institutions, to com-
mit human rights abuses related to political represession, and to engage in public 
corruption pose a continuing unusual and extraordinary threat to the national secu-
rity and foreign policy of the United States (Centre for Research on globalization 
2010).  
In response, a spokesman for the Belarusian Foreign Ministry characterized the American 
action as “controntational” and “useless,” indicating “the U.S.’s lack of political will to develop 
cooperation in the interests of peace and partnership” (Ria Novosti, 2010).  
given the continuing sanctions imposed by the American government, it seems unlikely 
that American press coverage will produce more favorable images of the Belarusian regime 
in the foreseeable future.  The prospect of Belarusian state-sponsored newspapers producing 
more balanced and positive coverage of the United States seem dim as well.  One can hope, 
nonetheless, that the news coverage within both nations becomes more frequent and com-
plete so as better to inform their respective publics and to produce images more conducive 
to effective and mutually beneficial relations.  
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Book Review:
The Terrorized Presidency
Glenn Harlan Reynolds1
Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency:  Law and Judgment Inside 
The Bush Administration
(New York: W.W. Norton, 2009) 256 pp. $16.95 
No President has fought a war under constraints as severe as those faced by 
President George W. Bush.  In his legal memoir, Office of Legal Counsel veteran and 
Harvard Law Professor Jack Goldsmith recounts the extent of those constraints, and 
the problems created by efforts to overcome them.  His memoir provides a troubling 
snapshot of the state of national security law and politics in the early days of the War 
on Terror, and a cautionary note for those who seek to end-run these problems.  It 
is a memoir that could profitably be read by many Bush critics and defenders, and in 
particular by those now filling similar slots in the Obama Administration.
Native-born Tennessean Jack Goldsmith was a Yale and Oxford Alumnus and 
a professor at the University of Chicago Law School when he was asked to work for 
the Department of Defense’s top legal officer.  After just over a year in that position, 
Goldsmith moved to the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, taking that 
position in place of the White House’s favored candidate, John Yoo, whom Attorney 
General John Ashcroft did not favor.
With Yoo blackballed by Ashcroft, Goldsmith took the job as head of the OLC, 
a (usually) obscure office of fewer than two dozen attorneys whose job is to serve as 
the main source of legal advice for the Attorney General and President.  Tradition-
ally, OLC lawyers have viewed themselves as being in the Executive Branch but not 
fully of it.  Given that many decisions taken by Presidents aren’t reviewable by courts, 
the OLC has developed “powerful cultural norms about the importance of providing 
the President with detached, apolitical legal advice, as if OLC were an independent 
court inside the executive branch.”2
Once in office, Goldsmith discovered that things didn’t always work that way.  In 
the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, members of the executive branch, 
namely those in the White House, the Department of Justice, and the intelligence 
community, felt powerful pressure to prevent future attacks, and to err, even substan-
tially, on the side of caution.  These pressures had been present even before the 9/11 
attacks, and, indeed, even before George W. Bush took office:
The Clinton OLC tended to invoke aggressive presidential military pow-
ers primarily for humanitarian rather than security ends, and its arguments 
for presidential power were more cautious than those in the Bush II OLC 
and relied more on congressional authorization.  But these differences do not 
1 Glenn Reynolds is the Beauchamp Brogan Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of Tennessee College of 
Law
2 P. 33.
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mask the fact that the Clinton lawyers -- like all OLC lawyers and Attorneys 
General over many decades -- were driven by the outlook and exigencies of 
the presidency to assert more robust presidential powers, especially during 
a war or crisis, than had been officially approved by the Supreme Court or 
than is generally accepted in the legal academy or by Congress.3
Nonetheless, after holding office for a while, Goldsmith found that he was un-
able to support many of the positions taken by the OLC (often authored by Yoo) 
and eventually tendered his resignation.  Much of the book consists of an interesting 
tale of an academic’s gradual realization that things are much less tidy, and much less 
pleasant, in the working precincts of government than in the more cheerful world of 
academe.
Goldsmith offers a number of cautionary notes that the current administration 
-- and its critics, now and in the future -- may wish to bear in mind.  One is the image 
of a presidency “ensnared by law” in the fashion of Gulliver among the Lilliputians. 
Modern Presidents operate in a legal culture, and a “CYA” culture, very different 
from that enjoyed by such wartime leaders as FDR or Lincoln.  As Goldsmith notes, 
when confronted with the prospect of judicial review for captured Nazi saboteurs, 
FDR announced that he would not hand the saboteurs over to a U.S. Marshal armed 
with a writ of habeas corpus, and threatened to execute them on his own authority 
no matter what the Supreme Court said.  Chastened, the Court gave way.
It’s difficult to imagine a similar set of events today, and much of Goldsmith’s dis-
cussion of this topic reminds me of Grant Gilmore’s famous statement:  “In Heaven 
there will be no law, and the lion will lie down with the lamb. . . .  In Hell, there will 
be nothing but law, -- and due process will be meticulously observed.”  Modern war-
fighters have to cope with what’s known as “lawfare,” the use of legal tools in order 
to obstruct war efforts and shield the enemy.  “Lawfare works because it manipulates 
something Americans value:  respect for law.”4  In particular, government employees 
in defense and law enforcement worry that they themselves may wind up in legal 
trouble for their efforts:
It may be hard to believe that executive branch officials, many of whom 
risk their lives to protect the nation, really care much about criminal law, 
investigation, and, possibly, jail.  But they do care—a lot.  In my two years 
in the government, I witnessed top officials and bureaucrats in the White 
House and throughout the administration openly worrying that investiga-
tors operating with the benefit of hindsight in a different political environ-
ment would impose criminal penalties on heat-of-battle judgment calls. 
These men and women didn’t believe they were breaking the law, and indeed 
they took extraordinary steps to ensure that they didn’t.  But they worried 
nonetheless because they would be judged in an atmosphere different from 
3 P. 37
4 P. 59.
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when they acted, because the criminal investigative process is mysterious and 
scary, because lawyers’ fees can cause devastating financial losses, and be-
cause an investigation can produce reputation-ruining dishonor and possibly 
end one’s career, even if you emerge “innocent.”
Why, then, do they even come close to the legal line?  Why risk reputa-
tion, fortune, and perhaps liberty?  Why not play it safe?  Many counterter-
rorism officials did play it safe before 9/11, when the criminalization of war 
and intelligence contributed to the paralyzing risk aversion that pervaded 
the White House and the intelligence community.  The 9/11 attacks, how-
ever, made playing it safe no longer feasible.5
Goldsmith also explains the other fear that pervades the Executive Branch:
Every morning the President sees a “threat matrix” that . . . lists “every 
threat directed at the United States in the past 24 hours.  The matrix can 
be many dozens of pages long. . . . It is hard to overstate the impact that the 
incessant waves of threat reports have on the judgment of people inside the 
executive branch who are responsible for protecting American lives.6 . . .  The 
President and everyone else responsible for national security after 9/11 un-
derstand that this attitude will lead them to do things that, in hindsight, will 
seem to be overreactions or errors.  National security officials do not have 
the luxury of hindsight when deciding how to act.  But they do understand 
the potential consequences of not taking threats seriously enough.  That is 
why the obsessively focus on how a genuine threat might look before the fact. 
They know that most of the 9/11 plotters, if arrested in the summer of 2001, 
would have seemed like unimportant malcontents who lacked the weapons 
or skills needed to kill three thousand people and cause tens of billions of 
dollars of damage in a single morning.  And so when national security of-
ficials learn about groups that seem like Al Qaeda cells or copycats, they 
believe they cannot afford not to act.  Nor do they think they can be patient 
with traditional investigative techniques when they have in custody some-
one like Abu Zubaydah, a close associate of Bin Laden who was involved in 
many prior terrorist attacks on Americans, and who likely had knowledge of 
future (and possibly near-term) attacks.7
Despite this fear, though, Goldsmith ultimately resigned over a difference re-
garding interrogation practices, where he felt that the OLC had bowed to pressure to 
endorse practices that were highly questionable as a matter of law.  He then went on 
to a professorship at Harvard Law School where -- his reasons for resignation still 
kept confidential -- he was pilloried by critics for being “pro-torture.”
Yet it is this dual character that makes Goldsmith’s book so valuable.  Unlike 
some critics on the outside, Goldsmith understands why people in the executive 
5 Pp. 69-70.
6 Pp. 71-72
7 P. 190.
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branch worry as they do, and feel compelled to -- as FDR did -- give the law short 
shrift at times.  But he also understands that, as a long-term strategy, that is simply 
not a viable approach.
Goldsmith believes that the Bush Administration -- despite a degree of political 
pressure almost unprecedented in wartime -- should nonetheless have reached out 
to Congress more, and tried to obtain more “buy in” from those who later became its 
critics.  He also stresses the importance of trust and credibility, and the damage that 
those can suffer from too-clever lawyering of the sort that is often a phenomenon in 
offices – like the Bush OLC – that are heavily populated by smart young Harvard 
and Yale graduates.  And he suggests that Bush Administration officials were too 
attached to notions of the importance of Presidential power in the abstract, and not 
willing enough to do things that might have enhanced it in concrete terms even if 
they did not expand executive prerogatives in a formal sense.  “Presidential power 
is primarily about persuasion and consent, rather than unilateral executive action.”8
It is now the Obama Administration that must keep us safe, or face the political 
and moral consequences of allowing another major terror attack, even as it faces po-
litical pressure to wind down the war on terror.  So far -- perhaps influenced by the 
threat matrix -- it has taken a number of steps that have angered its former support-
ers, as it boosts the “state secrets” defense9 and defends warrantless wiretaps aimed at 
American citizens.10  This has angered some former Bush critics,11 but it is probably 
inevitable.  It will certainly produce tensions as the Obama OLC faces the same pres-
sures as its predecessors.  One hopes that the new crowd has read, and internalized, 
the lessons of Goldsmith’s book already.
8 Pp. 211-12
9 Dan Froomkin, Obama’s State Secrets Overreach, Washington Post, April 08, 2009, available at http://voices.washing-
tonpost.com/white-house-watch/obamas-state-secrets-overreach040909.html?wprss=rss_blog
10 Bob Egelko, Government Opts for Secrecy in Wiretap Suit, San Francisco Chronicle, April 7, 2009, available at http://
www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/04/06/BARP16TJOQ.DTL&tsp=1
11 See, e.g, Glenn Greenwald, New and Worse Secrecy and Immunity Claims from the Obama DOJ, Salon, April 6, 2009, 
available at http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2009/04/06/obama/index.html.
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INTRODUCTION:
Student Symposium on National Security
Elizabeth Wilson Vaughan 
Bradford A. Vaughan
 As part of this edition of the Baker Center Journal of Applied Public Policy, we 
are pleased to present a Student Symposium focusing on topics relating to national 
security issues.  This Student Symposium is born out of the Baker Center’s contin-
ued commitment to promoting student engagement in public policy and directed 
research.
 In Undermining the National Security and Civil Liberties Debate: The Recurrence 
of Politically-Motivated Actions, Amber Patel analyzes the delicate balance between 
civil liberties and the politics of wartime.  Ms. Patel considers critical instances in 
the past when American civil liberties were suspended or curtailed, in the context of 
promoting national security or a political agenda during times of war.
 Bahar Azhdari critiques the weakening bargaining position of the United States 
as an international powerhouse in her article, Defining Enemy Combatants: Is the 
United States Unwittingly Sabotaging Itself?  Ms. Azhdari discusses the need to bal-
ance the United States’ international legal commitments against its interest in en-
suring the security of its citizens at home and abroad.  Through her sharp analysis 
of international law, Ms. Azhdari charts the possible impact of actions undertaken 
during the War on Terror.
 In The Fourth Amendment and Domestic National Security Surveillance: Challeng-
ing the Need for Traditional Warrants, Stephen Hargraves traces the history of the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment and the birth of the constitutional right to 
privacy.  Mr. Hargraves concludes his article by considering whether the protections 
of the Fourth Amendment can still be adequately provided to citizens after the gov-
ernment is able to fulfill its obligations to domestic national security.
 In Walking the Tightrope: A  New Approach to Balancing Concerns over the “Signif-
icant Purpose” Amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Charles Jarboe 
weighs the impact of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent 
amendments to FISA.  Mr. Jarboe considers the delicate balance between the gov-
ernment’s need need to preserve national security in exigent circumstances and the 
courts’ role in protecting civil liberties through various procedural safeguards.
 Karen Manning makes a thorough consideration of the nexus of national secu-
rity concerns and constitutional rights in her article, A Critical Analysis of the Mili-
tary Commissions Act of 2006.  Ms. Manning discusses the genesis of the MCA and 
analyzes provisions that may not comport with international law.  She also analyzes 
the suspension of habeas corpus for alien unlawful enemy combatants and ends with 
a discussion of the United States Supreme Court decision in Boumediene v. Bush. 
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Drawing on her expertise in Spanish language and culture, Emily Stulce 
compares how Spain and the United States have attempted to combat terrorism in 
her article, The United States and Spain: Changes and Development in Anti-Terrorism 
Law and Policy.  Ms. Stulce explores the historical backdrop of legislation and poli-
cies targeting terrorism in both countries and vigorously questions the purported 
successes and failures of each country in anti-terrorism activities.
 These articles, written by students engaged in graduate studies, represent a di-
verse and intriguing snapshot of how students discuss and analyze the impacts of 
public policy on key issues affecting the national security.  The Baker Center is proud 
to promote the work of students and provides these works as examples of how grad-
uate students can impact public policy through study and focused analysis. 
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Defining Enemy Combatants: Is the United States 
Unwittingly Sabotaging Itself?
Bahar Azhdari
Introduction 
The continuing threat of terrorist acts on home soil is a constant topic of public 
discourse between policymakers and opinion leaders in the United States.  With 
the increased attention given to transnational terrorist organizations like al Qaeda, 
the push to give its membership legal definitions has caused both domestic and 
international problems for U.S. leaders.  Under the banner of domestic law, terrorists 
might be analogous to criminals and subject to United States criminal law.  Widening 
the scope internationally, terrorists might be compared to enemy soldiers fighting on 
the field of battle. While domestic law is sufficient to handle terrorists acting within 
the United States or threatening its citizens abroad,1 the law has had to change to 
accommodate a new breed of fighter encountered in the war on terrorism and the 
Iraq conflict: one without national or state affiliation.  
President Bush declared the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 acts of 
war—a declaration that brought with it considerable legal consequences.2  Treating 
acts of terrorism as opening shots of an armed conflict allows the United States 
to “exercise fundamental incident[s] of waging war.”3   Among those “fundamental 
incidents” are the broad powers “to detain [enemies] for the duration of hostilities, 
to subject war violators to trials in military tribunals, and to exercise subject matter 
jurisdiction over the full scope of the law of war,”4 rather than only those defined 
in the United States’ criminal code.  By thus invoking the law of war, however, the 
government’s “[a]ctions justified by that law are bound by it as well.”5  
One of the main problems with former President Bush’s declaration—and 
the actions taken subsequent to it—is determining what part of the law of war is 
applicable to the “war on terror.”  The law of war is the body of international law 
governing warfare.  Traditionally, international law has divided armed conflict into 
two categories: international and non-international. Each camp has its own separate 
rules for conduct and participant treatment.  Unfortunately, the current “war on 
terror” does not fall neatly into either category.  As a result, the Bush Administration 
1 The main impediment to application of American law internationally is extraterritoriality.  In most cases, however, 
extraterritorial jurisdiction is available.  See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 86 (2d Cir. 2003) (“It is beyond doubt that, 
as a general proposition, Congress has the authority ‘to enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States.’” 
(quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991))). While a presumption exists that Congress intended a 
statute to be applied only in the United States, that presumption can be overcome when Congress manifests an extraterritorial 
intent.  Id.    
2 David Glazier, Full and Fair by What Measure?: Identifying the International Law Regulating Military Commission 
Procedure, 24 B.U. Int’l L.J. 55, 56 (2006).
3 Id.  (Internal quotations omitted.)
4 Id.
5 Id. 
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took advantage of this misfit by “re-characterizing terrorism as armed conflict and 
attempting to avoid the application of international standards to its treatment of 
detainees.”6  Historically, the use of international law in domestic affairs has been 
a long-standing tradition.  The United States Constitution explicitly states that “all 
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall 
be the supreme law of the Land . . . .”7  In reconciling this provision with Congressional 
power, “‘an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations 
if any other possible construction remains.’”8  The deference to international treaties 
does not always apply, however, due to domestic security concerns.9    
With the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States began fighting a 
war but not against an enemy state.  These new enemies belong to no state or political 
organization.  Instead, they are an amorphous group of fighters with the unifying 
goal of ousting the perceived invaders of their holy lands.  This lack of affiliation 
has led to a problem defining where those fighters and (later) detainees fall in both 
domestic and international law. 
The law of war, or international humanitarian law, is mostly codified in the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949.10  The Conventions apply “in time of war, ‘armed conflict,’ or 
military occupation”11 regardless of whether the powers involved have formally 
declared war.12  Unfortunately, the Conventions do not give a precise definition of 
“armed conflict.”  In addition to the difficulty of discerning when the Conventions 
apply, determining who exactly is a prisoner of war or a protected person under the 
Conventions has proved a complex task in the current conflict.  Recognizing this 
definitional gap, the United States has created the designation of “enemy combatant” 
to avoid the restrictions and protections of the Conventions.  In doing so, the United 
States has carved out for itself an exception to customary international law wherein 
it can treat its prisoners however it wishes without international ramifications.  
6 Id. at 57.
7 U.S. Const. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
8 Yousef, 327 F.3d at 86 (quoting McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21 (1963)). 
9 In fact, courts have held that Congress may legislate with respect to acts outside the United States, beyond the limits of 
international law.  See Yousef, 327 F.3d at 86; United States v. Quemener, 789 F.2d 145, 146 (2d Cir. 1986).
10 The 1949 Geneva Conventions are comprised of four treaties.  The First and Second address the treatment of the sick 
and wounded members of the military, respectively.  See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 74 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration 
of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85.  The 
Third and Fourth Conventions are relevant here.  The Third Geneva Convention concerns the treatment of prisoners of war, 
and the Fourth deals with the treatment of civilians and other protected persons.  See Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GPW]; Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GPC].  Two Protocols to the 
Conventions were concluded in 1977, but the United States did not sign on to them.  See Derek Jinks, The Applicability of the 
Geneva Conventions to the “Global War on Terrorism,” 46 Va. J. Int’l L. 165, 165-66 n.1 (2005).
11  Jinks, supra note 10, at 165. 
12  Id. at 166.
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Unfortunately, the plan might have a small snag.  The point of designating 
fighters as enemy combatants is that those combatants then no longer have to be 
treated by certain recognized standards.  The hope is that by depriving the fighters of 
minimum comfort and causing them to endure rigorous interrogation with no hope 
of habeas corpus relief, valuable information will be retrieved and future attacks 
thwarted.  Instead, it seems rather likely that by avoiding the strictures of the Geneva 
Conventions, the United States might be inadvertently fomenting more hostility 
towards itself internationally.  Rather than abiding by international rules, the United 
States has flaunted its actions while demanding that other countries get in line and 
obey international accords.  This seeming duplicity is then used by fundamentalist 
leaders in the Islamic world to gather more recruits and strengthen their objectives. 
Additionally, and perhaps even worse, the United States may later be unable to 
protect its own personnel from violations of foreign domestic law augmented to end-
run around the Conventions’ protections. 
The United States is weakening—rather than strengthening—its position 
internationally.  It is the end of the “American era”13 in the Middle East.  The United 
States must find a way to abide by its international agreements without sacrificing 
national security.  By presenting the ideas of publicists and commentators on the 
evolution of international humanitarian law in the realm of national security, this 
article concludes that the United States must recognize the validity and strength of 
international treaties by conforming its will to international dictates.  Part II discusses 
the Geneva Conventions, focusing on Common Article 3 which provides minimum 
standards of protection to those involved in conflicts not of an international nature. 
Part III then covers the Military Commissions Act of 2006, which is Congress’s 
reaction to the Supreme Court decision of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.  It analyzes the lead 
up to the Act and its interaction with international law.  Part IV deals with domestic 
and international reactions to the Bush Administration’s actions, focusing on the 
possible consequences of the United States’ decision to circumvent international 
treaties for its own benefit.  Part V concludes.
The Geneva Conventions
In the abstract, the Geneva Conventions deal with laws of war or international 
humanitarian law.14  The four Conventions are “undoubtedly the best known 
components of the overall corpus juris of the law of war, comprising . . . the ‘core of 
13  Richard N. Haass, The New Middle East, Foreign Affairs (November/December 2006).
14 The phrase “laws of war” is no longer often used to refer to the conduct of hostilities.  It has been overtaken by its modern 
counterpart jus in bello or international humanitarian law, which “addresses the treatment that states and their armed forces 
must accord to combatants, civilians, and prisoners in times of armed conflict.”  Mark W. Janis & John E. Noyes, Cases and 
Commentary on International Law 513 (3d ed. 2006).  “International humanitarian law” and “laws of war,” however, will 
be used interchangeably in this paper. 
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international humanitarian law.’”15  To their credit, the Conventions are universal 
compared to other treaties:  they have been ratified or acceded to by 194 nations,16 
two more than the number of United Nations members.17  It is important to note 
that as laws of war or international humanitarian law, the Geneva Conventions differ 
significantly from international human rights law.  Unlike the latter, the “law of war 
allows, or at least tolerates, the killing and wounding of innocent human beings not 
directly participating in an armed conflict, such as civilian victims of lawful collateral 
damage.”18  Also, the Conventions permit certain deprivations of personal freedom 
without fear of criminal reprisal.19  An occupying power is allowed to resort to 
internment and may limit the rights of appeal of detained individuals.20  Basically, 
“[a]s long as the rules of the game are observed, it is permissible to cause suffering, 
deprivation of freedom, and death.”21  
According to Professor Derek Jinks, the codification of the Conventions 
crystallized two changes in international humanitarian law.  First, the laws governed 
“de facto as well as de jure warfare,”22 meaning that the Conventions apply to any 
armed conflict between powers regardless of whether a formal declaration of war 
exists.23  Historically, a state of war meant “the complete rupture of legal relations 
between the belligerent states . . . the “‘laws of war’ completely displaced the ‘laws of 
peace’ (normal law).”24  Many types of conflict even “organized hostilities” did not 
“trigger” the laws of war, and formal declarations of war were required.25  Now, the 
treaties apply in all armed conflicts, and international conflicts are easy to discern. 
The difficulty, however, lies in determining when “an internal disturbance” or non-
international disturbance becomes an “armed conflict” under international law.26
Second, Common Article 327 regulates noninternational armed conflicts, which 
are conflicts between states and nonstate armed groups.28  Prior to the Conventions, 
15 Glazier, supra note 2, at 70 (citing Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, The Geneva Conventions: The Core of International 
Humanitarian Law (Mar. 6, 2004)). 
16 Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, The Geneva Conventions: The Core of International Humanitarian Law, http://www.
icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/genevaconventions (last visited Apr. 27, 2008).  This near- universal acceptance has 
led many commentators to argue that the Conventions’ provisions have risen to the status of customary international law.
17 United Nations, Press Release: United Nations Member States, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/org1469.
doc.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2008).  The two non-United Nations members who are signatories to the Geneva Conventions 
are the Cook Islands and the Holy See.  Glazier, supra note 2, at 71 n.92. 
18 Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 Am. J. Int’l L. 239, 240 (2000). 
19 Meron, supra note  18, at 240. 
20 Id. 
21 Id.
22 Jinks, The Applicability of the Geneva Conventions, supra note 10, at 166.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 167.
25 Id.
26 Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28 Yale J. Int’l L. 1, 10 (2003).
27 In terms of the Geneva Conventions, “Common Article 3” is identical in all four treaties, making it “common” to all of 
them.  Jinks, The Applicability of the Geneva Conventions, supra note 10, at 167 n.4. 
28 See GPW art. 3.  The provision applies to conflicts involving only one state or two nonstate armed groups.  Id. 
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these types of conflicts were governed solely by domestic law.29  In fact, if another state 
were to interfere, it would be viewed as “an unlawful intrusion into the international 
affairs of the state” and could have been deemed an act of war.30  After the atrocities 
of World War II, the international community realized that the “recognition of 
belligerency doctrine inadequately regulated noninternational armed conflicts.”31 
As a result, the Conventions “enacted a limited scheme that made some elementary 
humanitarian principles applicable in noninternational armed conflicts.”32
The main argument against the applicability of the Geneva Conventions in 
the current conflict is that the Conventions do not explicitly protect terrorists.33 
Professor Jinks asserts that this idea may be read in two ways: either “the Conventions 
do not apply at all to military operations directed against terrorist organizations or 
that individual terrorists do not fall into one of the categories of protected persons.”34 
The main point of departure, then, is whether an armed conflict exists.35  After that, 
the basic questions are then when do the Conventions apply and to whom do they 
apply.  If the Conventions do not apply to the current hostilities, then detainees 
resulting from them are afforded no minimum standards of treatment in the eyes 
of the international community.36  If they do apply, the United States, as signer and 
ratifier, must conform to their standards.
When Do the Conventions Apply?
The crux of the Geneva Conventions deals with international armed conflicts, 
which are armed conflicts between two or more states.37  The Conventions do, 
however, consider armed conflict that is not international in nature under Common 
Article 3.38  The Article, “a stand-alone provision, or ‘Convention in miniature,’”39 
sets forth certain minimum standards to be applied “[i]n the case of armed conflict 
not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High 
Contracting Parties.”40  Persons no longer taking active part in hostilities must be 
29 Jinks, The Applicability of the Geneva Conventions, supra note 10, at 167.
30 Id. at 167.  See generally U.N. Charter art. 2, paras. 4, 7.
31 Jinks, The Applicability of the Geneva Conventions, supra note 10, at 167.
32 Id. at 168.
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Kenneth Watkin, Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in Contemporary Armed Conflict, 98 Am. J. 
Int’l L. 1, 3 (2004).
36 A result that would be somewhat anomalous since the purpose of international humanitarian law is to afford protections 
to all.
37 “[T]he Convention’s several hundred articles are built around the paradigm of two opposing states, operating normally 
through the use of their regular armies, though perhaps assisted by militias or volunteer corps.”  Sean D. Murphy, Evolving 
Geneva Convention Paradigms in the “War on Terrorism”: Applying the Core Rules to the Release of Persons Deemed “Unprivileged 
Combatants”, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1105, 1113 (2007).
38  A noninternational conflict differs from an international conflict because of the legal status of those opposing each other. 
Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2796.
39  Glazier, supra note 2, at 91.
40  Geneva Conventions I-IV, supra note 10, art. 3 [hereinafter Common Article 3].
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treated humanely, and the particular acts proscribed against them are:
(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, 
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) Taking of hostages;
(c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating 
and degrading treatment; and
(d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions 
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly 
constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which 
are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.41
Common Article 3 contains the “lowest threshold of both application and 
protective standards.  It is intended to provide a minimum basis of protection” for those 
not participating in internal armed conflicts.42  The crux of the Article is to protect 
those most vulnerable during conflicts.  It neither addresses the status of combatants, 
nor does it even mention them.  Historically, states rarely invoke Common Article 
3 and “consistently avoid applying it to situations within their territory or even with 
respect to conflicts taking place in the territory of other states.”43  The main reason 
for this lack of application is that if applied to internal conflicts, Common Article 3 
would constrain a state’s “ability to respond to threats undermining [its] legitimacy 
without external interference and oversight.”44  Additionally, domestic courts remain 
wary of applying the Article to conflicts because invocation would be “a de facto, if not 
a de jure, recognition of belligerency—giving ‘status’ to persons whom states generally 
wanted to call ‘terrorists’ or ‘criminals’ and not combatants.”45
The precise time at which Common Article 3 activates is somewhat ambiguous. 
To begin, an armed conflict must exist.46  Next, the conflict must not be of an 
international nature, a designation which “is capable of meaning between any state 
and a non-state actor.”47  While the traveaux preparatoires show a lack of consensus at 
the “minimum trigger of applicability,” the drafting history shows a basis from which 
to conclude that the “threshold applicability” is lower than previously thought.48  The 
leading commentary to the drafting of the First and Second Conventions suggests 
that “a conflict must be similar in many respects to an international war, but take place 
41 Common Article 3(1). 
42 Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Hamdan and Common Article 3: Did the Supreme Court Get It Right?, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1523, 
1527 (2007).  Although enumerated for noninternational conflicts, “[t]he norms stated in Common Article 3 may be viewed 
as applicable to all conflicts, even those of an international character.”  Id. at n.16.  See also Theodor Meron, International 
Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 Am. J. Int’l L. 554, 560-61 (1995).
43 Ní Aoláin, supra note 42, at 1528.
44 Id. at 1528.  “[S]tates may be extremely sensitive to any attempt to limit their sovereign rights of response when faced 
with internal crisis.”  Id. at n.23 (internal quotations omitted).
45 Id. at 1528.
46 Id.
47 Murphy, supra note 37, at 1137.
48 Ní Aoláin, supra note 42, at 1529.
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within the geographical confines of a single country, in order to trigger the article.”49 
The purpose of the Article is to protect the widest range of persons possible, so a 
narrow interpretation would fly against the inherent meaning of the text.  
 Al Qaeda is not a state.  At its core, it is “an armed Sunni Islamist organization 
that is seeking to eliminate foreign influence in Muslim countries.”50  It is, however 
an armed group operating in several countries, one of which is Iraq, a “High 
Contracting Party” to the Geneva Conventions.51  Common Article 3 applies “[i]n 
the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory 
of one of the High Contracting Parties.”  While the United States’ argument that the 
conflict is not international in nature is credible, the argument against application 
of the Article because the conflict is not international is less so.  Either a conflict 
is international or non-international; the reference to a “transnational conflict” is 
mired in semantics.  In this case, Common Article 3 could apply because a state (the 
United States) is fighting an armed group (al Qaeda) within the territory of a High 
Contracting Party (Iraq).  While commentators argue that Common Article 3 refers 
only to civil wars, nothing in the text makes that distinction.  A narrow reading of it 
as such without authoritative amendment of such meaning would be incorrect.  
Despite this, the primary problem encountered in applying the Conventions is 
that the conflict is not a war in the common usage of the term.  Generally, the three 
reasons given for this lack of applicability are: 
(1) adverse legal and policy consequences might 
follow from characterizing the [war on terror] as a 
‘war’ in the legal sense; (2) terrorist organizations 
like al Qaeda are not states and conflicts with such 
entities are materially different from inter-state wars 
and civil wars; and (3) terrorist organizations enjoy 
no protection under the rules of war because they 
do not accept or observe these rules themselves.52
First, the Conventions define the treatment accorded vulnerable individuals 
during armed hostilities.  To that end, the Conventions require a level of “humane 
treatment” be afforded to captured enemy solders and civilians, all of which is limited 
by military necessity.53  As a result, the Conventions “establish minimum rules that 
apply even when arguably no other law does, shining the light of law, however dim, 
into the darkness of war.”54  With these “limited ambitions, the Conventions should 
49 Id. at 1530 (referring to the commentaries of Jean S. Pictet).
50 Murphy, supra note 37, at 1135.  Though the inner workings of the organization are unknown, analysts describe it as 
numerous independent and collaborative cells operating across several countries.  It is not an entity “temporally or geographically 
tied to the prior de facto government of Afghanistan, but rather an independent force engaged in a private war.”  Id.
51 Iraq ratified the Geneva Conventions on 14 February 1956 without reservations.  Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, State 
Parties/Signatories to the Geneva Conventions, http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=375&ps=P. 
52 Jinks, The Applicability of the Geneva Conventions, supra note 10, at 169.
53  Id. at 173.
54  Id.
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apply whenever fighting erupts between organized enemies.”55 
Additionally, if applicable, the Conventions do not “displace or trigger the 
application of any other body of rules.”56  No part of the Conventions requires the 
parties to “abrogate any rights-protecting scheme otherwise recognized in its law.”57 
Basically, if it chose to do so, the United States could give the captured combatants 
the full gamut of statutory and constitutional law, in addition to the Convention 
protections.58  On the other hand, “states cannot render the Conventions inapplicable 
simply by deciding to apply some other body of rules.”59  
Second, the applicability of the Conventions does not depend on whether any 
of the conflict’s parties are non-state actors. 60  In fact, the Bush Administration 
grants that the Conventions regulate some conflicts involving nonstate actors.61 Its 
argument against application, though, is that the current conflict is not a defined 
armed international conflict because the United States is not fighting a state.62  
The third argument to except applicability is that the enemy does not obey so the 
rules so no other country has to either. Depriving one group of certain minimal rights 
because they do not reciprocate those rights seems petty in the international context. 
Arguably, the United States is waging both a physical and a moral war.  It is hard 
to stand on the moral high ground while ignoring historical standards of detainee 
treatment to meet the opposition.  While al Qaeda does not follow the laws of war, 
as a non-state actor, it need not do so.  Al Qaeda’s failure to follow the rules, however, 
does not grant the United States license to also disobey them.  By abiding by the laws 
of war, the United States gives itself credibility in the international arena and proves 
its commitment to international treaties.  Furthermore, “the fundamental principle of 
equality of belligerents in the eyes of jus in bello means that the combatants’ privilege 
would be granted not only to arguably worthy forces such as armed pro-democracy 
militants, but also to those on the other side as well, such as armed anti-democracy 
forces.”63
To Whom Do the Conventions Apply?
According to Professor Fionnula Ní Aoláin, Common Article 3 does not refer to 
combatants or civilians specifically, so it does not require a status determination to be 
applicable.64  Its drafting history shows that “states intended the provisions to apply 
regardless of status” because reference to combatants “only appear[s] in the article by 
55  Id. (emphasis in original). 
56 Id. at 174.
57 Jinks, The Applicability of the Geneva Conventions, supra note 10, at 174.
58 Id. at 175.
59 Id. at 175.  But see Yousef, 327 F.3d at 86; The Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 948 (2006). 
60  Jinks, The Applicability of the Geneva Conventions, supra note  10, at 177. 
61 Id. 
62 Id.
63 Nathaniel Berman, Privileging Combat?: Contemporary Conflict and the Legal Construction of War, 43 Colum. J. 
Transnat’l L. 1, 28 (2004). 
64 Ní Aoláin, supra note 42, at 1538.
AzHDARI 692010
negative inference.”65  The explicit reference to “hors de combat” in the Article’s text 
acknowledges that some people remain active in the violence.66  As a result, states 
have failed to invoke Common Article 3 based on that negative inference because 
“application might create an inference that the state recognized the fighters in that 
conflict to be combatants.”67  
On the most basic level, the Conventions “protect civilians by encouraging 
combatants to distinguish themselves from noncombatants.”68  Specifically, the 
Third Geneva Convention outlines the protections afforded prisoners of war, and 
the Fourth Geneva Convention details the protection of civilians.  Since war often 
(sometimes deliberately) confuses the distinction between civilians and armies, 
states must have a clear way to distinguish between the two.69  According to one 
commentator, “[a] condition precedent for attaining combatant status is the existence 
of a responsible command and a disciplinary system that enforces compliance with 
the rules of international law in hostilities.”70  Specifically, Common Article 3 does 
not provide the “combatants’ privilege or POW status for prisoners captured during” 
non-international armed conflicts.71  Therefore, states are free to prosecute “rebels” 
in noninternational armed conflicts for mere participation, subject, of course, to the 
minimum requirements of the Article. 
While contemporary laws of war were contemplated with state actors and 
their armies in mind, “the historical trend is one that has favored development of 
certain core protections for all persons engaged in armed conflict.”72  Customary 
international law contains some unambiguous core protections for individuals 
detained in war time, and such protections “should be applied in situations where 
the status of persons is uncertain or contested.”73  Professor Sean D. Murphy states 
that “application of the core principles is legally compelled, is consistent with sound 
policy choices, and suggests possibilities for similar application of the core protections 
to other aspects of the ‘war on terrorism.’”74  Though the human conscience finds 
certain acts repugnant, “contemporary global society regards even individuals who 
appear to have committed genocide, crimes against humanity, and grave war crimes 
to be entitled to certain core standards of treatment.”75
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 1538-39.  See also CPW, supra note 10, art. 3; CPC, supra note 10, art. 3. 
67 Id. at 1539.
68 Jason Callen, Unlawful Combatants and the Geneva Conventions, 44 Va. J. Int’l L. 1025, 1063 (2004).
69 Id.
70 Watkin, supra note 35, at 22. 
71 Berman, supra note 63, at 20.
72 Murphy, supra note 37, at 1140.
73 Id. at 1140-41.  “The core protections establish specific rules concerning termination of captivity, imply a process for 
determining whether continued detention is merited, and suggest outcomes for different categories of detainees.”  Id. at 1141.
74  Id. at 1141. 
75  Id. at 1141.
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The Military Commissions Act of 2006
In an attempt to fill in the ambiguities left by the Conventions and to address 
the judiciary’s concern about military commissions expressed in Hamdan, Congress 
enacted the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (“MCA”).76  Before the Supreme 
Court decision in Hamdan, the President had determined that the conflict with 
al Qaeda was not a non-international armed conflict under the scope of Common 
Article 3.77  Coupled with the previous decision that the conflict was also not of an 
international character, the United States was free to fill in the treaty gap with its 
own rules.  The President’s Military Order of November 13, 2001 proceeded to do 
just that by establishing military commissions to try captured al Qaeda combatants.78 
Background to the MCA: Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
Hamdan, a Yemeni national, was in custody at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.79  In 
November 2001, during the hostilities between the United States and the then-
Taliban government of Afghanistan, Hamdan was captured.80  In June 2002, he was 
transported to Guantanamo Bay, where he remained for a year until President Bush 
determined him eligible for trial by military commission.81  The following year he 
was charged with one count of conspiracy “to commit . . . offenses triable by military 
commission.”82  As a result of being charged, Hamdan filed writs of habeas corpus 
and mandamus to challenge the military commission that would have been convened 
to try him.83  The District Court granted his habeas request,84 but the Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed.85  The Supreme Court granted certiorari and 
held that the military commission convened to try Hamdan lacked power to proceed 
because it violated both the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva 
Conventions.86  Four Justices went on to decide that the conspiracy offense of which 
Hamdan was accused was not an “‘offens[e] that by . . . the law of war may be tried 
by military commissions.’”87 
Though the decision did not overtly overrule prior precedent, it “substantially 
narrowed the scope of three World War II-era cases on which the Bush Administration 
had repeatedly relied as authority for its approach to detainees” captured in the 
76  Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (codified in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).
77  Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Military Commissions Act, the Geneva Conventions, and the Courts: A Critical Guide, 101 
Am. J. Int’l L. 73, 73 (2007).
78  Military Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 
57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001). 
79  Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2759. 
80  Id.
81  Id.
82  Id.  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
83  Id. 
84  Id.  See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F.Supp.2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004) (“Hamdan I”).
85  Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2759.  See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“Hamdan II”).
86  Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2759.
87  Id. at 2759-60 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 821). 
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conflict.88  The decision also implied that harsh treatment of detainees would be a 
violation of Common Article 3.89  According to Justice Kennedy, Common Article 
3 “is part of a treaty the United States has ratified and thus accepted as binding law 
. . . By Act of Congress, moreover, violations of [the provision] are considered ‘war 
crimes,’ punishable as federal offenses, when committed by or against United States 
nationals and military personnel.”90  The decision of the Court, however, left it up 
to the President to ask Congress for the authority he desired to convene military 
commissions.91  He did just that.
The President did not reject the court outright.  Rather, the President “sought to 
ensure that the Court would not again have occasion to interpret [the Article], or any 
of the other articles of the Geneva Conventions.”92  The initial bill, S. 3861, proposed 
barring “any invocation” of the Conventions in court, providing that “‘[n]o person in 
any habeas action or any other action may invoke the Geneva Conventions or any 
protocols thereto as a source of rights; whether directly or indirectly, for any purpose 
in any court of the United States or its States or territories.’”93  Luckily, Congress 
exercised restraint, but provisions of the subsequent MCA “arguably curtail the 
courts’ ability to enforce [the] Conventions or international law more generally.”94 
Nevertheless, sponsors of the bill emphasized that it was meant to “preserve intact 
the U.S. obligations under the Geneva Conventions.”95
The MCA
Congress responded to President Bush’s call by enacting the MCA.  The first 
order of business for the MCA was to give the President distinct statutory authority 
to establish military commissions.96  The Hamdan Court held that Article 21 of the 
statutory Articles of War97 made compliance with such laws a condition precedent 
to the President’s authority to establish military commissions.98  The MCA bypasses 
this statutory requirement and gives the President separate statutory authority “to 
88  Michael C. Dorf, The Orwellian Military Commissions Act of 2006, 5 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 10, 11 (2007).  In the cases of 
Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), and In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946), the 
Supreme Court had rejected various challenges to the outcomes of military tribunals.  Id. at 12. The Supreme Court found that 
the previous cases had either been narrowed or superseded, and instead, the Court relied on the Civil War-era case of Ex Parte 
Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866).  Id.  In Milligan, the Court held that “where no military emergency prevents the civilian courts from 
operating, military courts are unconstitutional.”  Id.
89 Dorf, supra note 88, at 11.
90  Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. 2802 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2441).
91  Dorf, supra note 88, at 12.
92  Vázquez, supra note 74, at 74. 
93  Id.  Strangely enough, the strong language of the text would even have barred United States citizens from invoking the 
protections of the Conventions in their own courts. 
94  Id. 
95  Id.; Statement of Sen. John McCain, 152 Cong. Rec. S10,354, S10, 413-14 (Sept. 28, 2006) (“[The proposed Act] does 
not amend, redefine, or modify the Geneva Conventions in any way.  The Conventions are preserved intact . . . [T]his bill makes 
clear that the United States will fulfill all of its obligations under those Conventions.”). 
96  Vázquez, supra note 74, at 76.
97  See 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000).
98  Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2795.  The laws of war include the Geneva Conventions.
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establish military commissions to try alien unlawful enemy combatants for specified 
offenses.”99  
The MCA contains the basic rules for military commissions, and “it authorizes 
the Secretary of Defense to enact additional pretrial and trial procedures,” which 
may diverge from courts-martial procedures if deemed “impracticable or inconsistent 
with military or intelligence operations.”100  Nevertheless, under section 948b(f ), “[a] 
military commission established under this chapter is a regularly constituted court, 
affording all necessary ‘judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by 
civilized peoples’ for purposes of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.”101 
This MCA provision quotes directly from the text of Common Article 3, thereby 
adopting it. As a result, the MCA cannot be said to repeal or supersede the 
Conventions.  
The basic strictures of the MCA itself are not controversial. The creation of 
a new status of combatant—the “unlawful combatant”—was.  The United States 
created the term “unlawful combatant” to ensure that regardless of to whomever 
Common Article 3 applies, it cannot apply to this designation of fighter.  The 
term “unite[s] crime and combat in a manner that short-circuit[s] the alternative” 
between international and domestic law.102  In effect, the United States declared 
that certain detainees, these “unlawful combatants,”  did not merit the protection of 
domestic law due to their activities, while simultaneously declaring that these same 
detainees did not merit the protections of the laws of war due to the unlawful nature 
of their combat.103  What results is a term which “seemed designed to establish a 
crude, general dichotomy between law and war.”104  In the way it has been used, 
the term creates a category of individuals without rights–“neither criminal suspects 
nor prisoners of war, committed to the caprice of unreviewable state power.”105  The 
international powers most likely did not have such a situation in mind when drafting 
the Conventions. 
Conflicts With International Law
If, as many commentators have argued, Common Article 3 has risen to the status 
of customary international law, its circumvention by the United States would be 
a breach of the Geneva Conventions.  Former Department of Defense Associate 
Deputy General Counsel (International Affairs) Jack M. Beard finds that the MCA 
contradicts the Geneva Conventions and the law of war in at least five ways106: (1) 
trial standards and detainee treatment; (2) new definition of combatancy; (3) the 
99 Vázquez, supra note 74, at 77.  See also 10 U.S.C. § 948b(a) (2006).
100 Vázquez, supra note 74, at 77; 10 U.S.C. § 949a(a) (2006).
101 10 U.S.C. § 948b(f ) (2006).
102 Berman, supra note 63, at 13.
103 Id. 
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Jack M. Beard, The Geneva Boomerang: The Military Commissions Act of 2006 and U.S. Counterterror Operations, 101 Am. 
J. Int’l L. 56, 56 (2007).
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addition of offenses to the law of war; (4) the omission of “vague” obligations and 
the rejection non-domestic sources of law; and (5) the confusion of laws governing 
international and noninternational armed conflict.107  
First, under the Geneva Conventions, “the passing of sentences and the carrying 
out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted 
court affording all the judicial guarantees . . . recognized as indispensable by civilized 
peoples” are prohibited.108  According to the Supreme Court in Hamdan, military 
commissions can be “regularly constituted courts” only if they display consistency 
with regular courts-martial practice or there is a “practical need” for any deviation.109 
A regularly constituted court “must be understood to incorporate at least the barest 
of those trial protections that have been recognized by customary international 
law.”110  Customary international law is described as “evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law.”111  For a rule to be established as customary, the practice of it need 
not be “in rigorous conformity with the rule.”112  
Unfortunately, despite attempts to add or to clarify additional rights, the MCA 
still allows for “significant deviations”113 from regular courts-martial: hearsay evidence 
not normally admissible may be used;114 the defendant may be excluded from the 
courtroom under certain circumstances;115 certain portions of the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice relating to a speedy trial, compulsory self-incrimination, and 
pretrial investigation are inapplicable;116 the pool of people from which a defendant 
may choose as counsel is limited;117 and classified information may be used against 
a defendant while the defendant’s ability to challenge how the government acquired 
the evidence is restricted.118 
Second, the failure of military commissions to try a single case since their 
inception in 2001 has led many of its supporters to call for coverage of more “off-the-
shelf ” war crimes in the MCA.119  In response, Congress cast a wide net to include 
not just those committing terrorist acts but also those accused of giving support 
to terrorists.120  An “unlawful enemy combatant” is defined, therefore, not only as 
107 Id. at 57-64.
108 Geneva Conventions, Common Article 3, supra note 10.  (Emphasis added.)
109 Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2797.
110 Id.
111 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b).
112 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. United States), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 98 (1986).  The I.C.J. continues stating 
that “instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally [be] treated as breaches of that rule, not as 
indications of the recognition of a new rule.”  Id.
113 Beard, supra note 106, at 58.
114 10 U.S.C. § 949a(b)(2)(E) (2006).
115 Id. at § 949a(b)(1)(B).
116 Id. at §§ 948b(d)(1)(A)-(C).
117 Id. at §§ 949c(b) & 948k.
118 Id. at § 949j(c).
119  Beard, supra note 106, at 59.
120  Id.
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a person engaged in hostilities but also one who has “purposefully and materially 
supported hostilities against the United States . . . who is not a lawful enemy 
combatant (including a person who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated 
forces).”121  Many were concerned that this expansion in the definition of combatancy 
would blur the distinction between combatant and civilian—a cardinal principle 
of the law of war.122  Although the distinction has not always been easy, Common 
Article 3 protects persons not actively taking part in hostilities.  By expanding the 
definition of “taking part” to include “material support,” the United States has made 
the distinction ever more difficult.123
Third, the MCA adds new war crimes to its definitions, most of which are 
taken from domestic law.  Since the United States could have punished unlawful 
combatants in its domestic system but chose not to do so, its establishment of military 
commissions must comply with the law of war.  One such domestic crime incorporated 
into the MCA is that of conspiracy, a crime which four justices in Hamdan felt did 
not constitute an independent war crime.124  The law of war as codified in the MCA, 
the “hybrid version” of the law of war, “fundamentally undermines the integrity of 
that body of law by importing into it ordinary domestic crimes that have no basis 
as war crimes.”125  Another problem with the additional war crimes is the possibility 
of ex post facto application.126  In an attempt to sidestep this foreseeable problem, 
Congress announced that the provisions of the MCA “codify offenses that have 
traditionally been triable by military commissions.”127  Furthermore, the MCA “does 
not establish new crimes that did not exist before its enactment but rather codifies 
those crimes for trial by military commission.”128
Fourth, the MCA amended the U.S. War Crimes Act to prohibit violations 
of Common Article 3 from being war crimes.129  As a result, only violations of 
Common Article 3 that are grave breaches may be prohibited, although “it has 
usually been assumed that the grave breaches regime applies only to armed conflicts 
of an international character.”130  Additionally, the MCA omitted two Article 
3 prohibitions: the prohibition in Common Article 3 of the passing of sentences 
and the carrying out of executions without the previous judgments of regularly 
121  10 U.S.C. § 948a(1)(A)(i). 
122  Beard, supra note 106, at 60.
123  See id. 
124  Id. at 61; Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2785.
125  Beard, supra note 106, at 61.
126  Id.
127  10 U.S.C. § 950p(a).
128  Id. at § 950p(a).  Additionally, since the provisions are declarative of existing law, crimes that occurred before enactment 
of the MCA are not precluded from trial.  Id. at § 950p(b).
129  Beard, supra note 106, at 62.
130  Id.  This is especially interesting given the insistence of the United States that the current conflict is noninternational. 
If the “grave breaches” regime only applied to international armed conflicts, the United States need not worry of committing 
such a breach in the present case.  Several commentators have claimed, however, that the need to treat those involved in internal 
conflicts more leniently than those in international conflicts is absurd.  Moreover, the United States itself argued that the 
regime should be applied to internal as well as international conflicts in Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-a-A, 38 ILM 1518 
(1999).  Id. at n.40.
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constituted courts and the prohibition against “outrages upon personal dignity,” 
including “humiliating and degrading treatment.”131  The only reason given for the 
second omission is that its wording is “‘vague.’”132 
Finally, the Geneva Conventions do not define what constitutes a “conflict not of 
an international character,” and no majority can agree on a single definition.133  The 
Bush Administration adamantly argued that the conflict with al Qaeda does not fall 
into either the category of international armed conflict or noninternational armed 
conflict, leaving the conflict to be the orphan child of the laws of war disallowing 
protection for detainees.  The purpose of international humanitarian law, however, 
is to afford a minimum standard of protection for peoples in conflict.  In an attempt 
to prevent the detainees from slipping through the cracks, the Supreme Court 
found that the minimal protections of Common Article 3 applied to the conflict.134 
Congress responded in the MCA by listing offenses not only included in Common 
Article 3 (of which there are few) but also those crimes “generally understood” to 
be violations of international armed conflict.135  Congress did this despite the fact 
that the Bush Administration had argued in Hamdan that the conflict was not 
international, disallowing the application of the full power of the Conventions.136  In 
the final product, detainees may be tried both for violations of international armed 
conflict and noninternational armed conflict despite the Administration’s constant 
insistence that the conflict is not of an international nature.
Responses to American Actions
The current administration’s post-September 11 legal and political responses 
to the threat of al Qaeda “generated an evident and growing rift domestically and 
internationally.”137  While there was immense support for the American position 
directly after the events, the constant failure to abide by international agreements 
ultimately led to dissatisfaction with the Administration both home and abroad. 
Moreover, the staunch position the United States has taken will cause it problems in 
future conflicts and dealings with foreign nations.
Domestic Reactions
According to several Gallup polls, domestic views of the United States’ position 
internationally have undergone a complete reversal.138  Since February 2001, the 
dissatisfaction with the United States’ global position has more than doubled to 
131  Beard, supra note 106, at 62; Geneva Conventions, Common Article 3, supra note 10.
132  Beard, supra note 106, at 62.
133  Id. at 63. 
134  Id. 
135  Id. 
136  Id.
137  Ní Aoláin, supra note 42, at 1535. 
138  Lydia Saad, Discontent With U.S. Global Position Hits Record High, Gallup, Mar. 5, 2008, http://www.gallup.com/
poll/104782/Discontent-US-Global-Position-Hits-Record-High.aspx.  The results are based on telephone interviews with 
1,007 adults conduct 11-14 February 2008.  The maximum margin for error is estimated at ± 3 percentage points.  Id.
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68%.139  This dissatisfaction rating is the highest Gallup has ever recorded on the 
question.140  The American public’s perception of how the rest of the world views 
the United States is equally dismal.  In February 2001, 75% of Americans said the 
United States rates favorably in the eyes of the rest of the world.141  As of January 
2008, that confidence is only at 43%.142  Furthermore, in April 2008, the percentage 
of Americans satisfied with the ways things were going in the United States was 
at a low of 15%, the third lowest since 1979.143  It was this trend, coupled with an 
ailing economy and the public’s general dissatisfaction with the leadership of the 
Bush Administration and congressional Republicans that largely led to the party’s 
overwhelming defeat in the 2006 and 2008 elections.
International Reactions
American intelligence agencies have found that American actions regarding Iraq 
have “helped spawn a new generation of Islamic radicalism and that the overall terrorist 
threat has grown since the September 11 attacks.”144  The National Intelligence 
Estimate is the first formal appraisal of global terrorism since the beginning of the 
Iraq war.145  Previous drafts of the Estimate described government actions “that 
were determined to have stoked the jihad movement, like the indefinite detention of 
prisoners at Guantanamo Bay.”146  Since most of the Estimate is classified, it is unclear 
whether the specific policy criticisms remained.  Regardless, every sign points to the 
spreading, not shrinking, of radicalization in the Muslim world.147
Regarding the MCA, foreign countries, including allies, “are likely to view the 
new military commissions in the context of the widely recognized and fundamental 
judicial guarantees referenced in Common Article 3.”148  As such, they may disagree 
“that the MCA successfully provides the ‘barest’ of these required trial provisions.”149 
The Future of U.S. Counterterrorism Operations in the Wake of the MCA
As a result of the actions taken despite its obligations under the law of the 
war, the United States may have inadvertently caused a “negative or ‘boomerang’ 
effect” on its own interests.150  Though containing repeated invocations of the 
Geneva Conventions, the MCA “authorizes the United States to breach those 
139  Id.  As of January 2008, only 30% of Americans polled were satisfied with the position of the United States in the 
world–a decline from a high of 71% in January 2002.  Id.
140  Id.
141  Id.
142  Id.
143  Frank Newport, U.S. Satisfaction at 15%, Lowest since 1992, Gallup, Apr. 14, 2008, http://www.gallup.com/
poll/106498/US-Satisfaction-15-Lowest-Since-1992.aspx. 
144  Mark Mazzetti, Spy Agencies Say Iraq War Worsens Terrorism Threat, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 2006, at A1.
145  Id.
146  Id.
147  Id.
148  Beard, supra note 106, at 58.
149  Id. at 58.
150  Id. at 56.
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Conventions because it authorizes the opening of a gap between the U.S.-sourced 
only interpretation of the Conventions and the consensus view of the international 
community.”151 Accordingly, the negative impact can fall into two categories: legal 
and political.  
Legally, one or two small violations of the laws of war by a state might not lead 
to immediate reciprocal action; an attempt, however, to rewrite specific obligations 
can lead to trouble.152  Based on its position and strength in the world, the United 
States had significant incentive to participate in the creation and the continued 
support of the Geneva Conventions.  Overlooking the purely humanitarian 
reasons for such participation, “encouraging the proper treatment of captured U.S. 
personnel, and . . . the observance of obligations under the law of war is viewed by 
the U.S. military as fundamentally advancing U.S. military objectives.”153  As in most 
cases, the United States has been reluctant to take steps which would undermine 
long-term interests in preserving the status quo of the laws of war.  Prior to the 
MCA, the Bush Administration had to retreat from “aggressive” interpretations 
of the Conventions “in light of their potential long-term negative impact on U.S. 
operations.”154  More importantly, “issuance of sweeping pronouncements about the 
inapplicability of the Geneva Conventions to foreign countries . . . would undermine 
the overall U.S. commitment to the Conventions and serve as a dangerous precedent 
in future conflicts.”155  This is especially important in the international context where 
there is no real mechanism for enforcement.  By allowing easy violation of treaties, 
the commitment of the United States to the international community is severely 
discredited.  This, in turn, could lead other countries to decrease their desire to 
strictly uphold their international agreements.156 
As for the future, the revisions of the Conventions by the MCA “may impede 
or estop the United States from taking legal positions that it has previously relied 
on to support its operations and protect its personnel from violators of the laws of 
war.”157  Even worse, Congress may have given future enemies a model by which 
to bypass Convention obligations which could prove hazardous to United States 
personnel engaged in overseas conflicts.  Specifically, the blurring of the designation 
between combatants and civilians has erased the previous interpretation that simply 
contributing to a war effort generally did not make a civilian a combatant.  In an 
over-simplified example, foreign countries could find United States’ taxpayers guilty 
of contributing to the United States’ war effort, thus committing a war crime. 
151  Dorf, supra note 88, at 17-18 (emphasis in original).
152  Beard, supra note 106, at 64.
153  Id.
154  Id.  For example, while the Department of Justice claimed that the Taliban was “nothing more than a militant group 
of terrorists” and that the President had authority to suspend the Third Geneva Conventions between the United States and 
Afghanistan, the President decided against such suspension in lieu of the negative impact such actions would have on future 
American interests.  Id.
155  Id. at 65.
156  See id. at 66.
157  Beard, supra note 106, at 66.
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 The incorporation of domestic crimes into United States laws of war should prove 
more frightening.  The inclusion of the new war crimes will “pose serious challenges 
to U.S. military commanders and their forces if they find themselves subject to the 
ex post facto application of new war crimes that originate in other countries’ domestic 
legal systems.”158  Moreover, it is not unimaginable for some states involved in future 
armed conflict with the United States, to copy the legal approach taken by Congress 
and to fashion new “‘war crimes’ for captured U.S. personnel that reflect those states’ 
very different political or religious beliefs.”159  To sum it up, “Congress [has] endorsed 
an approach to war crimes that could permit a future adversary to reject the same 
international legal norms and rules that the United States has supported and relied 
upon for over a century.”160  If this is the case, the United States might be estopped 
from making arguments counter to its current position, or at the very least find its 
protestations falling upon deaf ears.
Politically, the United States is alienating the foreign countries it needs to fight 
the war on terror.  To be successful in its pursuit of terrorists, the United States 
needs enormous amounts of international cooperation.  In the beginning, the United 
States enjoyed wide support for its efforts, but its current decisions to circumvent 
international law have not fared well, even among its closest traditional allies. 
Public support in Europe and other states for cooperative activities with the United 
States is dwindling.161  Additionally, European audiences are skeptical of United 
States detention policies, leading some countries to threaten refusal of extradition 
unless the United States promises the detainees would be tried in civilian courts.162 
Furthermore, European officials have come under fire in their home countries 
for clandestine activities related to the detention and the transfer of suspected 
terrorists, which suggests that the United States might have a harder time using 
European soil to conduct such activities in the future.163  Finally, the operation of 
United States military bases overseas involves the cooperation of foreign states, and 
even some military operations occurring outside the bases need foreign assent and 
authorization.  Further cooperation by the foreign states might be foreclosed due to 
the United States’ flaunting of international norms. 
Conclusion
The Bush Administration engaged in “‘hyper-technical legal analysis’ to exploit 
ambiguities in existing treaties and thus deny their applicability[,] . . . [an] approach . 
. . wholly at odds with America’s long history of faithful application of the law of war, 
158  Id. at 67.
159  Id.
160  Id. at 68.
161  Id. at 70.  “[R]ecent remarks of the legal adviser of the U.S. Department of State [conceded] that trying to explain U.S. 
detention policies to foreign audiences was ‘clearly an uphill battle.’”  Id.
162  Beard, supra note 106, at 70.
163  Id. at 72.
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whether formally required or not.”164  The United States is fighting in unchartered 
waters, but it does not need to end-run around international treaties to protect its 
sovereignty.  Common Article 3 provides minimum standards of detainee treatment 
which would neither inconvenience the United States nor hamper its ability to find 
the war on terror.  The Obama Administration’s decision to abide by these minimal 
standards would return the United States to its position as world leader while 
maintaining its ability to protect its personnel in future conflicts.  As a global leader, 
the United States must return to its roots and faithfully apply the laws of war. 
164  Glazier, supra note 2, at 119. 
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The Fourth Amendment and Domestic National 
Security Surveillance:
Challenging the Need for Traditional Warrants
Stephen D. Hargraves
Introduction
 Large-scale domestic terrorist attacks beginning with the 1993 World Trade 
Center bombing and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and culminating in the 
World Trade Center devastation incurred on September 11, 2001, have brought 
the need for effective national security investigations to the political forefront. 
Traditionally, to gather information regarding national security threats, government 
officials have used many tools, such as wiretapping, which also have applications in 
ordinary criminal investigations.1 Such tools have succeeded in preventing attacks 
on the American public.2 However, past government wiretapping abuses, implicating 
First Amendment freedom of expression and Fourth Amendment privacy violations, 
have created an atmosphere of mistrust and a general “Big Brother” fear by the 
American people.3 As a result of past civil rights violations, as well as the cross-over 
effect of national security investigations and ordinary criminal investigations risking 
an individual’s exposure to criminal liability, a tug-of-war exists between individual 
civil rights and effective national security efforts. 
Much attention has been given to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
(“FISA”) as it relates to national security investigations, including wiretapping, 
of foreign nationals.4 This paper, however, focused on the balancing act between 
individual rights under the Fourth Amendment and domestic national security 
wiretapping, with specific attention given to whether a post hoc retroactive judicial 
validation and legislative wiretapping review process, related to national security 
investigations, can take the traditional warrant role in satisfying due process under 
the Fourth Amendment. 
 First, this paper will briefly review the history surrounding the drafting of the 
Fourth Amendment to provide a framework for discussing how the Framers’ goals 
may be satisfied in today’s terrorism landscape. An examination of the genesis of 
the modern right to privacy will further illustrate the underlying goals and rights 
1  Stephen Dycus et al., National Security Law 477 (4th ed. 2007).
2  Id.
3  J. Edgar Hoover’s secret electronic surveillance in the 1930’s; President Roosevelt’s secret surveillance approval in the 
1940’s, and the related executive claim that “the authority to conduct warrantless surveillance derived from the President’s 
inherent powers in the realm of foreign affairs;” the FBI’s self-authorized use of electronic surveillance in the 1950’s and 
60’s against war protestors and civil rights leaders; and the Watergate scandal involving secret executive surveillance of 
political enemies. Elizabeth Gillingham Dailey, Comment, Beyond “Persons, Houses, Papers, and Effects”: Rewriting the Fourth 
Amendment for National Security Surveillance, 10 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 641, 644-45 (2006).
4  See, e.g., Dailey, supra note 3; Dara Jebrock, Comment, Securing Liberty: Terrorizing Fourth Amendment Protections in a 
Post 9/11 World, 30 Nova L. Rev. 279 (2006); Jennifer L. Sullivan, From “The Purpose” to “A Significant Purpose”: Assessing the 
Constitutionality of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Under the Fourth Amendment, 19 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. 
Pol’y 379, 403 (2005).
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of the Fourth Amendment. Next, this paper will address United States Supreme 
Court jurisprudence affecting national security investigations, as well as possible 
FISA applications to domestic investigations. Lastly, this critique will conclude 
by demonstrating legal parallels to the wiretapping issue, such as the Fourth 
Amendment’s open field exception, the administrative subpoena function, and 
national security letter Fourth Amendment implications. The paper will articulate 
how parallels can be instructive in the determination that post hoc review is consistent 
with Fourth Amendment principles.
 This paper will resolve the following general questions: 1) how does the history 
surrounding the Fourth Amendment’s drafting, and the modern right to privacy’s 
genesis, illustrate the Fourth Amendment’s underlying goals and rights; and 2) 
whatever the Fourth Amendment’s underlying goals and rights, how can those 
goals be sufficiently satisfied while balancing the government’s obligations related to 
domestic national security. Focusing on the foregoing questions will illustrate that 
a post hoc retroactive judicial validation process, coupled with legislative oversight, 
should be implemented in the domestic national security landscape.
History Surrounding the Fourth Amendment’s Drafting
 A brief historical review surrounding the Fourth Amendment’s drafting provides 
a framework for achieving the Framers’ goals in today’s terrorism landscape. The 
Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized.5
The well known historical purpose of the Fourth Amendment, directed against 
general warrants and writs of assistance, was to prevent the use of governmental 
force to search a man’s house, his person, his papers, and his effects, and to prevent 
a seizure against his will.6 In the late 1700s, “[t]he British general warrant was a 
search tool employed without limitation on location, and without any necessity to 
precisely describe the object or person sought.”7 Given its broad function, the British 
government used general warrants as a tool to intimidate citizens.8 In 1766, after 
many abuses by the English government, general warrants were declared illegal in 
England.9
5  U.S. Const. amend. Iv.
6  See e.g., Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
7  Dycus, supra note 1, at 481.
8  Id.
9  General warrants employed by Charles I intended to “intimidate dissidents, authors, and printers of seditious material 
by ransacking homes and seizing personal papers.” Id..
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 While general warrant use subsided in England, “[t]he practice had obtained in 
the colonies of issuing writs of assistance to the revenue officers, empowering them, 
in their discretion, to search suspected places for smuggled goods.”10 Additionally, 
the Secretary of State would issue general warrants to search private houses “for the 
discovery and seizures of books and papers that might be used to convict their owner 
of the charge of libel.”11 For example, from 1762 to 1766, a publication called “North 
Briton” published anti-government messages.12 As a result, based on the paper’s 
exercise of speech, the North Briton’s owner was served a general warrant, his home 
was searched, and his personal papers were seized by the government.13 
 After the Revolutionary War, the Framers of the Constitution drafted the 
Fourth Amendment in response to the crescendo of complaints against royal officials’ 
abuses regarding privacy violations via writs of assistance.14 Accordingly, “[t]he 
Fourth Amendment was designed to protect against overreaching in investigations 
of criminal enterprises.”15 Moreover, the Fourth Amendment’s historical framework 
reveals that the Framers’ primary concern in drafting the amendment was to limit 
governmental abuse of freedom of assembly and speech.16 As such, any proposed 
judicial review system which effectively curtails national security investigation abuses 
will substantively satisfy the Fourth Amendment. 
The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy:  A Modern View’s 
Genesis
 After the invention of wire communications in 1844, wiretapping closely 
followed as a method to intercept such communications.17 In essence, “[w]iretaps 
allow a person to intercept private conversations by placing a listening device on the 
communication wires.”18 At the beginning of the twentieth century, law enforcement 
agents quickly learned of wiretapping’s value, and turned the method into an 
investigatory tool.19 
1920’s Fourth Amendment Concept
 Prior to the United States Supreme Court Katz v. United States decision in 
1967, wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping had been governed for forty 
years by Olmstead v. United States.20 In Olmstead, the Court found that the Fourth 
Amendment only protected against the seizure of tangible objects.21 Thus, the police 
10  Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625.
11  Id. at 625-26.
12  Id.
13  Id.
14  Dycus, supra note 1, at 482.
15  Id.
16  Id.
17 Dailey, supra note 3, at 644.
18  Id.
19  Id.
20  Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
21  Id. at 466.
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wiretapping interception of a private telephone conversation, where there was no 
physical trespass of the house, did not violate the Fourth Amendment.22 However, 
Justice Brandeis, in his dissenting opinion, anticipated the upcoming technological 
horizon and disparaged the majority’s property/trespass requirement when he 
stated:
‘Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and 
purposes.’ Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy 
have become available to the government. Discovery and invention 
have made it possible for the government, by means far more effective 
than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is 
whispered in the closet…. The progress of science in furnishing the 
government with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire 
tapping. Ways may some day be developed by which the government, 
without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in 
court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most 
intimate occurrences of the home.23
The Court’s holding in Olmstead laid the foundation for the Fourth Amendment’s 
property/trespass concept.
 An example of the absurdity of the Fourth Amendment property/trespass 
concept, when applied against modern technology, is evident in Goldman v. 
United States.24 In the Goldman case, federal agents initially attempted to extend 
earphones into an office to overhear a conference involving the defendant.25 When 
the initial attempt to eavesdrop did not work, the agents placed a sensitive listening 
device, a detectaphone, against the wall, successfully intercepting the defendant’s 
conversations.26 In its holding, the Court found that while the earphones’ use 
constituted a trespass, the detectaphone’s use was not a trespass.27 Therefore, the 
Court held that because the conversation was recorded using the detectaphone, the 
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights had not been violated.28 
Allowing a defendant’s Fourth Amendment protections to turn on “trivialities 
of the local law of trespass” did not seem to fit the Amendment’s substantive goals.29 
As noted above, the Fourth Amendment focused on government abuses of a citizen’s 
right to free speech, and in effect the privacy of one’s home.30 Binding constitutional 
rights to trespass laws, as illustrated in Goldman, did nothing to keep the government’s 
22  Id.
23  Id. at 473-74.
24  Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
25  Id. at 131.
26  Id. at 131-32.
27  Id. at 135.
28  Id.
29  Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring).
30  Dycus, supra note 1, at 482.
84 BAKER CENTER JOURNAL OF APPLIED PUBLIC POLICY
eavesdropping in check. It would take twenty five years after the Goldman court’s use 
of the detectaphone loophole before the Supreme Court would drastically change 
the Fourth Amendment’s landscape.
Right to Privacy: From Protecting Places to Protecting People
The United States Supreme Court decisively put to rest the Fourth Amendment’s 
property/trespass concept in Katz v. United States.31 In Katz, the government was 
permitted to use evidence of the petitioner’s telephone conversations, conducted from 
a public telephone booth, which had been gathered using an electronic listening and 
recording device attached to the outside of the booth.32 As a result of this evidence, 
the petitioner was convicted of transmitting gambling information in violation of a 
federal statute.33 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision 
to allow the electronic surveillance evidence.34
The Supreme Court noted that “once it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment 
protects people -- and not simply ‘areas’ -- against unreasonable searches and seizures 
it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or 
absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.”35 Instead, the Court turned 
its attention to whether the defendant “justifiably relied” on the privacy supplied by 
the phone booth.36 Indeed, the Court found that:
[o]ne who occupies [a telephone booth], shuts the door behind him, 
and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to 
assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be 
broadcast to the world. To read the Constitution more narrowly is 
to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in 
private communication.37
Given the petitioner’s justifiable reliance on his privacy within the public telephone 
booth, the Court held that the government agents fatally “ignored ‘the procedure of 
antecedent justification . . . that is central to the Fourth Amendment,’ a procedure 
that [the Court] hold[s] to be a constitutional precondition of the kind of electronic 
surveillance involved in this case . . . because it led to the petitioner’s conviction . . . .”38
Although, in Katz, the Court sought to protect the petitioner’s privacy, the Fourth 
Amendment cannot be read to stand as a general constitutional right to privacy.39 The 
Court specifically noted that the Amendment “protects individual privacy against 
certain kinds of governmental intrusion . . . the protection of a person’s general right 
to privacy -- his right to be let alone by other people -- is, like the protection of 
31  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
32  Id. at 348. 
33  Id.
34  “[T]he Court of Appeals rejected the contention that the recordings had been obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, because ‘[t]here was no physical entrance into the area occupied by [the petitioner].’” Id. at 348-49. 
35  Id. at 353.
36  Id.
37  Id. at 352 (emphasis added).
38  Id. at 359.
39  Id. at 350.
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his property and of his very life, left largely to the law of the individual States.”40 
Therefore, while the outcome of the Katz case provided the petitioner with a right to 
privacy, the Court’s focus, as it related to the Fourth Amendment, remained on the 
prevention of government electronic surveillance abuses. 
Specifically, the Court noted that the government agents’ electronic wiretapping 
“was so narrowly circumscribed that a duly authorized magistrate [pursuant to 
conventional warrant requirements and procedures] … could constitutionally have 
authorized . . . the very limited search and seizure that the Government assert[ed] 
in fact took place.”41 Nonetheless, the Court refused to validate the agents’ conduct 
retroactively.42 While the Court’s refusal appears to shut the door to a retroactive 
judicial validation process,43 the Court held that the fact that the defendant was 
criminally convicted was paramount to the lack of antecedent justification rising to 
the level of a Fourth Amendment violation.44 The decision is silent as to whether 
the Fourth Amendment is implicated when a defendant is not criminally charged, 
and specifically notes that “[w]hether safeguards other than prior authorization by a 
magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national 
security is a question not presented by this case.”45 Therefore, in a national security 
investigation setting, eliminating the ability to criminally charge the target, or at least 
subjecting criminal charges to a “secondary purpose” rule, through retroactive judicial 
validation would appear to substantively satisfy both the Fourth Amendment’s goal 
to prevent government abuse and the Court’s interests in Katz.
The Balancing Act
A tug-of-war exists between the government’s duty to protect domestic security 
and the individual citizen’s right to privacy and free expression. As such, any solution 
must weigh the national security benefits against the risk of governmental civil rights 
abuses. On balance, a retroactive judicial validation scheme for domestic national 
security electronic surveillance, coupled with legislative oversight, can serve to 
mitigate unfettered governmental civil rights abuses, while providing government 
agents with the flexibility to effectively fight the war against Islamic fundamental 
extremists. When faced with compelling exigent circumstances, agents will have the 
ability to react quickly with electronic investigation tools, while they are still subject 
to judicial process and the watchful eye of elected officials in Congress. 
40  Id. at 350-51.
41  Id. at 354.
42  Id. at 356, 358 (quoting Beck v. State of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964)).
43  The Court argues that the “omission of [prior judicial] authorization ‘bypasses the safeguards provided by an objective 
predetermination of probable cause, and substitutes instead the far less reliable procedure of an after-the-event justification for 
the . . . search, too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment.’” Id. at 358 (quoting Beck 
v. State of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964)).
44  Id. at 359.
45  Id. at 358.
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Applying Keith to the Domestic Security Landscape: Leaving the Door Cracked
Shortly after the Supreme Court in Katz extended the Fourth Amendment to 
apply to electronic surveillance, Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act (“OCCSSA”).46 Title III of the Act provided for a procedure to 
gain judicial authorization for electronic surveillance.47 However, Title III explicitly 
excluded national security surveillance from its purview:
Nothing contained in this chapter . . . shall limit the constitutional 
power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to 
protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts 
of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed 
essential to the security of the United States, or to protect national 
security information against foreign intelligence activities. Nor shall 
anything contained in this chapter be deemed to limit the constitutional 
power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to 
protect the United States against the overthrow of the Government by 
force or other unlawful means, or against any other clear and present 
danger to the structure or existence of the Government.48
While the Katz case addressed criminal investigation electronic surveillance, the 
Court directly took up the issue of domestic national security surveillance in United 
States v. United States District Court (known as Keith after the presiding District 
Judge).49 
 In Keith, “[t]he United States charged three defendants with conspiracy to 
destroy, and one of them with destroying, Government property.”50 In charging the 
defendants, the government used electronic surveillance evidence of the defendants’ 
plan to dynamite bomb a Central Intelligence Agency office in Ann Arbor, Michigan.51 
The Attorney General authorized the wiretap used by the government, which was 
not subject to any antecedent judicial justification.52 Although the wiretap was 
conducted without prior judicial review, the government asserted that the electronic 
surveillance was lawful as a “reasonable exercise of presidential power [exercised 
through the Attorney General] to protect the national security.”53 Specifically, in 
light of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3), the government argued “that ‘in excepting national 
security surveillances from the Act’s warrant requirement Congress recognized the 
President’s authority to conduct such surveillances without prior judicial approval’ 
. . . thus [the section] is viewed as a recognition or affirmance of a constitutional 
46  Dycus, supra note 1, at 484.
47  Id.
48  Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (3) (2000).
49  United States v. United States District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
50  Id. at 297.
51  Id. at 299.
52  Id.
53  Id. at 297.
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authority in the President to conduct warrantless domestic security surveillance 
….”54 However, the Court found that § 2511(3) merely served “as a congressional 
disclaimer and expression of neutrality,” and “that the statute is not the measure of 
the executive authority asserted [by the government].”55
Moving past its Title III interpretation, the Court focused its efforts on the 
question left open by Katz: “Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by a 
magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national 
security ….”56 Although the government claimed an inherent presidential authority 
to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance in domestic security investigations,57 
the Court noted that Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution could not serve as the 
sole authority for unfettered executive power.58 In fact, the judicial role in antecedent 
justification of Title III warrants “accords with our basic constitutional doctrine 
that individual freedoms will best be preserved through a separation of powers and 
division of functions among the different branches and levels of Government.”59 As 
such, the Court held that prior judicial approval is required for the type of domestic 
security surveillance involved in Keith.60 
At first glance, the Court’s holding in Keith appears to prevent a post hoc judicial 
review process for domestic national security surveillance. Yet, the Court provided 
that its opinion “does not … attempt to guide the congressional judgment but rather 
to delineate the present scope of [its holding].”61 In addition, the Court announced 
that it did “not attempt to detail the precise standards for domestic security warrants 
any more than [its] decision in Katz sought to set the refined requirements for the 
specified criminal surveillances which now constitute Title III.”62 Indeed, the Court 
recognized that a new judicial process involving searches and seizures in the domestic 
national security landscape is likely necessary given the different policy and practical 
considerations from the surveillance of ordinary and typical crimes.63 
Title III and Domestic National Security Surveillance: Round Peg in Square Hole
As previously noted, Title III of the OCCSSA created a procedural framework 
for government agents to obtain judicial authorization to conduct electronic 
surveillance.64 Indeed, the requirements of Title III “closely track the traditional 
Fourth Amendment warrant requirements.”65 The requirements to issue such a 
warrant are: 1) a neutral judge or magistrate must receive a written application upon 
oath or affirmation of a law enforcement officer; 2) the judge must find probable 
54  Id. at 303.
55  Id. at 308.
56  Id. at 309.
57  Dycus, supra note 1, at 477.
58  Keith, 407 U.S. at 316-18.
59  Id. at 317.
60  Id. at 324.
61  Id. at 323.
62  Id.
63  Id. at 322.
64  Dycus, supra note 1, at 484.
65  Dailey, supra note 3, at 647. 
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cause to believe that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to 
commit a particular crime, that particular communications about the crime will be 
obtained, and that the facility targeted for surveillance is being used, or is about 
to be used in connection with the crime or by the person suspected of the crime; 
and 3) the judge must determine that “normal investigative procedures” other than 
electronic surveillance have failed or are unreasonable for some reason.66 Title III 
also provides a thirty day time limitation for electronic surveillance, as well as a 
notification requirement for the intended target of the surveillance.67
However, applying the traditional Title III warrant requirements to the domestic 
national security landscape is an inherently difficult task, because national security 
investigations often lack information regarding the exact nature of terrorist threats. 
As with a FISA application,68 the first Title III requirement can be easily met in the 
domestic security environment, through the provision of an affidavit accompanying 
a written request for an electronic surveillance warrant by various members of the 
intelligence community. Either a special domestic intelligence surveillance court 
could sit as a neutral magistrate, or the current FISA court could hear domestic 
electronic surveillance applications.69 In addition, the third Title III requirement may 
easily be met, because the need for a clandestine approach to investigate the secretive 
and sensitive national security threats obviates any normal investigative procedure.70
The problematic issue with Title III warrants, as the process relates to domestic 
national security surveillance, lies with the second requirement of procuring the 
necessary authorization. With national security threats, the investigation’s primary 
purpose is to thwart a national disaster, not to build a criminal case against a 
perpetrator. As such, the probable cause requirement in and of itself does not fit, 
because the particular target may not be committing a crime at all. Rather, the 
target may be a link in the chain to ascertain more useful information surrounding 
a perceived threat.
Another difference between national security and ordinary criminal investigations 
noted in Keith, is that “the gathering of security intelligence is often long range 
and involves the interrelation of various sources and types of information.”71 
Furthermore, the “exact targets of such surveillance may be more difficult to identify 
than in surveillance operations against many types of crime specified in Title III.”72 
66  Id. at 648.
67  Id.
68  FISA court orders satisfy the first requirement for the constitutionality of search warrants, because under § 1803, all 
applications are written and then received and reviewed by neutral members of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
(“FISC”). Sullivan, supra note 4, at 403.
69  Id. 
70  The Court in Keith noted that “[t]he covertness and complexity of potential unlawful conduct against the [g]overnment 
and the necessary dependency of many conspirators upon the telephone make electronic surveillance an effective investigatory 
instrument in certain circumstances.” Keith, 407 U.S. at 311-12. Furthermore, “[i]t would be contrary to the public interest for 
Government to deny to itself the prudent and lawful employment of those very techniques which are employed against the [g]
overnment and its law-abiding citizens . . . .” Id. at 312.
71  Id. 
72  Id.
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Additionally, the “emphasis of domestic intelligence gathering is on the prevention 
of unlawful activity or the enhancement of the Government’s preparedness for some 
possible future crisis or emergency …. Thus, the focus of domestic surveillance may be 
less precise than that directed against more conventional types of crime.”73 Lastly, the 
national security investigation process often involves a lack of information regarding 
the exact nature of terrorist threats. Taking into account the distinctions between 
domestic national security and ordinary criminal investigations, the Supreme Court 
in Keith conceded that a different legislative standard could be compatible with the 
Fourth Amendment if “[it is] reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of 
Government for intelligence information and the protected rights of our citizens.”74 
What Legislation Would Satisfy the Fourth Amendment: Striking the Keith Balance 
The natural starting point for a legislative solution to the difficulties in applying 
Title III to the domestic national security landscape is to look at the FISA 
framework. Similar to 18 U.S.C. § 1803, a special domestic intelligence surveillance 
court (“DISC”) could be established to allow for neutral judges or magistrates to 
receive and review written domestic surveillance applications. Or, the current FISC 
could hear domestic electronic surveillance applications. Either option would satisfy 
the first Title III requirement for the constitutionality of search warrants. 
Additionally, a domestic intelligence surveillance application should contain a 
description of the target of the surveillance, and a statement of facts justifying the 
government’s belief that the target is directly or indirectly a clear and present threat 
against the United States of America. Such a verification would speak to both the 
Fourth Amendment’s requirement to designate the specific target of an investigation, 
and the constitutional powers granted to the executive branch in Article II, Section 
1 of the Constitution, to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the 
United States.”75 In addition, the application must contain a statement justifying the 
government’s belief that the target facility is being used or is about to be used by the 
target of the investigation. 
Although the venue and written requirements for a domestic intelligence 
surveillance application have important constitutional implications in how closely 
Title III requirements are tracked, the most important issue surrounding such 
applications is the timing of the application. While the traditional warrant, as noted 
in Katz, requires antecedent justification,76 the unique and exigent circumstances 
present in national security threats require a post hoc retroactive judicial validation 
process to grant the government the flexibility to successfully maintain the national 
security. 
In the FISA arena, the statutes provide that the “President, through the 
Attorney General, may authorize electronic surveillance without a court order under 
this subchapter to acquire foreign intelligence information for periods of up to one 
73  Id.
74  Id. at 322-23.
75  U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.
76  Katz, 389 U.S. at 359.
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year if the Attorney General [makes certain certifications] in writing under oath.”77 
Specifically, the Attorney General must certify that the electronic surveillance is 
directed solely at a foreign power, or its agents, and not a United States citizen.78 
The executive power to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance, without a prior 
court order, was affirmed by the 4th Circuit in United States v. Truong Dinh Hung.79 
In Truong, the defendants were convicted of espionage, conspiracy to commit 
espionage, and several espionage-related offenses for transmitting classified United 
States government information to representatives of the government of the Socialist 
Republic of vietnam.80 In convicting the defendant, the government used recorded 
conversations obtained from warrantless wiretaps of the defendant’s phone, and 
electronic surveillance equipment (“bugs”) in the defendant’s apartment.81 
The court in Troung held that in the area of foreign intelligence, a “uniform warrant 
requirement would, following Keith, ‘unduly frustrate’ the President in carrying 
out his foreign affairs responsibilities.”82 The court also reasoned that “attempts to 
counter foreign threats to the national security require the utmost stealth, speed, 
and secrecy.”83 Indeed, a “warrant requirement would add a procedural hurdle that 
would reduce the flexibility of executive foreign intelligence initiatives, in some cases 
delay executive response to foreign intelligence threats, and increase the chance of 
leaks regarding sensitive executive operations.”84 Moreover, “[f ]ew, if any, district 
courts would be truly competent to judge the importance of particular information 
to the security of the United States or the ‘probable cause’ to demonstrate that the 
government in fact needs to recover that information from one particular source.”85 
However, the court incorrectly found that when there is “no foreign connection, the 
executive’s needs become less compelling; and the surveillance more closely resembles 
the surveillance of suspected criminals, which must be authorized by warrant.”86 The 
constitutional question of whether antecedent justification is necessary for domestic 
electronic surveillance, in order to prevent a catastrophic national security disaster, 
should not turn on whether the investigation’s target is a U.S. citizen or foreign 
national, or whether that target is connected to a foreign power.87 As seen in the 
political debate over what constitutes torture, and the applicability of the Geneva 
Conventions, it is not easy to define and identify a traditional “foreign power” in a 
terrorism environment. In Keith, the Court noted that it used “the term ‘domestic 
organization’ in [its] opinion to mean a group or organization … composed of citizens 
77  50 U.S.C. § 1802 (2000).
78  Id.
79  United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1982).
80  Id. at 911.
81  Id. at 912.
82  Id. at 913.
83  Id.
84  Id.
85  Id. at 914.
86  Id. at 915.
87  Truong was a vietnamese citizen, therefore the court did not have to address how the legal analysis would change if he 
was a U.S. citizen working with a foreign power. Id. at 911.
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of the United States and which has no significant connection with a foreign power, 
its agents or agencies,” and the Court recognized that there would be cases “where 
it will be difficult to distinguish between “domestic” and “foreign” unlawful activities 
directed against the government of the United States where there is collaboration in 
varying degrees between domestic groups or organizations and agents or agencies of 
foreign powers.”88 
FISA authorization to conduct warrantless wiretaps for up to a year is only 
available where a U.S. citizen is not involved.89 However, if the only change in a fact 
pattern before the DISC is that a U.S. citizen is involved, does the need for “stealth, 
speed, and secrecy”outlined in Troung necessarily change? Does the “interrelation 
of various sources and types of information,” as noted in Keith, necessarily change? 
Does the preventative emphasis of domestic intelligence gathering efforts necessarily 
change? 
The answer, most clearly, is no, but the concern for civil rights abuses enters 
the picture with the introduction of U.S. citizens into the domestic surveillance 
landscape. However, if the only weight on the balancing scale against the government’s 
interests in conducting electronic surveillance is a concern for protection against 
government abuses, then a post hoc retroactive judicial validation process would 
serve to mitigate those concerns. The Court, in Keith, was concerned that “post-
surveillance review would never reach the surveillances which failed to result in 
prosecutions.”90 Therefore, post hoc judicial review must be mandatory for all 
electronic surveillance activities not subjected to antecedent justification, without 
regard to whether criminal prosecutions were allowed or pursued. Mandatory review 
would ensure that government agents employing electronic surveillance would be 
subject to judicial oversight, satisfying the separation of powers reasoning in Keith, 
and, consequently, the agents would naturally self-regulate the reasonableness and 
degree of impact involved in any domestic electronic surveillance.
Another solution to offset the concerns of government civil rights abuses lies 
with the “Primary Purpose Test” treatment in the context of domestic national 
security. Truong is “widely credited with establishing the primary purpose test.”91 
The test mandates that “the executive should be excused from securing a warrant 
only when the surveillance is conducted ‘primarily’ for foreign intelligence reasons.”92 
In conjunction with post 9/11 congressional changes, “section 218 of the Patriot 
Act changed section 1804(a)(7)(b) to require a designated member of the executive 
branch to certify that ‘a significant purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign 
intelligence information.’”93 
Whether the government must show that the surveillance’s primary purpose, 
or significant purpose, is for national security reasons, the government’s ability to 
88  Keith, 407 U.S. at 309.
89  50 U.S.C. § 1802 (2000).
90  Keith, 407 U.S. at 318.
91  Dailey, supra note 3, at 654.
92  Truong, 629 F.2d at 915.
93  Sullivan, supra note 4, at 400.
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use the investigation’s findings in criminal proceedings has created a concern that 
an end-around approach to Title III will become prevalent. As such, where the 
government seeks to avail itself of a post hoc retroactive judicial validation process, the 
government must be prohibited from using any fruit from the domestic intelligence 
surveillance in criminal prosecutions. This approach would obviously create tension 
in the executive branch, between moving ahead with electronic surveillance without 
antecedent justification and the peril of the executive branch losing its prosecutorial 
ability. However, in situations involving compelling exigent circumstances, the 
government would have the flexibility to effectively move against domestic national 
security threats. 
Lastly, any legislative solution to the unique issues involving domestic national 
security intelligence surveillance must involve legislative oversight. To provide 
adequate legislative oversight, a designated committee in the House of Representatives 
and the Senate to review a minimum number of post hoc applications to the DISC is 
necessary. The respective committees would have the power to review all applications, 
but a mandatory review requirement would ensure that at some level the government 
agents’ surveillance activities, and the DISC treatment of those activities, have the 
chance of further legislative review. This additional level of review would further 
mitigate the any perceived concerns about Fourth Amendment abuses.
Areas of the Law Supporting a Post Hoc Retroactive Judicial Validation Process
 The Fourth Amendment’s application to searches and seizures, including 
domestic intelligence surveillance, has evolved since the invention of wire 
communication in 1844. The very language of the Amendment, “against unreasonable 
searches and seizures,” allows for modern interpretations of reasonableness to expand 
the Amendment’s protection and provide for specifically tailored exceptions. Indeed, 
in Katz, the Court found “first that a person ha[s] exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared 
to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”94 As such, creating a post hoc retroactive judicial review 
process and related legislative oversight, is consist with the United States’ history of 
balancing the framers’ goals against the government’s unique modern day searches 
and seizures requirements. 
 One example of the Court providing an exception to the Fourth Amendment, 
in light of unique circumstances, can be found in the “open fields” doctrine. The 
doctrine, as first announced in Hester v. United States, permits police officers to enter 
and search a field without a warrant.95 While the Court couched its reasoning under 
an interpretation that the Fourth Amendment did not extend from “persons, houses, 
papers, and effects” to open fields,96 the impetus behind the new exception stemmed 
from the government’s need to quickly conduct searches and seizures related to 
alcohol manufacturers who were in violation of the Prohibition Act. Unlike illegal 
94  Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
95  Joseph G. Cook & Paul Marcus, Criminal Procedure 319 (6th ed. 2005).
96  Hester v. United States, 466 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
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alcohol manufacturing, the differences between ordinary criminal and domestic 
national security investigations create an even more compelling justification for 
creating an exception to the traditional warrant requirement in a domestic national 
security investigation.
 Another exception to the traditional warrant requirement can be found in 
the treatment of administrative subpoenas and national security letters (“NSL’s”). 
Ordinary administrative subpoenas, which may include requests for books, papers, 
documents, data, or other objects, are issued by federal agencies.97 Such subpoenas 
are enforced pursuant to minimum requirements that do not rise to the level of Title 
III warrant requirements.98 Specifically, as noted in Doe v. Ashcroft, courts will enforce 
a subpoena as long as: “(1) the agency’s investigation is being conducted pursuant to a 
legitimate purpose, (2) the inquiry is relevant to that purpose, (3) the information is 
not already within the agency’s possession, and (4) the proper procedures have been 
followed.”99 
In addition to these minimal enforceability requirements, subpoenas – even 
though they are issued by a court clerk - are issued “pro forma” and “in blank” upon 
request.100 More importantly, the “court exercises no prior control whatsoever upon 
their use.”101 In fact, “the court becomes involved in the subpoena process only if the 
subpoenaed party moves to quash the request ….”102 In contrast to traditional searches 
and seizures, “an administrative subpoena ‘is regulated by, and its justification derives 
from, [ judicial] process’ available after the subpoena is issued.”103 As such, given the 
administrative subpoena’s minimal reasonableness requirements, the subpoena’s 
post hoc Fourth Amendment judicial justification, and the lack of mandatory review, 
a mandatory post hoc retroactive judicial validation process for domestic national 
security surveillance should be recognized as an acceptable Fourth Amendment 
exception.
Similar to the administrative subpoena’s after-the-fact judicial justification, the 
court, in Doe I, held that fundamental rights to free speech and associational activity 
are implicated in cases “in which the Government may employ § 2709 broadly to 
gather information, thus requiring that the process incorporate the safeguards of 
some judicial review to ensure that if an infringement of those rights is asserted, they 
are adequately protected through fair process in an independent neutral tribunal.”104 
As a result, the court found that “[b]ecause the necessary procedural protections 
[were] wholly absent [in the instant case],” § 2709 was invalid when dealing with 
NSL’s.105 While the Doe I’s appeal was pending, Congress enacted the Patriot 
97  Dycus, supra note 1, at 565.
98  Id.
99  Doe v. Ashcroft (Doe I), 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
100  Id. at 486.
101  Id. (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 486 F.2d 85, 90 (3d Cir. 1973) (emphasis added)).
102  Id. at 486.
103  Id. at 495 (quoting United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2000) (emphasis in original)).
104  Id. at 511.
105  Id. 
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Improvement Act § 115, which authorized the recipient of an NSL to petition for 
judicial review.106 Consequently, the plaintiffs abandoned their Fourth Amendment 
claims, making the issue pending on appeal moot.107 Again, the post hoc judicial 
review in the NSL context only occurs if either the recipient petitions for review, 
under the Patriot Improvement Act § 115, or the government seeks to compel 
compliance with an NSL. Therefore, a mandatory post hoc retroactive judicial 
validation process for domestic national security surveillance should be recognized 
as an acceptable Fourth Amendment exception.
Conclusion
While there have been exceptions to the warrant requirement related to the 
legitimate needs of law enforcement officers,108 the Supreme Court has expounded 
the principle that “the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial 
approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure.”109 Similarly, the 
government’s use of a retroactive judicial validation process related to domestic 
national security surveillance should be avoided whenever practicable, in favor of 
procuring a conventional Title III warrant. However, the existence of a post hoc 
retroactive judicial validation exception to the prior warrant requirement, coupled 
with prescribed legislative oversight, would provide the government the flexibility to 
effectively maintain national security, in instances where either the speed required 
or the secrecy necessary for electronic surveillance would preclude antecedent 
justification.
106  Dycus, supra note 1, at 579.
107  Id. (citing Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415, 419 (2d. Cir. 2006)).
108  See, e.g., Dycus, supra note 1, at 482-83.
109  Keith, 407 U.S. at 318 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
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Walking the Tightrope: A New Approach to Balancing 
Concerns over the “Significant Purpose” Amendment to the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act
Charles Jarboe
 Arguably, most Americans experience two powerful, competing forces upon 
hearing the term “national security”: a desire for safety against future terrorist attacks 
and a desire to retain their privacy and civil liberties.  Unfortunately, balancing these 
forces requires the United States government to walk a proverbial tightrope, with 
the American public quick to remonstrate every decision the government makes. 
During the past decade, one of the most judicially accepted, yet equally controversial, 
attempts to balance these forces emerged as perhaps the greatest unresolved issue 
facing the United States today.  The issue evokes the basic fears of many Americans: 
possible future terrorist attacks, unfettered government investigations, the erosion 
of constitutional protections, and potentially missing the clues necessary to prevent 
future attacks.
 After September 11, 2001, Congress amended the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act1 (“FISA”) by relaxing the standards whereby the government could 
execute electronic surveillance against foreign powers, or agents of foreign powers, 
in the United States.2  The amended law requires that the government demonstrate 
only that a “significant purpose” of the investigation is for foreign intelligence 
purposes, rather than for the purpose of a criminal investigation.3  This annulled 
FISA’s previous “primary purpose” test.4  Theoretically, FISA allows the government 
to initiate surveillance without a traditional warrant and then use the garnered 
evidence in prosecuting the target for any criminal act, with the target unable to 
review or challenge the basis for conducting the original surveillance.5
 Undoubtedly, this FISA amendment is emerging as a critical topic in national 
security law.  First, the Supreme Court has not considered the constitutionality of 
FISA.6  Second,  although lower courts that have addressed the issue have uniformly 
upheld the amendment’s constitutionality,7 dissention amongst the federal courts 
1  50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1862 (2003 & Supp. 2005).
2  See generally Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. 272, 291 (2001) (amending 50 U.S.C. §§ 
1804, 1823 (1982)).
3  50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B).
4  50 U.S.C. §§ 1804, 1823 (1982) (amended 2001).
5  See William E. Ringel, Searches and Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 8:34 (2d. 2008) (discussing Mayfield v. United 
States, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (D. Or. 2007) (FISA evidence is admissible against defendants in criminal cases but the basis and 
substance for the FISA warrant is generally kept from the defendant via ex parte / in camera proceedings)).
6  Stephen Dycus et al., National Security Law 531 (4th ed. 2007).
7  See, e.g., United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 532 F. Supp. 2d 299 (D. Conn. 2008) (FISA as amended is constitutional); United 
States v. Mubayyid, 521 F. Supp. 2d 125 (D. Mass. 2007) (same); In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, 02-002, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA 
Ct. Rev. 2002) (same).
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has begun.8  In 2007, the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, 
in Mayfield v. United States, held that the “significant purpose” amendment is 
unconstitutional.9  Furthermore, FISA’s self-created judicial court of review, the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (“FISCR”), in the court’s only 
opinion to date, held that the amended FISA is constitutional, but conceded that the 
issue “has no definitive jurisprudential answer.”10
 However, FISA’s constitutionality impacts more than just lawyers, judges, and 
academics.  A former FBI official, when asked what current legal issue most affects 
their work, unequivocally identified FISA’s continued constitutional validity as the 
paramount issue.11   Clearly, Congress and the judiciary must strike a balance 
that is constitutional and that acknowledges the concerns of law enforcement, the 
legal community, and the general public.  The current system does not satisfy this 
standard.  Most judges and law enforcement officials surmise that FISA, as currently 
amended, is indeed a constitutional balance of security interests with constitutional 
rights.12  Conversely, many academics argue that FISA’s “significant purpose” test 
is unconstitutional and that the former test, or something of similar effect, should 
replace the current language to prevent government abuse.13  The purpose of this 
article is to propose a modification to the “significant purpose” test that satisfies the 
concerns of practitioners and academics.   
 First, judicial interpretation of the “significant purpose” amendment must change 
to better conform with FISA’s original purpose—the availability of special warrants 
when law enforcement officials need to collect foreign intelligence information, and 
not simply evidence of general, criminal activity.14  Second, Congress should amend 
FISA to allow criminal defendants access to FISA-derived information, if the 
government uses FISA evidence to prosecute the defendant under general criminal 
statutes.  However, if the government elects to prosecute under anti-terrorism 
statutes,15 the government may protect the FISA information vis-à-vis an ex parte, in 
camera review, as provided in FISA’s current version.16  This proposed resolution will 
restore FISA to its original purpose, continue to provide law enforcement with the 
flexibility to fight terrorism, restore defendants’ rights, and prevent the government 
8  See Mayfield, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 1042-43 (holding the FISA amendment unconstitutional).
9  Id. 
10  In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 743.
11  Email from Jay Koerner, Former Supervisory Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation (Feb. 17, 2008) (on file with 
author).
12  See cases cited supra note 7.
13  See generally William Funk, Electronic Surveillance of Terrorism: The Intelligence/Law Enforcement Dilemma—A History, 
11 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 1099 (2007); Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
1306 (2004); Joshua H. Pike, Note, The Impact of a Knee-Jerk Reaction: The Patriot Act Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act and the Ability of One Word to Erase Established Constitutional Requirements, 36 Hofstra L. Rev. 185 (2007). 
14  See Richard Henry Seamon & William Dylan Gardner, The PATRIOT Act and the Wall Between Foreign Intelligence and 
Law Enforcement, 28 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 319, 331 (2005).
15  See infra notes 112-14.
16  50 U.S.C. § 1806(f ) (giving the attorney general power to pervert the defendant’s access to FISA information by filing 
an affidavit against disclosure for national security reasons).
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from using FISA as a pretext to circumvent traditional warrant requirements.
The Creation and Evolution of FISA
 In 1979, Congress enacted FISA in the wake of Watergate, new revelations 
about domestic intelligence security abuses, and a Supreme Court opinion that 
invited Congress to legislate in the arena of foreign security surveillance.17  FISA 
attempted to balance the government’s national security interests with constitutional 
protections, as contemplated by the Supreme Court.18  In Keith, the Supreme Court 
acknowledged that surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes might necessitate 
a different warrant requirement than the traditional requirements used in criminal 
investigations.19   
 Accordingly, FISA allows federal officers to obtain an order from the judge of a 
specially-created FISA court20 (“FISC”) which authorizes electronic surveillance of 
a foreign power or the agent of a foreign power for the purpose of obtaining foreign 
intelligence information.21  A high ranking executive must certify that the purpose of 
the investigation is to obtain foreign intelligence information, that the information 
sought is foreign intelligence information, and that such information cannot 
reasonably be obtained through normal means of investigation.22  Additionally, an 
officer must include the identity, if known, and description of the target, and certify 
that the target is a foreign power or agent, and that the place under surveillance is 
being used, or is about to be used, by the foreign power or agent.23  FISA authorizes 
surveillance for up to 120 days.24  Moreover, if the government prosecutes the target 
under FISA, and the Attorney General submits to the FISC an affidavit stating that 
disclosure of the FISA information will harm national security, the FISC judge can 
keep the information from the target, and review it ex parte and in camera.25 
 The FISC judge must grant the order if there is probable cause that: (1) the 
target is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power; (2) the place under surveillance 
is being used, or is about to be used, by a foreign power or agent; and (3) the 
application meets the necessary requirements.26  The FISA’s probable cause standard 
is less stringent than the standard required by the analogous statute authorizing 
electronic surveillance for criminal investigations.27  Title III of the Omnibus 
17  Swire, supra note 13, at 314-15.
18  United States v. United States Dist. Ct. (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 314-15 (1972) (imploring legislatures to balance national 
security interests with constitutional rights in the area of foreign security surveillance).    
19  Id. at 321-22.
20  50 U.S.C. § 1803.
21  Id. § 1802(b); Funk, supra note 13, at 1113-14.
22  50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7).
23  Id. § 1804(a)(1)-(4).
24  Id. § 1805(e)(1)(B).
25  50 U.S.C. § 1806(f ).
26  Id. § 1805(a)(3).
27  United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 72 (2d. Cir. 1984); John J. Dvorske, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and 
Application of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C.A. § § 1801 et seq.) Authorizing Electronic Surveillance of 
Foreign Powers and Their Agents, 190 A.L.R. Fed. 385, at § 3b (2003).
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Crime Control and Safe Streets Act28 (“Title III”) authorizes electronic surveillance 
if probable cause exists to believe an individual is committing, has committed, or 
is about to commit a specific offense.29  Conversely, the FISA standard does not 
require the government to demonstrate a connection between the target and any 
criminal activity.30  However, FISA’s probable cause standard is generally deemed 
constitutional.31
 After FISA’s passage, courts have interpreted the “purpose” requirement in 
§1804(a)(7)(B) to mean that the “primary purpose” of the investigation must be 
foreign intelligence.32  Accordingly, the government could use evidence garnered 
from a FISA order in a criminal prosecution only if the original, primary purpose of 
the surveillance was to obtain foreign intelligence information.33  After September 
11, 2001, critics argued that the “primary purpose” requirement perverted the 
government’s ability to share information between the intelligence and criminal 
divisions of the executive branch, creating the metaphorical “wall” discussed later 
in this article, thereby hindering the government’s ability to stop the hijackers 
beforehand.34  
 Shortly after the September 11 tragedy, Congress passed the USA PATRIOT 
Act, which amended the “primary purpose” language with “a significant purpose.”35 
The amendment allowed law enforcement officials to arrest and subsequently 
prosecute many targets by sharing FISA-derived evidence with criminal investigators, 
which was previously impermissible.36  In In re Sealed Case,37 the quintessential FISA 
amendment decision, the FISCR interpreted “significant purpose” as follows: 
 So long as the government entertains a realistic option of dealing 
with the agent  other than through criminal prosecution, it satisfies 
the significant purpose test . . .  the Patriot Act amendment, by 
using the word “significant,” eliminated any justification for the FISA 
court to balance the relative weight the government places on criminal 
prosecution as compared to other counterintelligence responses.38 
Moreover, courts have only minimal scrutiny over the government’s certification of 
28  18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (2002).
29  18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (2000 & Supp. III. 2003).
30  Mayfield, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 1039. 
31  See Duggan, 743 F.2d at 74 (holding that the FISA’s probable cause standard satisfies the Fourth Amendment); 
Mubayyid, 521 F. Supp. 2d at 137 (holding the probable cause standard constitutional).  But see Mayfield, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 
1038-39 (holding that FISA probable cause standard violates Fourth Amendment). 
32  Funk, supra note 13, at 1123 (citing United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 572 (1st Cir. 1992); Duggan, 743 F.2d at 77)). 
33  Johnson, 952 F.2d at 572.
34  Stephen Dycus et al., supra note 6, at 533 (citing David Johnston & Philip Shenon, F.B.I Curbed Scrutiny of Man Now a 
Suspect in Attacks, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 2001, at A1).
35  USA PATRIOT Act, at § 218.
36  Telephone Interview with James Jarboe, Former Section Chief Domestic Counterterrorism, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (Mar. 26, 2008).
37  In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
38  Id. at 735.
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what constitutes a foreign intelligence purpose, and must rely on the government’s 
certification of a foreign intelligence purpose.39 
 In re Sealed Case and other federal decisions have consistently upheld the 
constitutionality of the FISA’s “significant purpose” language.40  The courts have 
found that the new language is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because 
the amendment adequately balances national security interests with individual 
rights, and because FISA contains additional safeguards against abuse.41  While In 
re Sealed Case “has been cited in nine reported cases, its precedential value has not 
been adjudicated and may be open to challenge.”42
 In 2007, Judge Ann Aiken entered a declaratory judgment holding that FISA, as 
amended by the USA PATRIOT Act, was facially unconstitutional.43  In Mayfield, 
the government executed FISA surveillance on Brandon Mayfield, an attorney, after 
a latent-fingerprint analysis erroneously connected him to a terrorist bombing in 
Madrid, Spain.44  Agents arrested Mayfield, and the media subsequently announced 
his guilt.45  Officials eventually discovered the identification error, and the government 
settled with Mayfield for $2,000,000.00 and the right to challenge 50 U.S.C. §§ 
1804 and 1823 on its face.46  
 The Mayfield court remonstrated In re Sealed Case’s justification for upholding 
the “significant purpose” amendment, holding that the FISCR incorrectly attributed 
the “wall” to the primary purpose requirement,47 incorrectly analogized the problem 
with the Supreme Court’s “special needs” cases,48 and ignored congressional intent 
to distinguish intelligence gathering and criminal law enforcement.49  Essentially, 
the Mayfield court held the amendment unconstitutional because FISA’s amended 
version allows the executive to collect evidence for a criminal prosecution, without 
first securing a warrant predicated upon a showing of probable cause that the 
defendant is, or was, engaged in any criminal activity, as required by the Fourth 
Amendment.50 
 Federal courts addressing Mayfield’s concerns chose not to follow in Judge 
Aiken’s footsteps.51  In Abu-Jihaad, the District Court of Connecticut denied the 
petitioner’s FISA challenge, which relied heavily upon the Mayfield decision.52  The 
39  United States v. Sattar, No. 02 Cr. 395 ( JGK), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16164, at *41-42 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2003).
40  See cases cited supra note 7.
41  Id.
42  Steve C. Posner, 1 Privacy Law and the USA PATRIOT Act § 4.30 (2007). 
43  Mayfield, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 1042-43.
44  Id. at 1026-30.
45  Id. at 1029.
46  Id. at 1026.
47  Id. at 1041 (noting that other PATRIOT Act amendments effectively eliminated the “wall”).
48  Id. at 1041-42 (arguing that prior to the 2001 amendments FISA’s programmatic purpose was fighting terrorism but 
after the amendments the purpose can be generating evidence for criminal prosecutions without probable cause).
49  Id. at 1042 (invoking the founding fathers’ desires to balance in favor of the Bill of Rights).
50  Id. at 1036-37.
51  See Abu-Jihaad, 531 F. Supp. 2d at 304 (declining to follow Mayfield); Mubayyid, 521 F. Supp. 2d at 140 (same).
52  Abu-Jihaad, 531 F. Supp. 2d at 304.
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court expressed concern that Mayfield declared FISA facially unconstitutional, given 
the court’s factual findings that the government’s primary purpose in watching Mr. 
Mayfield was for criminal prosecution, rather than to gather foreign intelligence.53 
However, the court’s concern is mistaken.  The crux of the Mayfield court’s argument 
is that under the “significant purpose” standard, as interpreted by In re Sealed Case, 
the government can conduct FISA surveillance even if the primary purpose is for a 
criminal prosecution, as long as criminal prosecution is not the only reason.54  This 
is what the In re Sealed Case court held.55  Thus, despite the Mayfield court’s finding 
that the government used FISA for criminal purposes, the warrant would have been 
upheld, under the current law, had the Mayfield court not chosen to defy the norm.
 Nevertheless, Abu-Jihaad reflects the current state of the law—that the 
“significant purpose” standard is constitutional.  Yet, the Mayfield court’s concerns 
with the standard might be legitimate.  The legitimacy of the court’s concerns is 
better understood after examining how FISA operates in practice, including the 
application process and the approval frequency.
FISA in Action
 As previously illustrated, many fear that the government will use FISA to 
circumvent the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirements and pursue 
investigations under FISA, rather than Title III.  In fact, one scholar pejoratively 
opined that “[o]ne cannot tell from publicly available information how far the 
government is already moving toward using FISA orders for narcotics and organized 
crime investigations with the United States.  It is possible that many such cases 
already use FISA orders.”56  
 Indeed, FISA applications increased after 2001, although the approval rating 
of FISA applications remained consistently high, to wit: 1998 (all 796 applications 
approved);57 1999 (all 886 applications approved);58 2000 (all 1012 approved, one 
modified by the court);59 2001 (all 934 applications approved);60 2002 (all 1228 
applications approved);61 2003 (1724 approved, four denied, 79 modified);62 2004 
(1754 approved, three withdrawn by government, 94 modified);63 2005 (2072 
approved, two withdrawn, 61 modified);64 and 2006 (2176 approved, five withdrawn, 
53  Id. at n.5.
54  Mayfield, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 1032 (citing In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“In re 
FISC”), 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 615 n.2 (FISA Ct. 2002)).
55  In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 735.
56  Swire, surpa note 13, at 1355.
57  1998 Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep., available at http://www.usdoj.gov/nsd/foia/reading_room/1998 fisa-ltr.pdf.
58  1999 Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep., available at http://www.usdoj.gov/nsd/foia/reading_room/1999 fisa-ltr.pdf.
59  2000 Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep., available at http://www.usdoj.gov/nsd/foia/reading_room/2000 fisa-ltr.pdf.
60  2001 Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep., available at http://www.usdoj.gov/nsd/foia/reading_room/2001 fisa-ltr.pdf.
61  2002 Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep., available at http://www.usdoj.gov/nsd/foia/reading_room/2002 fisa-ltr.pdf.
62  2003 Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep., available at http://www.usdoj.gov/nsd/foia/reading_room/2003 fisa-ltr.pdf.
63  2004 Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep., available at http://www.usdoj.gov/nsd/foia/reading_room/2004 fisa-ltr.pdf.
64  2005 Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep., available at http://www.usdoj.gov/nsd/foia/reading_room/2005 fisa-ltr.pdf.
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one denied, 73 modified).65
 Alternatively, the Title III warrants secured by the federal government over 
the same period are as follows: 1998 (566 authorized); 1999 (601 authorized); 
2000 (479 authorized), 2001 (486 authorized); 2002 (497 authorized); 2003 
(578 authorized); 2004 (730 authorized); 2005 (625 authorized); and 2006 (461 
authorized).66  Similar to FISA applications, the courts approve nearly all Title III 
requests.67
 These statistics clearly reveal that FISA orders for electronic surveillance are 
more prevalent than the criminal counterpart under Title III.  Do these statistics 
indicate that federal agents chose FISA over Title III because of the lesser probable 
cause standard?  Or, do these statistics merely illustrate the FBI’s post-2001 
restructuring away from focusing on criminal activities toward focusing primarily on 
counterintelligence?  When presented with this question, former FBI Supervisory 
Special Agent Jay Koerner, whose primary responsibility was foreign intelligence, 
responded that the latter deduction was accurate.68  
 After 2001, the FBI reorganized and shifted investigative priorities to three 
primary areas: counter-terrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber crimes, with the 
former two receiving the most attention.69  Accordingly, the number of agents 
working traditional criminal matters is now drastically lower.70  Agents in the 
counter-terrorism and counterintelligence divisions use FISA almost exclusively, 
thus reducing the need for Title III warrants.  
 Contrary to many assumptions, FISA warrants are more difficult and time-
consuming to secure than Title III warrants.71  Title III applications require 
the review and approval of the local FBI Special Agent in Charge (“SAC”), the 
Assistant United States Attorney, and an official from the Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) before the federal judge reviews the application.72   Alternatively, FISA 
applications require the review and signed approval of the SAC, the Section Chief, 
the Deputy Assistant Director, the Assistant Director, the FBI Director, the DOJ 
Office of Intelligence and Policy Review (“OIPR”), and the Attorney General, prior 
to submitting the application to the FISA judge.73  Many FISA applications never 
survive the process.74  Furthermore, agents at several field offices have expressed 
frustration with FISA’s bevy of requirements, and have instead chosen to pursue 
65  2006 Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep., available at http://www.usdoj.gov/nsd/foia/reading_room/2006 fisa-ltr.pdf.
66  2006 Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, 2006 Wiretap Report, at 34 tbl.7, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
wiretap06/Table72006.pdf.
67  See Id.
68  Email from Jay Koerner, Former Supervisory Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation (Mar. 31, 2008) (on file 
with author).
69  Id.
70  Id.
71  Id.
72  Id. 
73  Id.
74  Id.
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Title III warrants as the quicker alternative.75  Thus, the fear of agents using FISA as 
an end-run around Title III’s traditional warrant requirement is likely exaggerated.  
Common to many legal issues, the theoretical fears outweigh the practical 
ones.  Nevertheless, as previously illustrated, a potential for abuse exists under the 
current version of FISA.  Legal academics often focus on the “potentials” and the 
“hypotheticals.”  Many of today’s fundamental legal protections would not exist 
without individuals first expressing concern about potential abuses.  While it is naive 
to think that the government will always behave properly, it is equally inappropriate 
to believe that government agents will abuse the system, if able.  Thus, both sides 
have legitimate concerns, and FISA must change to better address these concerns. 
The remainder of this article explores one potential resolution.
Adding Substance to the “Significant Purpose” Standard
 First, judicial interpretations of the “significant purpose” standard must change to 
accord the term “significant” its proper meaning.  Unfortunately, after the PATRIOT 
Act amendments, courts have diluted the “significant purpose” standard by according 
little weight to the term “significant.”76  Congress clearly intended a lesser standard 
by amending FISA, thus appeasing those concerned about America’s security after 
September 11.  However, courts have subsequently lessened the standard to a degree 
that prompted great concerns from those who are fearful that FISA will function as 
an end-run around the Constitution.  Thus, assuming that the “significant purpose” 
standard continues to be the law, the judiciary must give the term “significant” its 
literal meaning.  The change will strike a balance that helps address both concerns.
Primary Purpose or Significant Purpose?
 Many legal academics, and those concerned about FISA’s impact on civil 
liberties, advocate for the return of the “primary purpose” standard, arguing that 
any lesser standard violates the rule against warrantless searches.77  While this 
position is logically sound, Keith correctly indicates that the answer lies in striking 
a balance between national security concerns and the Fourth Amendment.78 
Presently, Congress has chosen to strike this balance by amending FISA’s purpose 
requirement.  By amending FISA, Congress intended that the intelligence purpose 
“could be less than the main or dominant purpose, but nevertheless important and 
not de minimis.”79  Furthermore, “gathering criminal evidence could be the primary 
purpose as long as gathering foreign intelligence was a significant purpose in the 
investigation.”80  Congress wanted to change the previous standard to address the 
nation’s national security concerns.  Section 218 of the PATRIOT Act remains the 
75  Id.
76  Swire, supra note 13, at 1338.
77  See sources cited supra note 5.
78  See Keith, 407 U.S. at 314-15.
79  148 Cong. Rec. S9109, S9110 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 2002) ( joint statement of Senators Hatch, Thurmond, Kyl, DeWine, 
Sessions, and McConnell).
80  Id.
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law until Congress elects to amend the “significant purpose” standard.81  Therefore, 
the most practical approach is to work within the framework delineated by Congress.
Redefining the Standard
 Assuming, arguendo, the “significant purpose” standard’s legitimacy, the judiciary’s 
subsequent interpretations of the standard clearly demonstrate a need to give these 
words a different interpretation.  As previously discussed, In re Sealed Case severely 
diluted the standard by requiring the government to demonstrate only a minimal 
foreign intelligence purpose and by eliminating the need to balance the government’s 
intelligence and criminal prosecution objectives.82  Furthermore, the Abu-Jihaad 
court found that “the statutory change from ‘purpose’ . . . to ‘significant purpose’ is 
[not] constitutionally significant.”83  The Abu-Jihaad court also adopted In re Sealed 
Case’s position that the change eliminates the FISC’s need to weigh the intelligence 
and criminal prosecution justifications.84  
 These interpretations virtually eliminate the word “significant” from the statute 
and disregard the potential for abuse inherent in such a lax interpretation.  First, the 
courts ignore Congress’s decision to raise the standard from “a purpose,” as originally 
proposed by the Bush administration, to the higher “significant purpose” standard.85 
No meaningful, coherent difference exists between the courts’ current interpretation 
of the term “significant purpose” and the “purpose” standard rejected by Congress. 
Second, the interpretations do not reflect the original purpose of the amendment. 
According to Senator Leahy, one of the primary architects of Section 218, such 
interpretations are improper, to wit:
The Department contends that changing the FISA test from requiring 
‘’the purpose’’ of collecting foreign intelligence to a ‘’significant purpose’’ 
allows the use of FISA by prosecutors as a tool for a case even when 
they know from the outset that the case will be criminally prosecuted. 
They claim that criminal prosecutors can now initiate and direct 
secret FISA wiretaps, without normal probable cause requirements 
and discovery protections, as another tool in criminal investigations, 
even though they know that the strictures of Title III of [sic] the 
Fourth Amendment cannot be met. … But it was not the intent of 
these amendments to fundamentally change FISA from a foreign 
intelligence tool into a criminal law enforcement tool . . . we did not 
intend to obliterate the distinction between the two, and we did not 
do so. Indeed, if we wanted to make a sweeping change in FISA, it 
81  See USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub.L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (2006) (making 
the significant purpose requirement permanent).
82  In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 735.
83  Abu-Jihaad, 531 F. Supp. 2d at 307.
84  Id. at 308, n.9. 
85  Legislative Measures to Improve America’s Counter-Terrorism Programs Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 107th 
Cong. (2001) (statement of Jerry Berman, Exec. Director, Center for Democracy & Technology).
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would have required changes in far more parts of the statute than were 
affected by the USA PATRIOT Act.86
 
Third, the interpretation is alarming because the government can gather evidence 
for a criminal prosecution simply by asserting that criminal prosecution is not the 
sole reason for the warrant.  Regardless of whether abuse actually occurs, the courts’ 
interpretation undeniably creates the potential for abuse.  The courts, and to some 
extent Congress, skew the balance too far away from valid constitutional concerns 
and towards national security concerns. 
 The judiciary’s power to strike a better balance by redefining the term “significant 
purpose” is incontrovertible.  The judiciary, rather than Congress, originally created 
the “primary purpose” standard, although the statute literally said “the purpose.”87 
Moreover, during the PATRIOT Act debates, Congress admitted that “it will be 
up to the courts to determine how far law enforcement agencies may use FISA for 
criminal investigation and prosecution beyond the scope of the statutory definition 
of ‘foreign intelligence information.’”88  Therefore, the courts should give “significant 
purpose” its literal meaning.  “Significant” is defined as “a noticeably or measurably 
large amount,”89 or “fairly large in amount or quantity.”90  Synonymous words include: 
considerable, critical, substantial, and vital.91  Rather than interpreting “significant 
purpose” to mean simply more than a “de minimis” purpose,92 or more than “a purpose,” 
the term should, at a minimum, require the government to demonstrate that the 
foreign intelligence purpose is more than an “important” one.  Despite the term’s 
vagueness, any reasonable interpretation of the word “significant” would require the 
government to show a greater foreign intelligence purpose than the remarkably low 
standard articulated in In re Sealed Case.
 A more literal interpretation of the “significant purpose” standard will restore 
the term to its logical, original purpose under the PATRIOT Act.  This change in 
interpretation should reduce the potential for governmental abuse, thus satiating 
some critics.  However, by retaining the “significant purpose” language, the proposed 
resolution also addresses concerns in Congress and the law enforcement community 
that the old “primary purpose” standard was too restrictive to successfully combat 
terrorism.  Thus, a new judicial interpretation is justified both legally and as a matter 
of public policy.
86  The USA PATRIOT Act in Practice: Shedding Light on the FISA Process: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
107th Cong. 7-8 (2002).
87  See generally United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980).
88  147 Cong. Rec. S11,990, 11,004 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Senator Leahy).
89  Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/cgi-bin/dictionary 
?book=Dictionary&va=significant (last visited Apr. 5, 2008).
90  American Heritage Online Dictionary, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/significant (last visited Apr. 5, 2008).
91  Roget’s New Millennium Thesaurus Online, http://thesaurus.reference.com/browse/significant (last visited Apr. 5, 
2008).
92  See source cited supra note 76.
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Impact on the Wall”
 A stricter “significant purpose” standard will not recreate a metaphorical wall 
within the executive branch, because the wall was largely a bureaucratic, rather than 
a statutory, creation.  Moreover, the wall will not reemerge because the PATRIOT 
Act amendments and current DOJ guidelines encourage communication within the 
executive branch.
 Commentators popularized the term “wall” to describe information-sharing 
barriers between intelligence officials and law enforcement officers within the 
executive branch.93  After September 11, many argued that FISA’s primary purpose 
requirement created the wall, which prevented FBI criminal investigators from 
arresting the hijackers.94  Thereafter, the Bush administration sought to amend the 
purpose requirement through the PATRIOT Act.95  Indeed, many applauded the 
new “significant purpose” requirement for destroying the wall.96
 FISA’s purpose requirement neither created, nor required, the wall.97  Rather, 
the head of OIPR unjustifiably misconstrued FISA and subsequently instituted 
procedures which severed all communications between the FBI’s intelligence 
personnel and the Criminal Division without prior OIPR approval.98  Also, 
former Attorney General Janet Reno, in 1995, solidified the wall through internal 
DOJ procedures.99  These bureaucratic actions effectively prevented intelligence 
agents and criminal investigators from talking to one another concerning on-going 
investigations.100  After the PATRIOT Act, the DOJ drafted new guidelines which 
allowed intelligence and law enforcement officers to freely exchange information.101 
While the FISC rejected the guidelines as antithetical to the text of FISA,102 the 
FISCR overruled the FISC and affirmed the legality of the guidelines.103
 If bureaucrats, rather than FISA’s purpose requirement, created the wall, 
then any change to the current “significant purpose” interpretation would not re-
erect the wall as long as the DOJ and OIPR do not resurrect the 1995 procedures. 
93  In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 721.
94  See Nat’l Comm’n on Terrorist Attacks Upon the U.S., The 9/11 Comm. Report 339-60 (2004), available at http://
www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/fullreport.pdf.
95  Funk, supra note 13, at 1100-01 (by amending the “significant purpose” standard).
96  Oversight of the USA PATRIOT Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 10 (2005) (testimony 
of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, FBI) (“Section 218 of the Patriot Act was the first step in dismantling the wall between 
criminal and intelligence investigators. It eliminates the primary purpose requirement under FISA and replaces it with a 
significant purpose test. FBI agents working on intelligence and counterintelligence matters now have greater latitude to 
consult criminal investigators or prosecutors without putting their investigations at risk.”).
97  Funk, supra note 13, at 1126.
98  Id. at 1126-27.
99  See Office of Inspector Gen., A Review of the FBI’s Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 
Attacks 27-30 (2004).
100  Telephone Interview with James Jarboe, Former Section Chief Domestic Counterterrorism, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (Apr. 4, 2008).
101  Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., to the Dir., FBI; Assistant Att’y Gen., Criminal Div.; Counsel for 
Intelligence Policy; U.S. Att’ys (March 6, 2002), available at http://www.fas.org /irp/agency/doj/fisa/ag030602.html.
102  In re FISC, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 624-25.
103  In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 719-20, 746.
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Furthermore, the PATRIOT Act amendments affirmatively dismantled the wall 
by amending 50 U.S.C. § 1806 to allow coordination and consultation between 
intelligence and criminal investigators.104  While a wall certainly existed prior to 
2001, once the September 11 tragedy illuminated the information-sharing problem, 
the later bureaucratic and statutory changes dismantled the wall.  Thus, regardless 
of any subsequent changes to FISA’s “significant purpose” standard, the wall will not 
return.  
Allowing Greater Transparency in Criminal,
Adversarial Proceedings
 Second, Congress must amend FISA so that criminal defendants may review 
the FISA-derived evidence used to prosecute them when the defendant is charged 
under ordinary criminal statutes.  If the government prosecutes a defendant under 
anti-terrorism laws, no change is necessary, and the government may choose to 
disclose the evidence only to a FISC judge, as currently allowed by the statute.  The 
proposed amendment more adeptly balances security interests with constitutional 
rights.  The government may use FISA to detect, defeat, and prosecute terrorist 
activity with the vigor currently allowed under FISA.  However, if the government 
uses FISA, uncovers ordinary criminal activity, and elects to prosecute the target 
for violations thereof, the defendant will be able to review and challenge the FISA-
derived evidence.  The change will produce two benefits, to wit: the transparency will 
restore defendants’ rights in the adversarial process and will prevent the government 
from using FISA as a pretext around traditional warrant requirements.
The Problem with FISA’s Disclosure Procedures
 Currently, if the government demonstrates a “significant [foreign intelligence] 
purpose,” FISA allows information gathered from the surveillance to be used in later 
criminal proceedings against the target and other defendants.105 Defendants who 
challenge the FISA application might be allowed to review the order if, in the judge’s 
discretion, it is necessary to determining the application’s legality.106  However, 
all the government must do to prevent disclosure is file an affidavit stating that 
“disclosure or an adversary hearing would harm the national security of the United 
States,” and thereafter the court must consider the application and order ex parte 
and in camera.107  FISA discovery rules are more restrictive and protective than 
other rules governing disclosure of sensitive, confidential information in adversarial 
proceedings.108  Paradoxically, defendants cannot successfully attack the sufficiency 
of the FISA motion without reviewing the motion.  However, no defense counsel, 
104  See 50 U.S.C § 1806(k)(1)(A)-(C); Mayfield, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 1031,1041.
105  In Re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 727.
106  50 U.S.C. § 1806(f ).
107  Id.
108  Beryl A. Howell and Dana J. Lesemann, FISA’s Fruits in Criminal Cases: An Opportunity for Improved Accountability 12 
UCLA J. Int’l L. & Foreign Aff. 145, 156-60 (Spring 2007).
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to date, has convinced a judge to order the unsealing of a motion.109  Clearly, the 
government has a legitimate interest in protecting sensitive information.  But, in 
ordinary criminal prosecutions, the defendant’s inability to access the evidence used 
against him, coupled with the already lax “significant purpose” requirement, greatly 
increases the potential for government abuse and constitutional violations.  A balance 
will never exist if FISA does not sufficiently account for these concerns.
Greater Transparency is a Constitutional Approach to Remedying Potential Abuses
 The proposed amendment to FISA’s current disclosure procedures is 
constitutional.  The amendment also acknowledges concerns that FISA could be 
used to circumvent Title III and the traditional warrant requirements.
 First, courts unanimously uphold FISA’s disclosure procedures, although the 
system currently contemplates ex parte, in camera reviews of FISA documents.110 
The proposed reform imparts greater deference to the rights of defendants by 
allowing defendants access to the underlying FISA documents in ordinary criminal 
cases.  Accordingly, if the current system is constitutional, a fortiori, any system that 
grants defendants greater protections is constitutional.
 Second, the amendment better addresses FISA’s potential for abuse.  Under the 
proposed reform, defendants can challenge the FISA order for both violations of 
the “significant purpose” requirement and for misrepresentations in the application. 
After reviewing the application, the defendant can better argue that the government’s 
FISA application contained insufficient, objective evidence that a significant purpose 
of the surveillance was for foreign intelligence.  Necessarily, the government would 
have to comply with the heightened “significant purpose” standard proposed in this 
article.  
 Furthermore, greater transparency will enable defendants to challenge the 
veracity of the government’s submissions in support of the FISA application vis-à-
vis a Franks hearing.111  Under the amended FISA, courts have rejected defendants’ 
requests for a Franks hearing, even though the hearing applies to all search 
warrants.112  In United States v. Damrah, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that Franks hearings are not applicable to FISA applications and then found that, 
assuming Franks was applicable, the defendant failed to meet the burden of proving 
governmental misrepresentation.113  Damrah begs the question: how can a defendant 
109  Id. at 160.
110  See Dvorske, supra note 26, at § 4 (citing United States v. Isa, 923 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir. 1991) (no violation of right to 
confrontation); United States v. Ott, 827 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1987) (no due process violation); Global Relief Foundation, Inc. v. 
O’Neil, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (same); United States v. Spanjol, 720 F. Supp. 55 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (courts generally 
uphold FISA disclosure as constitutional); United States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306 (E.D. N.Y. 1982) (FISA constitutional)).
111  See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978) (a search warrant is subject to attack if the defendant demonstrates 
it is based on an affidavit containing material false statements, and/or omissions, knowingly and intentionally made, or made 
with a reckless disregard for the truth).
112  See United States v. Damrah, 412 F.3d 618, 624-25 (6th Cir. 2005) (denying applicability of Franks hearing to FISA and 
the defendant’s Franks argument); Abu-Jihaad, 531 F. Supp. 2d at 311-12 (rejecting defendant’s Franks argument); Mubayyid, 
521 F. Supp. 2d at 130(same).
113  Damrah, 412 F.3d at 624-25.
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satisfy the Franks burden of proof if the defendant never sees the application?  Clearly, 
defendants cannot successfully challenge FISA search warrants through methods 
traditionally available in criminal trials without access to the applications.  
 Currently, judges decide in camera whether the application meets the purpose 
requirement and whether submissions in support of the application contain any 
misrepresentations.114  The potential for misuse multiplies in a closed-door system, 
particularly when the ultimate consequence is a criminal conviction.  Thus, it is of 
paramount importance to amend FISA.
Distinguishing Between Ordinary Criminal Laws and Anti-Terrorism Laws
 Terrorism prosecutions, or prosecutions arising under “anti-terrorism laws,” 
include charges brought under Title 18 Chapter 113B,115 espionage statutes,116 
and statutes aimed at international terrorism.117  Ordinary, criminal prosecutions 
include all non-terrorism related crimes.118  Why distinguish the two?  Essentially, 
the dichotomy helps rectify the current dilemma: the public wants the government 
to vigorously prosecute terrorists, and FISA often provides the evidence to do so. 
However, people do not want the government to use FISA in ordinary criminal 
prosecutions because of the potential for abuse.  Under the proposed amendment, the 
government can still prosecute terrorists vigorously, while simultaneously, ordinary 
criminal defendants gain additional rights in criminal, adversarial proceedings.
 The proposed amendment also focuses on both the objective of the surveillance 
and the nature and subsequent use of the obtained information.  One difficulty with 
FISA is that investigators never know what information the warrant will uncover 
when making the application.119  The surveillance could yield intelligence information, 
or criminal information, and both could be used in a later prosecution.120  Under the 
proposed reform, the focus is first on the use of the information: use in a prosecution 
for violating anti-terrorism laws or use in an ordinary criminal prosecution.  If the 
former, the inquiry ends and the government need not disclose the information; if 
the latter, focus then shifts towards the government’s original purpose for obtaining 
the FISA order.  The proper inquiry becomes whether the government’s original 
purpose meets the heightened statutory “significant purpose” requirement.121  Thus, 
the proposed reform scrutinizes the entire FISA process.
114  See 50 U.S.C. §1806(f ).
115  18 U.S.C. § 2331, et seq.
116  18 U.S.C. § 791, et seq.
117  Id. §§ 31-32 (2000) (hijacking or sabotaging aircraft); Id. §§175-78 (developing or possessing biological or toxin 
weapons); 49 U.S.C. §§ 46501-07 (2000 & Supp. III 2003) (committing air piracy).
118  For the purposes of this article, conspiracy charges are considered ordinary criminal activity, although conspiracy charges 
are commonly used to prosecute terrorists.
119  Swire, supra note 13, at 1362.
120  See Id.
121  Inquiry into the government’s purpose is an objective one based on the entire application.  A subjective inquiry into the 
agent’s purpose is inappropriate because of the obvious difficulty in proving intent and because the Supreme Court in City of 
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) held that an officer’s subjective intentions are irrelevant.  
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 Additionally, distinguishing between ordinary criminal prosecutions and 
terrorism prosecutions supports the government’s principal anti-terrorism objectives. 
After September 11, Attorney General John Ashcroft declared a shift in focus from 
prosecution to prevention.122  Moreover, the FBI’s 2003 field directive encouraged 
further dismantling of the wall by deemphasizing criminal prosecutions in favor 
of longer-term intelligence surveillance.123  The proposed reforms will encourage 
prosecutors and agents to use FISA for foreign intelligence purposes, rather than 
for prosecutions of ordinary criminal violations.  Prosecutors will likely not risk 
divulging FISA information, and therefore, will forego ordinary criminal charges 
for long-term intelligence gathering.  Not only does the amendment give defendants 
more rights, it also deters the government from ever initiating ordinary criminal 
charges.  Concurrently, the amendment has the added benefit of being consistent 
with the government’s purported anti-terrorism goals. 
 Finally, requiring disclosure in ordinary criminal prosecutions appropriately 
balances privacy interests with national security interests.  When FISA surveillance 
uncovers primarily criminal activity, which forms the basis for a criminal prosecution, 
individual privacy interests escalate and the government’s foreign intelligence 
concerns recede.124  In that scenario, courts are competent to make the usual probable 
cause determination,125 as in Title III.  Conversely, when FISA surveillance uncovers 
foreign intelligence and terrorist activity, FISA’s standards are appropriate, and the 
government can vigorously prosecute the target for violation of anti-terrorism laws 
without sacrificing the sensitivity of the intelligence gathered.
Applying the Rule
 Three scenarios arise that require application of this article’s proposed 
amendment: prosecutions for only ordinary criminal activity, prosecutions under 
anti-terrorism statutes, and mixed prosecutions.  The proposed disclosure procedures 
will help curtail the first scenario, or at least provide the defendants additional rights. 
In Damrah, the prosecution used FISA-derived evidence to convict the target for 
filing false statements in a citizenship application.126  In Mubayyid, the defendant 
was convicted of tax fraud.127  Neither court granted the defendants access to the 
FISA information.128  Damrah and Mubayyid represent the concern of using FISA 
as an end-run around Title III.  As previously addressed, the proposed amendment 
should diminish such occurrences. 
 In the second scenario, the government can prosecute terrorists without 
jeopardizing sensitive intelligence information.  
122  John Ashcroft, Never Again: Securing America and Restoring Justice 130 (2006).
123  Dan Eggen, FBI Applies New Rules to Surveillance, Wash. Post, Dec. 13, 2003, at A1.
124  Truong, 629 F.2d at 915.
125  See Id.
126  Damrah, 412 F.3d at 624-25.
127  Mubayyid, 521 F. Supp. 2d at 129-31.
128  Damrah, at 623-25; Mubayyid, at 129-31.
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 The last scenario will inevitably require prosecutors to balance the government’s 
interest in prosecuting criminals with the interest in maintaining secrecy over the 
details of FISA surveillance.  If the latter interest wins, the government can prosecute, 
but the defendant gains greater rights with which to challenge the FISA evidence. 
If the former interest wins, the government will forego using FISA to convict the 
defendant for ordinary criminal violations.
Impact on Law Enforcement
 Disclosing FISA information to criminal defendants could reduce the 
number of foreign intelligence informants, known as “assets,” willing to provide 
information.129  Friendly international and domestic intelligence agencies might also 
be more reluctant to share intelligence information with the FBI.130  Nevertheless, 
any resolution will require compromise from both national security and civil liberties 
advocates.  However, the fundamental constitutional implications of FISA’s use in 
ordinary criminal trials are sufficiently compelling to warrant greater transparency.
 Moreover, the proposed amendment does not require disclosure and 
the subsequent loss of assets or other intelligence sources.  Prosecutors can bring 
terrorist-related charges against targets without disclosing FISA information. 
Additionally, when FISA surveillance clearly evidences only ordinary criminal 
behavior, FBI agents can open a parallel criminal investigation and thereafter utilize 
Title III to gather evidence necessary for a conviction.131
Conclusion
 Most people, including federal law enforcement officers,132 rightfully 
acknowledge that FISA’s present use should match the statute’s original purpose—
as a tool for collecting foreign intelligence information.  However, FISA, as 
currently written and interpreted, contains three problems that create a potential 
for abuse.  First, courts interpret FISA’s “significant purpose” requirement far too 
loosely, thereby creating an opportunity for the government to use FISA as an end-
run around Title III.  Second, when FISA investigations reveal ordinary criminal 
activity, FISA’s disclosure procedures deny the targets access to the FISA-derived 
information at trial.  Third, FISA’s differing probable cause standard, compared to 
Title III warrants, creates another fundamental problem when FISA evidence is 
used in prosecutions for ordinary criminal offenses.
 Given the potential for abuse, this article argues that: (1) courts must 
interpret the “significant purpose” requirement more literally, and (2) Congress must 
amend FISA’s disclosure procedures to allow defendants access to FISA information 
when prosecuted for ordinary criminal violations.  The proffered judicial and 
statutory reforms should restore the amendment to its original purpose, continue 
129  Telephone Interview with James Jarboe, Former Section Chief Domestic Counterterrorism, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (Mar. 28, 2008). 
130  Email from Jay Koerner, Former Supervisory Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation (Apr. 8, 2008) (on file 
with author). 
131  Id.
132  Id.
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to provide law enforcement with the flexibility to fight terrorism, restore defendants’ 
rights, and prevent the government from using FISA as a pretext around traditional 
warrant requirements.  Additionally, these reforms should satiate the concerns of 
those emphasizing the need for strong national security and those emphasizing a 
continued commitment to civil liberties.
 Striking a balance between national security and civil liberties is one of 
the most salient issues of our time.  The government must walk a tightrope to 
achieve this goal.  Perhaps successfully accomplishing this objective is as difficult 
metaphorically, as it is literally.  National security law is mostly reactionary, behaving 
like a pendulum.  When our nation is safe and secure, the pendulum swings in favor 
of greater constitutional protections.  When disaster strikes, such as September 
11, national security concerns come to the forefront. Thus, the future of FISA, 
as currently written, may depend on events beyond our control.  Only time will 
tell. 
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A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY
COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2006
Karen G. Manning
“Our basic charter cannot be contracted away like this.  The Constitution grants 
Congress and the President the power to acquire, dispose of, and govern territory, 
not the power to decide when and where its terms apply.”  
Boumediene v. Bush, slip op. at 35 (2008).
1The Military Commissions Act of 2006 (“MCA”)2 is the most recent legislation 
in the series of constitutional struggles between the Executive, Legislative, and 
Judicial branches of the federal government over executive detentions in the “war on 
terror.”  
In Rasul v. Bush,3 the Supreme Court of the United States held that any person 
claiming to be held in violation of U.S. law could seek redress for the illegal detention 
using the statutory writ of habeas corpus.4  Although the Supreme Court had 
found in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld5 that Congress had authorized the President to detain 
prisoners determined to be “unlawful enemy combatants,” the Court in Rasul ruled 
that U.S. citizens so detained must be given “a meaningful opportunity to contest” 
their classification and detention before a neutral decision-maker.6  
Intending to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction over these unlawful enemy 
combatants’ habeas corpus petitions, Congress then passed the Detainee Treatment 
Act of 2005 (“DTA.”)7  In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,8 the Court ruled first that the 
Detainee Treatment Act did not strip the courts of jurisdiction over pending claims. 
Additionally, the military commissions created to try these detainees violated both 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”) and the Geneva Convention relative 
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (“3rd Geneva Convention.”)9  
Undeterred, the President then asked Congress for legislation specifically 
excluding alien unlawful enemy combatants from being tried in courts-martial, from 
filing habeas corpus petitions, and from claiming the protections of the Geneva 
conventions.  (As the U.S. has signed and ratified10 each of the four 1949 Conventions, 
it is legally bound to assure the standards set out in each.)  The President got his 
wish with the MCA.  
1  An alumna of Smith College, the author obtained her Doctor of Jurisprudence, cum laude, from the University of 
Tennessee College of Law in 2008.  She is licensed to practice in Tennessee.  After clerking for a judge on the Tennessee Court 
of Criminal Appeals, she now works as a contract attorney in Knoxville, Tennessee.  
2  10 U.S.C. §§ 948a–950w (2007).
3  Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 159 L. Ed. 2d 548 (2004).  
4  22 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).  
5  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 159 L. Ed. 2d 578 (2004).
6  542 U.S. at 509, 124 S. Ct. at 2635, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 586.  
7  Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 119 Stat. 2739-44. 
8  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 165 L. Ed. 2d 723 (2006).
9  Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
10  Ratified by the U.S. February 2, 1956.
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Although it reflects congressional approval of the Commander-in-Chief ’s 
prosecution11 of the “war on terror,” the MCA violates domestic law, particularly the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice and habeas corpus law, as well as international 
humanitarian law as codified in the 3rd Geneva Convention.12  Even more significant, 
however, is the Act’s removal of the Federal courts’ jurisdiction of habeas corpus 
claims filed by enemy combatants.13  The MCA specifically precludes detainees from 
challenging their detention in a habeas proceeding.  
This article will outline, first, the salient features of the Military Commissions 
Act of 2006.  Second, it will contrast the procedures of the MCA with those provided 
by the statutory courts-martial.  Third, it will discuss, in brief, the provisions of the 
MCA that many commentators believe violate the United States’ multilateral treaty 
obligations, specifically the 3rd Geneva Convention.  Fourth, it will question the 
Act’s suspension of habeas corpus rights for alien unlawful enemy combatants, and 
will recommend the Court take into account recent legal developments, as well as 
concerns about the rule of law domestically and internationally, to hold that the MCA 
provides an unconstitutional substitute for habeas corpus review available in areas 
under exclusive U.S. control (i.e., military bases, particularly the U.S. Naval Base at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, which continues to house detainees captured abroad in the 
war on terror.)  It will also recount the 2008 Supreme Court decision in Boumediene 
v. Bush14 invalidating a section of the Military Commissions Act.  
Salient Features of the Military Commissions 
The MCA was enacted to “authorize trial by military commission” of alien 
enemy unlawful combatants “for violations of the law of war and other purposes.”15 
“Alien unlawful enemy combatants” are those foreign fighters who have engaged in 
hostilities against the United States, and who do not per se fit into the framework of 
Article 4 of the 3rd Geneva Convention—they are neither in the military of a state, 
nor are they a visibly identifiable militia group respecting the laws of war.16  These 
alien enemy unlawful combatants are adjudicated as such either by predecessors 
to the MCA’s military commissions (e.g., the Combatant Status Review Tribunals 
invalidated in Hamdan) or by any other tribunal convened by the President or by 
the Secretary of Defense.17  Again, the military commissions have jurisdiction to 
try “any offense made punishable by [the Act] or the law of war when committed 
by an alien unlawful enemy combatant before, on, or after September 11, 2001.”18 
Also, Congress provided the President congressional authority to create the military 
11  U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
12  Ratified by the U.S. February 2, 1956.
13  10 U.S.C. § 950j(b).  
14  553 U.S. ____, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).  
15  10 U.S.C. §§ 948a–950w.
16  Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War arts. 3 and 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 
U.N.T.S. 135.
17  10 U.S.C. §§ 948(a)(1)(i-ii), 948d(c) (2006).  
18  Id. § 948d(a).  
114 BAKER CENTER JOURNAL OF APPLIED PUBLIC POLICY
commissions envisioned by this Act.19
 The MCA provides requirements for its composition and procedures, yet 
also allows the Secretary of Defense great discretion in fashioning procedures for 
the military commission.   The MCA stipulates that a military commission shall 
be comprised of at least five members;20 shall have a judge and attorneys detailed 
to it,21 and lists the qualifications of each;22 and the commission shall have court 
reporters and may use interpreters.23  (In cases where the death penalty is sought, 
the commission must be composed of at least twelve members.24)  The military 
commissions conduct open proceedings (except for deliberations) with the accused 
present,25 and counsel must be present.26  For hearings, the commission members 
do not have to be present.27  The commissions are independent, and cannot be 
“censur[ed], reprimand[ed], or admonish[ed]”28 by the “convening authority” (either 
the Secretary of Defense or his designee,29 now the Honorable Susan J. Crawford). 
Charges against an accused must be signed by someone subject to the UCMJ and 
before another person able to administer an oath, usually a commissioned officer.30 
The affidavit must state that the affiant either has personal knowledge of her or 
his claim or has reason to believe what she or he is claiming.  Notice of the charges 
must be given to the accused “as soon as possible,”31 and must be served on both 
the accused and military defense counsel in English and in a language the accused 
understands, at a time “sufficiently in advance of trial to prepare a defense.”32
 The Secretary of Defense “may” promulgate rules for “pretrial, trial, and post-
trial procedures, including elements and modes of proof.”33  Although these rules 
“shall apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence in trial by general courts-
martial,”34 the Secretary of Defense has considerable discretion here.  Under the 
MCA, he can, “so far as [he] considers practicable or consistent with military or 
intelligence activities,”35 issue rules inconsistent with rules of courts-martial, merely 
by stating that it is “impractical” for the military commission to apply rules of courts-
19  Id. § 948b(b).  
20  Id. § 948m.
21  Id. § 948i, j, k.  
22  Id. § 948j, k.
23  Id. § 948l.  
24  Id. § 948m(a)(2) and § 949m(c)(1-2), where a military commission may, in cases of hardship or emergency, be composed 
of only nine members.  
25  Id. § 949d(d).  
26  Id. § 949d(d).  
27  Id. § 949d(a).
28  Id. § 949b(a)(1).  
29  Id. § 948h.
30  Id. § 948q(a).  
31  Id. § 948q(b).  
32  Id.  
33  Id. § 949a(a).  
34  Id. § 949a(a).  
35  Id. § 949a(a).  
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martial in the context of the “war on terror.”  Additionally, the Secretary of Defense 
can “consult” with the Attorney General in issuing these rules and regulations.
 Nonetheless, the accused “shall be permitted” to present a defense, to cross-
examine witnesses, to be represented by an attorney during the proceedings, and 
to discover evidence.  The accused is not “required to testify against himself.”36 
Additionally, the accused may retain civilian counsel instead of using the appointed 
military counsel.  In this case, the appointed counsel becomes associate counsel.37 
The accused can also represent himself.38  The accused, like the prosecution, may 
challenge the composition of the military commission for cause, one person at a 
time.39  Each side also has one peremptory challenge.40  The judge, however, may 
be challenged only for cause.41  If the commission’s composition changes during 
the proceedings, each side may peremptorily challenge a member not previously so 
challenged.42  
However, evidence against the accused is not subject to exclusion if it has 
been illegally obtained.43  Also, coerced statements are admissible44 in military 
commissions as long as they were not obtained via torture or “cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment.”45  Additionally, hearsay that would be inadmissible in a court-
martial may be admitted46 if the proponent gives notice and if the information is 
reliable and probative.47  The MCA does, though, contain a provision similar to the 
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence excluding evidence either whose probative 
value is substantially outweighed by dangers to the accused’s case or that wastes the 
commission’s time.48  Additionally, the accused may have to face a national security 
privilege,49 for which the Secretary of Defense may issue regulations.50  The military 
commission judge has discretion on how to proceed, however.51  These national 
security privilege regulations must be presented to the Congressional Armed Services 
Committees sixty days before they go into effect.52  The Secretary may also delegate 
his rule-prescribing authority.53 
36  Id. § 948r(a).  
37  Id. §§ 949a, 949c(a)(3).
38  Id. § 949a(b)(1)(D). 
39  Id. § 949f(a).
40  Id. § 949f(b).
41  Id. § 949f(b).
42  Id. § 949f(c).  
43  Id. § 949a(b)(2)(B).  
44  Id. § 949a(b)(2)(C).
45  Id. § 948r(b)–(d).
46  Id. § 949a(b)(2)(E)(i)–(ii).  
47  Id. § 949a(b)(2)(E)(ii).  
48  Id. § 949a(b)(2)(F)(i)–(ii).
49  Id. § 949d(f ).
50  Id. § 949f(e)–(f ).  
51  Id. § 949d(f )(1)–(2).  
52  Id. § 949d(f )(4).
53  Id. § 949a(c).  
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To convict the accused of violations of international humanitarian law or acts 
proscribed by the MCA,54 the military commission must find the accused guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt.55  Alternatively, the Act provides for the acceptance of 
a guilty plea, and in December 2008, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and four other 
detainees announced their intention to plead guilty.56  Additionally, Australian David 
Hicks pleaded guilty in March 2007 to providing material support for terrorism 
and served the remainder of his sentence in Australia, where he was released in 
December 2007.57  The accused is deemed innocent until proven guilty.58  The gravity 
of the punishment determines the vote necessary for conviction and sentencing. 
For example, a conviction requires the votes of two-thirds of the commission’s five 
members.59  Life imprisonment or a sentence of ten or more years requires the vote 
of three-fourths of the members.60  A death penalty sentence must be unanimous 
among the commission’s twelve or nine members, as the case may be.61  All other 
sentences require a two-thirds vote.62  The commission must announce its verdicts,63 
and must provide defense counsel with an unredacted trial transcript, subject to the 
national security privilege.64  The accused receives a redacted transcript.65  
Should the defendant wish to appeal, he must submit documents to the convening 
authority, who will evaluate the proceedings.66  The convening authority may order a 
rehearing,67 alter the commission’s findings, or refer the case to the Court of Military 
Commission Review (“CMCR”).68  (The prosecution cannot appeal a “not guilty” 
verdict,69 nor can it appeal a ruling tantamount to “not guilty.”70)  Any finding of 
“guilty” is automatically referred to the CMCR,71 a panel of three appellate military 
judges.72  The MCA sets out their qualifications, and further states that the CMCR 
can only act on matters of law.73  Additionally, while the prosecution has the ability to 
file an interlocutory appeal, the accused does not.74  The accused and the prosecution 
are also appointed appellate counsel pursuant to section 950h of the MCA.  
54  See id. §§ 950q, t, v, and w for the list of offenses.  
55  Id. § 949l(c)(1).   
56  Id. § 949(i)(b).  
57 http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/2-david-hicks/documents/5/pages/1#2; http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/americas/6510899.stm; see http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo for information on the disposition of 
detainees.  (December 29, 2008).  
58  Id. § 949l(c)(1).  
59  Id. §§ 949m(a) and 949m(b)(3).  
60  Id. § 949m(b)(2).
61  Id. § 949m(c).  
62  Id. § 949m(b)(3).  
63  Id. § 949n.
64  Id. § 949o(c).  
65  Id.
66  Id. § 950b(c).  
67  Id. § 950d.
68  Id. § 950f.  
69  See id. § 950c(a).  
70  Id. § 950d.
71  Id. § 950c(a).  
72  Id. § 950f.
73  Id. § 950f(d).  
74  See id. § 950d(a).  
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The defendant may pursue further review by submitting the case to the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.75  According to the MCA, 
this court has “exclusive jurisdiction”76 over whether the final decision of the military 
commission or CMCR was consistent with the MCA and whether the case 
conformed to constitutional, statutory, and common law standards.77  The appellate 
courts, however, are only able to act on matters of law.78  After the court of appeals 
has resolved the matter, the defendant may also petition for certiorari to the Supreme 
Court.79  
Should the Court deny the petition for certiorari, the defendant has no further 
recourse.  The MCA both explicitly prohibits an accused from invoking the protections 
of the Geneva Conventions80 and deprives the domestic courts of jurisdiction over 
habeas corpus petitions.81  Each of these provisions will be discussed below.  
After a judgment is final, the Secretary of Defense has the authority to execute 
the sentence.82  The accused may be incarcerated in a U.S. military or civilian prison 
or a foreign jail that the U.S. has permission to use.83  In cases where the death penalty 
is imposed, the President has the discretion to approve or alter the sentence,84 and 
the defendant cannot be executed without the President’s approval.85  Each year, the 
Secretary of Defense must submit a report to the Congressional Armed Services 
Committees of “any” trials by military commission.86
 The MCA and UCMJ are Discrete Entities 
The Military Commissions Act contains explicit language stating these military 
commissions are entities discrete from courts-martial, and that the MCA specifically 
differs from the Uniform Code of Military Justice.  Although the MCA says the 
military commissions are “based upon the procedures for trial by general courts-
martial” listed in title 10, chapter 47 of the U.S. Code,87 the MCA explicitly states that 
certain provisions used in courts-martial88 are inapplicable to military commissions. 
Furthermore, the UCMJ is inapplicable to chapter 47A (the Military Commissions 
Act as codified in 10 U.S.C. § 948 et seq.) except as provided.89  The MCA goes on to 
say that the UCMJ and the military commissions of the MCA neither are binding 
precedent on each other,90 nor can information from either proceeding be introduced 
75  Id. § 950g.
76  Id. § 950g(a).
77  Id.  § 950g(c)(1)–(2).
78  Id. § 950h(b).  
79  Id. § 950g(d).  
80  Id. § 948b(g).  
81  Id. § 950j(b).
82  Id. § 950i.  
83  Id. § 949u(a).
84  Id. § 950i.
85  Id. § 950i(b).  
86  Id. § 948e(a).  
87  Id. § 948b(c).
88  Id. § 948b(d)(A)-(C) (regarding speedy trial, compulsory self-incrimination, and pretrial investigation).
89  Id. § 948b(c).  
90  Id. § 948b(c).
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in a proceeding subject to another part of title 10 of the U.S. Code (i.e., evidence of 
a court-martial proceeding cannot be introduced in a military commission and vice 
versa.)91
This discreteness of procedures seems to revive issues presented in Hamdan,92 
where the Supreme Court invalidated the military commissions created by the 
President.  In that case, the Court construed 10 U.S.C. §§ 836(a) and (b), and found 
that the Executive’s power to promulgate rules of procedure for military commissions 
and courts-martial were restricted in two ways.93  First, “no procedural rule …may be 
‘contrary to or inconsistent with’ the UCMJ—however practical it may seem.”94  This 
addresses 10 U.S.C. § 836(a).  Second, pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 836(b),”the rules 
adopted must be ‘uniform insofar as practical.’”95 
In the MCA, again, the President has run afoul of constitutional powers.  First, 
the military commissions specifically operate under rules “contrary to or inconsistent” 
with the UCMJ.96  Additionally, in the UCMJ, the President must promulgate rules 
of courts-martial consistent with those used in federal district courts in criminal 
trials.97  The provisions of the military commissions do not comply with these rules. 
Take, e.g., the admissions of coerced statements; the admission of inadmissible, 
illegally obtained evidence; the exception of the accused from Geneva Convention 
protections; and the stripping of habeas jurisdiction from the federal courts.  As 
in Hamdan, although the President’s claim of the impracticability of using federal 
criminal court rules and procedures in the military commissions is entitled to 
deference,98 the President again has not justified the claimed impracticability of 
the laws of courts-martial in a military commission.99  The threat of “international 
terrorism” does not, by itself, justify a claim that the rules of courts-martial cannot 
feasibly be applied to the detainees in military commissions.100
Second, the rules for military commissions and courts-martial are not “uniform 
insofar as practical.”101  In Hamdan, the Court stated that the rules [of courts-martial] 
must apply to military commissions unless impractical.”102  In obtaining congressional 
approval to exclude protections of the UCMJ from the military commissions,103 the 
President has again claimed that the threat of international terrorism requires “a 
91  Id. § 948b(e).  
92  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 165 L. Ed. 2d 723 (2006).
93  126 S. Ct. at 2790, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 771.
94  Id.
95  Id.
96  See 948b(c)-(g) (the commissions apply rules inconsistent with and contrary to those employed in courts-martial).  
97  10 U.S.C. § 836.
98  Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2791, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 772.
99  126 S. Ct 2792, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 773.  
100  See id.
101  126 S. Ct. at 2790, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 771.
102  126 S. Ct. at 2991, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 772.
103  10 U.S.C. § 948b(d), (e).
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more summary form of justice than is afforded by courts-martial.”104  The Supreme 
Court has rebuffed this argument before.105  It should do so again.   
The MCA Violates the Third Geneva Convention 
The MCA also places the U.S. at odds with its multilateral treaty obligations. 
Although the Bush administration classes alien unlawful enemy combatants outside 
the scope of the Geneva Conventions, the Supreme Court has held that this is a 
fallacious interpretation of the language of the Geneva Conventions’ Common 
Articles.106  The prisoners of war captured in the “war on terror” are indeed protected 
by the 3rd Geneva Convention’s Article 3.107  
The MCA purports to strip detainees captured during the war on terror of any 
rights protected by the 1949 Geneva Conventions.108  In essence, the government 
claims the MCA is equivalent to any obligations the U.S. owes its prisoners of 
war through the Geneva Conventions.  The Act specifically states that military 
commissions established under the MCA are regularly established courts complying 
with 3rd Geneva Convention’s Article 3.109  This convention, addressing prisoners of 
war, prohibits trying and sentencing detainees in tribunals not qualifying as “regularly 
constituted court[s] affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as 
indispensable by civilized peoples.”110  In Hamdan, the Supreme Court ruled that the 
President’s military commissions were not “regularly constituted court[s]” (and thus 
did not satisfy the Geneva Convention’s requirements,) as the regularly constituted 
military courts for the U.S. were the statutory courts-martial,111 and not “special 
courts”112 such as the military commissions.  
Additionally, the 3rd Geneva Convention requires all High Contracting Parties 
(including the United States) to bring all persons “alleged to have committed, or to 
have ordered to be committed, [war crimes] regardless of their nationality, before its 
own courts.”113  As a signatory to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the U.S. must 
bring prisoners of war to U.S. courts-martial and follow their procedures.  Also, 
the 3rd Geneva Convention prohibits “moral or physical coercion” of prisoners to 
compel incriminating statements.114  While barring statements obtained through 
104  Reiterating Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2792, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 773.     
105  Id. 
106  Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 
135.
107  See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2795, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 778.  
108  10 U.S.C. § 948d(g).
109  Id.  § 948b(f ).  
110  Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, 1(d).
111  Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2797, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 778, referring to Justice Kennedy’s concurrence at 2803 and 785.
112  Justice Stevens refers to the commentary to the 4th Geneva Convention, cited in Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2796-97, 165 L. 
Ed. 2d at 778.
113  Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 129.
114  Id. art. 99.
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torture,115 the MCA allows coerced statements if :  1) these statements are reliable, 
2) the admittance of these statements would serve “the interests of justice”, and 3) the 
treatment is not “cruel, inhuman, or degrading.”116  Additionally, the period of pre-
trial confinement for offenses meriting it cannot exceed three months.  The U.S. has 
detained people since 2001 at various locations worldwide, including Guantanamo 
Bay, and continues to detain untried prisoners, although some have been released.
 The U.S. has not denounced its participation in the Geneva Conventions’ 
obligations.117  On the contrary, the U.S. has asserted its willingness to fulfill its 
treaty obligations, 118 namely by its 2005 ratification of an additional protocol to 
the Geneva Conventions.119  Thus, the U.S. is still bound by its multilateral treaty 
obligations toward prisoners of war, be they soldiers of a foreign state or “alien 
unlawful enemy combatants.”  
The MCA Deprives Alien Unlawful Enemy Combatants 
of the Right to Contest Detention Through a Habeas 
Position
The most salient feature of the MCA is that it strips the federal courts of habeas 
corpus jurisdiction for alien unlawful combatants120—i.e., people detained in the 
“war on terror” who are not citizens or legal residents of the United States.  The 
United States’ Constitution states:  “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus 
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public 
Safety may require it.”121  In Rasul v. Bush,122 the Supreme Court interpreted 22 
U.S.C. § 2241 (the statute granting federal courts jurisdiction for habeas petitions) 
and found that the federal courts did, in fact, have jurisdiction over the habeas 
petitions of Guantanamo detainees, both American and foreign.123  Later, Congress 
attempted to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts over habeas petitions.124  The 
Supreme Court rebuffed this effort, holding the Detainee Treatment Act did not 
deprive the federal courts of habeas jurisdiction.125  
After this third defeat,126 the Bush Administration obtained legislation (the 
MCA) purporting to suspend the courts’ jurisdiction of habeas claims.127  The 
115  10 U.S.C. § 948r(b).  
116  Id. § 948r(c)-(d).  
117  pursuant to Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 129.  
118  See the briefing by the Department of State’s Legal Advisor on September 7, 2006, at http://www.state.gov/s/l/
rls/71939.htm ( July 10, 2007).  
119  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 19 August 1949, and relating to the Adoption of an Additional 
Distinctive Emblem (Protocol III), 8 December 2005, ratified by the U.S. on March 8, 2007.  
120  10 U.S.C. § 950j(b).  
121  U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.  
122  542 U.S. 466, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 159 L. Ed. 2d 548 (2004).
123  542 U.S. at 481, 124 S. Ct. at 2696, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 561.  
124  Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 119 Stat. 2742 (2006) at (e)(1).  
125  Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2753, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 732.  
126  The Court had ruled against the government in Hamdi.  
127  10 U.S.C. § 950j(b).  
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MCA strips the courts of their jurisdiction not only for future habeas petitions 
by detainees, but, more alarmingly, of pending habeas petitions, as well.  Although 
there is precedent for such a statute,128 such a summary dismissal of pending claims 
is troubling, particularly as the Court determined the DTA did not limit the 
jurisdiction of federal courts to hear detainees’ habeas claims.  Indeed, the Supreme 
Court announced it would review the constitutionality of the MCA’s removal of 
jurisdiction over detainees’ habeas claims.129 
Although federal habeas corpus review for anyone detained in violation of U.S. 
law is thought to be a matter of course, review of actual habeas case law and statutes 
proves otherwise.  In fact, federal habeas corpus jurisdiction has been successively 
narrowed both by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts and Congress130 to such a 
degree that the odds of a pro se petitioner (there is no right to counsel on collateral 
review, so the vast majority of petitioners have no assistance of counsel) receiving 
relief from unlawful detention are almost non-existent.131  The ability of a court to 
have jurisdiction over executive detainees must be viewed in this context.  
On the final day of its October 2006 term, the Supreme Court accepted 
habeas petitions on behalf of two detainees, after initially denying the petitions for 
certiorari.132  At the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the government 
successfully invoked a procedural bar and a two-part substantive-law bar to the 
court’s jurisdiction of a habeas claim.  The government argued in Boumediene that: 
1) the petitioners had not yet exhausted all their remedies before seeking habeas 
review, so the petitions for review must be denied; and 2) the plain language of the 
MCA eliminates a federal court’s jurisdiction of a detainee’s habeas petition133 and 
is consistent with the suspension clause, as the writ of habeas corpus in 1789 would 
not be available to foreign nationals neither present in the U.S. nor having property 
interests in the U.S.134 
 The government also claimed in its March 21, 2007 brief several times, without 
citations to any authority, that the DTA gives 9/11 detainees “greater rights of 
128  Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 19 L. Ed. 264 (1869).  
129  Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 961 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 2007 WL 1854132 ( June 29, 2007) (No. 06-1195) 
and Al Odah v. U.S., 476 F.3d 981, 375 U.S. App. D.C. 48, cert granted, 2007 WL 681992, 75 U.S.L.W. 3483 ( June 29, 2007) 
(No. 06-1196).
130  E.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 103 L. Ed.2d 334 (1989) (imposing procedural bar to invoking 
constitutional rights declared by the Supreme Court of the U.S. on collateral review after the date on which a state’s highest 
court had affirmed petitioner’s conviction on direct review); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) 
as codified, for example, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(1-2), (d) and § 2254(d)(1)–(2) (imposing rigid procedural bars to reject 
the bulk of petitions for habeas corpus relief on procedural grounds without evaluating the merits of the constitutional claims).
131  John H. Blume, AEDPA:  the “Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 Cornell L. R. 259, 284-285 (2006) (showing comparisons of 
success rates for non-capital and capital petitioners).
132  Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 961 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 2007 WL 1854132 ( June 29, 2007) (No. 06-1195) 
and al Odah v. U.S., 476 F.3d 981, 375 U.S. App. D.C. 48, cert granted, 2007 WL 681992, 75 U.S.L.W. 3483 ( June 29, 2007) 
(No. 06-1196).
133  Brief for the Respondents in Opposition, Boumediene v. Bush, 2007 WL 868965 (March 21, 2007) (Nos. 06-1195 and 
06-1196).
134  Id.
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judicial review than traditionally provided to those held for punishment pursuant to 
the judgment of a military tribunal.”135
The government based most of its substantive law argument on one case: Johnson 
v. Eisentrager.136  This is the famous World-War-II era case declining to extend the 
constitutional privilege to seek habeas review in U.S. courts to German nationals 
captured in a war theater (China), but who neither were present in the U.S. nor 
had property interests in the U.S.137  These men were, however, transported to a 
U.S. military prison in occupied Germany—an area under the control of the U.S. 
military.  The Eisentrager Court ignores this aspect.  Instead, the Court chooses to 
ridicule the idea that the Constitution should be respected by U.S. officials, and 
discusses the nonsensical idea of the extra-territoriality of constitutional rights.  For 
the Court, the problem is that captured foreign military agents would be able to 
invoke all the protections of the U.S. Constitution,138 while U.S. citizens held abroad 
would not be able to assert similar protections against their foreign jailers.  
The Eisentrager Court invoked a traditionalist approach when confidently 
asserting there is no constitutional right to habeas review for foreign nationals.139 
The Court adopted the common law distinction between alien nationals in the U.S. 
from a country with which the U.S. is at war, other foreign nationals from “peaceful” 
countries, and U.S. citizens.140  Aliens not from countries assisting in the war effort 
must be considered as enemies, according to the Court.141
Much has changed since the Supreme Court issued the Eisentrager opinion—so 
much, in fact, that the denial of statutory habeas corpus review to foreign nationals 
and upholding the constitutionality of the MCA, as drafted and enacted, is today 
precluded. 
First, the U.S. signed and ratified142 the August 12, 1949 Geneva Conventions, 
including the 3rd Geneva Convention,143 on August 2, 1955.  As a state party to the 
conventions, the U.S. has renounced any common law tradition of distinguishing 
135  Id. at *13, echoing statement at *8-9.   
136  Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 70 S. Ct. 936, 94 L.Ed. 1255 (1950).  
137  For other examples where this approach has been applied, see also People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 
182 F.3d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1999) and U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 108 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1990).
138  Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 781-82.
139  The government’s use of Eisentrager to bolster its argument is curious, as the case does not strengthen its position. 
Justice Kennedy, in fact, cited Eisentrager and a totality-of-the-circumstances approach in his Rasul concurrence to find that 
Eisentrager was in stark contrast to the position of the Rasul petitioners, who were able to petition for habeas relief as they were 
detained in a U.S. military base.  In Rasul, the petitioners were held indefinitely, without being able to determine their status 
as terrorists associated with al-Qaaeda, and were detained on a U.S. military base.  Eisentrager, on the other hand, involved 
petitioners who had been tried and convicted for having engaged in military activity against the U.S. in China after Germany’s 
surrender.  
140  Id. at 769-773.
141  Id. at 769.
142  http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=375&ps=P (Dec. 13, 2007).
143  Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 
135.
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alien combatants from U.S. military actors.144  The U.S. must bring alien enemy 
combatants before its own “regularly constituted courts.”  The Eisentrager logic is no 
longer applicable to deny petitioners the ability to contest their detention pursuant 
to U.S. law—the statutory habeas provision codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq.
Second, the Eisentrager Court relies in part on the Alien Enemy Act of 1798, 
codified at 50 U.S.C. § 21, to justify the exclusion of alien, non-resident combatants 
from U.S. courts.  This section renders “the resident alien enemy…constitutionally 
subject to summary arrest, internment, and deportation whenever a declared war 
exists.”145  (As the legal rights of resident aliens in time of war were subject to a type 
of rescission, non-resident aliens had no constitutional rights at all.)  Although this 
statute is still in force, actions based on it surely would be subject to the due process 
and equal protection concerns of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution.  Although not the case during World War II, racism and nationalism 
are not powerful enough in the U.S. today to justify the abridgment of the rights 
of those detained, whether citizen, legal resident, or other, in contravention of the 
Constitution.    
Third, invoking rights that existed in 1789, as the government does in its brief,146 
is not an effective strategy.  In 1789, only British and U.S. citizens could challenge 
their detention respectively in lands subject to the British crown or in the U.S.  In 
the intervening 200 years, the citizenry of each country has been extended from 
exclusively white, propertied men to both women and members of other ethnic and 
racial groups.  Although an examination of law in 1789 might be determinative for 
evaluating whether cases are jury-eligible, it is not a meaningful aid in determining 
the ability of those detained in violation of U.S. law to contest their detention—
particularly when the case supporting the government’s position, Eisentrager, has 
been effectively minimized, if not overruled, by Rasul.    
Fourth, the tone of Eisentrager is an anachronism incompatible with the modern 
conception of the rule of law.  In that decision, the Court ridicules the idea that 
foreign nationals in U.S. military custody should be able to invoke the writ of 
habeas corpus to challenge their detention in U.S. courts.  Granting foreign soldiers 
constitutional protections, the Eisentrager Court insists, would make soldiers and 
combatants immune from prosecution.147  More plausibly, allowing foreign nationals 
to challenge their detention in U.S. courts would force the administration to 
prosecute its case against each detainee more fully, and in compliance with domestic 
law.  If the detention is found to be lawful, then that strengthens the administration’s 
hand in its “war on terror.”
Additionally, subjecting detentions to habeas evaluation demonstrates respect 
for the rule of law.  The U.S. is founded on, among other principles, respect for the 
144  See article 106 (stating that a State Party must accord to a foreign soldier the same rights to appellate review as it would 
to one of its own soldiers).  
145  Eisentrager at 775.
146  Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at *6.  
147  Eisentrager at 785.
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rule of law.  As one of the world’s largest democracies, the U.S. is a world leader, 
and its foreign policy is informed by policies furthering the rule of law.  The U.S. 
even evaluates other countries for their democratic credentials, as well as their 
commitment to human rights and to the rule of law.148  In their respective briefs,149 
the American Bar Association and a group of former U.S. diplomats urge the Court 
to consider both the centrality of the writ of habeas corpus in our system and our 
role in the international community.150  The Bush administration’s zeal to place 
detainees outside the jurisdiction of the U.S. violates our domestic law, of which 
international law (i.e., the 1949 Geneva Conventions and other treaties) is a part 
under the Supremacy Clause, and it significantly damages the worldwide opinion 
of the U.S.  How can a democratic government obliged to protect the Constitution 
deny those it imprisons the ability to contest their detention, a writ listed in the 
Constitution? 
Fifth, the Supreme Court has viewed whether U.S. courts have habeas jurisdiction 
for foreign combatants detained by U.S. officials and the military differently in the 
“war on terror” than in the World-War-II era.  To withdraw habeas jurisdiction, 
Congress must provide an adequate alternative remedy.151  In the “war on terror” 
cases, habeas remains available, as no other adequate alternative remedy has been 
created.152  
In Rasul, the Court held any person claiming to be held in violation of U.S. 
law could seek redress for the illegal detention using habeas corpus.  The Court 
determined in Rasul that the “statutory predicate” to the Eisentrager holding (i.e., that 
the petitioner had to be within the court’s jurisdiction to have a proper habeas claim) 
had been overruled in Braden153, where the Court held that the jailer’s location, not 
the detainee’s location, was the material issue for determining a court’s jurisdiction of 
a habeas claim.154  Additionally, there could be no claim of extraterritoriality barring 
application of U.S. law in Rasul.155  There, the petitioners were incarcerated in a U.S. 
naval prison at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba—land over which the 
U.S. “exercise[d] complete jurisdiction and control” and which had been nominally 
leased for an indeterminate duration.156
Next, in Hamdi, the Court ruled that military commissions indeed could be 
148  See the U.S. Dept. of State’s listings of reports on human rights practices for the past ten years.  http://www.state.gov/g/
drl/rls/index.htm (Oct.18, 2009).
149  Brief for the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Boumediene v. Bush, 2007 WL 
2456942 (2007) (Nos. 06-1194, 06-1196) and Brief for Former United States Diplomats as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, Boumediene v. Bush, 2007 WL 2414900 (2007) (Nos. 06-1195 and 06-1196).  
150  American Bar Association Amicus Brief.  
151  Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 97 S. Ct. 1224, 51 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1977).  
152  This will be discussed below using the Court’s June 2008 Boumediene v. Bush decision.  
153  Rasul, 542 U.S. at 479 (construing Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 93 S. Ct. 1123, 35 L.Ed.2d 443 
(1973)).   
154  Id.
155  Rasul at 480.  
156  Rasul at 471 (discussing the lease agreement between the U.S. and Cuba).
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used to determine a detainee’s enemy combatant status.157  However, in the absence 
of a tribunal determining the citizen-detainee’s legal status of “enemy combatant,” a 
federal court has habeas jurisdiction to evaluate the detention for compliance with 
constitutional rights (e.g., access to counsel, notice of the charges against a detainee, 
notice of the basis for classification as an enemy combatant, and the opportunity to 
rebut evidence against a detainee before a neutral decision-maker.158)  The writ of 
habeas corpus was available to anyone detained in violation of the U.S. Constitution 
unless Congress had suspended the writ.  The Court found that it had not.
The following year, in Hamdan, the Court invalidated the tribunal convened 
to try the petitioners, as it did not meet jurisdictional prerequisites and because it 
violated the UCMJ and Geneva Convention.159  In its decision, the Court discussed 
the jurisdictional prerequisites for the three types of military commissions, 
including the model used by the Bush administration:  the “law-of-war” military 
commission.160  The tribunal used to try Hamdan did not meet the four preconditions 
for jurisdiction.161   First, for a law-of-war military commission to have jurisdiction 
over enemy combatants, the commission can only try offenses committed within 
the theater of war.  Second, the charged offense must have been committed during 
the duration of the war (and not before).  Third, persons triable by the commission 
can be only members of the commission’s own military forces or members of enemy 
armed forces engaged in violations of the law of war.  Fourth, only two branches of 
offenses are possible:  1) violations of the law of war, including general principles of 
law (i.e., what individual states consider to be violations of the law of war), and 2) 
breaches of military orders and regulations that are not legally triable by statutory 
courts-martial.162  As these criteria were not satisfied by the military commission 
claiming to have jurisdiction over Hamdan, the military commission could not 
legally try him.   
Conclusion
Each recent detainee decision has resulted in a corresponding legislative change 
to bring executive detention more into line with the Supreme Court’s rulings.  On 
June 29, 2007, the Supreme Court granted petitions for rehearing that it had earlier 
denied.163  In doing so, it granted petitions for certiorari from Lakhdar Boumediene 
and Khaled Al Odah164 to review their habeas claims.  The Court reviewed the 
constitutionality of section 7 of the Act in these consolidated cases and announced 
157  Hamdi at 509.  
158  Id. at 537.
159  Hamdan at 2749.  
160  Id. at 2777.
161  Id. at 2749.  
162  Id.
163  Order, Nos. 06-1195, 06-1196, denying petition for cert. Apr. 2, 2007.   
164  Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 961 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 2007 WL 1854132 ( June 29, 2007) (No. 06-1195) 
and al Odah v. U.S., 476 F.3d 981, 375 U.S. App. D.C. 48, cert granted, 2007 WL 681992, 75 U.S.L.W. 3483 ( June 29, 2007) 
(No. 06-1196).
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in June 2008 that section 7 of the MCA was an “unconstitutional suspension” of the 
writ of habeas corpus.165  The Court ruled the scope of review afforded a detainee 
through the CSRT and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, as 
codified in the MCA,166 was an insufficient substitute for habeas corpus review in a 
federal district court.167  The court stated that construing section 7 to avoid finding 
the statute unconstitutional “would come close to reinstating the §2241 language 
Congress sought to deny” the detainees by enacting the MCA.168  (The dissenters, 
however, rebuke the majority for claiming section 7 violates the detainees’ rights, 
without ever enumerating what rights the detainees actually would have.169)  Among 
the deficiencies of the MCA’s language, including the failure to state explicitly that 
a detainee could be released if the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit determined that detention was not warranted pursuant to the Secretary of 
Defense’s own “standards and procedures”170—i.e., the failure to provide language 
allowing a court to “correct” the status determination,171the most egregious was 
the failure to provide a meaningful way for the detainee to introduce (exculpatory) 
evidence that had not been not presented at the time of his status determination by 
the CSRT.172  
In striking down section 7, the Court emphasized that the writ of habeas 
corpus was a central element of the separation of powers as set out in the original 
Constitution.173  It stated the Government’s claim, that de jure sovereignty informed 
the scope of constitutional rights available to those outside U.S. territory, was 
unsupported by history and the common law, which favored a more fact-specific, 
case-by-case determination.174  The court recognized that common law habeas 
corpus is “an adaptable remedy”175 for the courts to inquire into executive detentions, 
and it allowed the judicial scrutiny required in a proceeding challenging detention 
to vary inversely with the procedural protections afforded the detainee.176  The 
Court stated that in view of the length of the Guantanamo inmates’ detention, the 
detainees were not required to exhaust all remedies under the DTA by challenging 
the constitutionality of the CSRT under DTA section 1005(e)(2)(C)(ii) before 
filing a petition for habeas corpus.177  However, the Court cautioned that the 
165  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. ___, slip op. at 64; 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).  
166  DTA section 1005(e)(2)(C), as specified in section 7 of the MCA, codified in 22 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1)-(2).  
167  Boumediene, slip op. at 62.
168  Boumediene, slip op. at 63.  
169  See id., Roberts, C.J., dissenting at 1 (slip op.).  
170  Boumediene at 59 (construing DTA section 1005(e)(2)(C)(i)).   
171  Id. at 57.
172  Id. at 60-61.
173  See Boumediene at 8, 35-36, 43.  
174  Boumediene at 25-34.
175  Boumediene at 50.  
176  See id. at 53 (“The idea that necessary scope of habeas review in part depends on the rigor of any earlier proceedings 
accords with our [Mathews] test for procedural adequacy in the due process context.”).  
177  Boumediene at 65-66.  
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remainder of the DTA and the MCA remain in force.178  In a final reminder of 
the balancing of interests required in the constitutional interplay between the three 
branches of government regarding executive detentions, the Court admonished that 
a federal court should not involve itself in the detention before the Executive has had 
a “reasonable period of time to determine a detainee’s status.”179  
After the cases were remanded, the district court ordered the release of 
Lakhdar Boumediene and four other detainees in November 2008 after finding the 
government’s hearsay evidence was insufficient to detain and (eventually) to prosecute 
the men.180  The Supreme Court announced it would hear habeas arguments in 
another case,181 involving the detention of an uncharged legal U.S. resident based on 
the government’s assertion the detainee conspired with al Qaeda.182  The interplay 
between the branches of government regarding the “war on terror” continues.  
178  Boumediene at 66.
179  Boumediene at 66.  
180  Boumediene was not immediately released; he was transferred in 2009 to France, which had agreed to receive the 
Guantanamo inmate.  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/25/AR2009052502263.html 
(Oct. 21, 2009).  
181  Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri v. John Pucciarelli, No. 08-368, cert. granted Dec. 5, 2008.  
182  http://origin.www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/08-00368qp.pdf (Dec. 29, 2008).  The Obama Administration 
transferred al-Marri into the criminal justice system in early 2009, and al-Marri was negotiating a plea agreement in which he 
would plead guilty to one count of providing material support or resources to al Qaeda in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339(B)
(a)(1).  http://www.ilcd.uscourts.gov/media/pdf/22.pdf (Oct. 18, 2009).  
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Undermining the National Security and Civil 
Liberties Debate:
The Recurrence of Politically-Motivated Actions
Amber Patel
Introduction
The addition of the Bill of Rights to the Constitution in 1791 was a hard-fought 
victory for the Anti-Federalists.  The attitude of the Federalists, who were reluctant 
to incorporate the Bill of Rights, was famously embodied in Alexander Hamilton’s 
Federalist Number 84.  Hamilton believed that bills of rights had “no application to 
constitutions professedly founded upon the power of the people, and executed by 
their immediate representatives and servants.”1  That is, the government proposed 
under such constitutions is subordinate to the people, through which “the people 
surrender nothing, and as they retain everything, they have no need of particular 
reservations.”2  He felt that including a bill of rights that addressed only certain 
liberties would be dangerous because it would imply that the federal government had 
the power to regulate those liberties which were not specifically enumerated.  This 
perspective is telling; even the Federalists who sought a strong national government 
initially understood the inherent need for limitations of government power.
While Hamilton’s arguments were persuasive, the Anti-Federalists were not 
willing to accept silence as a guarantee of liberties.  Aware of mankind’s inherent 
attraction to power, the Anti-Federalists campaigned to undermine the ratification 
of any constitution that they viewed as a poor guarantor of liberties.  For this reason, 
George Mason, author of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, a major influence on 
the drafting of the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights, refused 
to sign the Constitution.3  The passions attached to the inclusion of rights are 
hardly surprising given the political atmosphere of the time.  With the dust of the 
American Revolution settling, and the seeds of the French Revolution sprouting, the 
Founding Fathers had grave concerns that a newly-established government without 
a well-defined constitutional role could default into the equivalent of a tyrannical 
monarchy.  While James Madison deemed the inclusion of liberties as a waste of 
congressional time, he finally penned the Bill of Rights in an effort to assuage the 
ardent Anti-Federalists, conceding that their inclusion was “neither improper nor 
altogether useless.”4    
The Bill of Rights was borne from the distrust of a government’s ability to respect 
its established boundaries.  Moreover, while the legislative and executive branches 
have gained power through expansive interpretations of Congress’s Commerce 
1 The Federalist No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton).
2 Id.
3 Problems with state ratification began with the Massachusetts Convention.  The Massachusetts Compromise allowed 
for the ratification of the Constitution if certain amendments were considered in the first Congress.  This compromise became 
a model to ratification of the Constitution for the remaining states, with the sole exception of Maryland.
4 Register, I, 423-37 and Gazette of the United States, 10 and 13 June 1789.
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Clause and the President’s war powers respectively, the Bill of Rights, strengthened 
by long-term patterns of judicial decision-making, remains the bulwark against 
government intrusion into the private lives of its citizens.
The relation between the liberties enumerated in the Bill of Rights and national 
security deserves careful attention.  Can liberties and national security measures 
amiably co-exist? Historically, the two have operated on a sliding scale in which 
prevailing national security concerns determine the prevalence and extent of civil 
liberties.  Civil liberties are most vulnerable when the President is afforded wide 
discretion in exercising his authority as Commander-in-Chief.5
Beyond the historical pattern of executive aggrandizement, the basic structure 
of our government itself contributes to the vulnerability of civil liberties.  The 
Constitution essentially acts as a contract between the people and the government, 
and it carves out a role for all three branches.  The legislative branch represents 
the people, the judicial branch represents the contract, and the executive branch 
represents the government.  When the executive branch is allowed (or even expected) 
to determine the policies affecting civil liberties, those liberties will tend to diminish 
whenever the interests of the government are deemed to be at risk.   
The struggle between national security and civil liberty is an unfortunate yet 
inevitable byproduct of the Constitution and its apportionment of significant 
police power to the majoritarian political branches.  However, allowing politically-
motivated factors to undermine the legitimacy of this debate is deleterious to the 
integrity of the debate and the image of the governing administration.
Governments are a composite of the political ideologies they portray to the 
public.  Can a government objectively compare the importance of its own political 
philosophy with the importance of individual liberties, particularly when the two 
come into conflict?  People are, by nature, self-interested, and the interests of those 
who work under the protective cloak of the government are biased from the outset. 
Recognizing the juxtaposition of these competing interests leads to an understanding 
of how civil liberty violations which are purely politically-motivated can occur under 
the pretext of preserving national security.  The goal is clear: partisan politics must be 
taken out of the equation.  The difficulty, then, lies in devising a method of removing 
a seemingly inherent characteristic of the institutional structure.  
The problem is two-fold: first, to distinguish between decision-making based on 
political motivation and genuine national security motivation (without the benefit 
of hindsight), and second, to inadvertently avoid undermining national security 
when attempting to remove the political motivations that drive executive decision-
making.  The first obstacle is particularly problematic when a national security 
measure violates the First Amendment’s protection of free speech or the Fourth 
Amendment’s protection against unreasonable search and seizure by suppressing 
opposition to governmental policies, as the political opponents of a governmental 
5 An analysis of the rise of executive power during war is beyond the scope of this article, but it is generally accepted that 
the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief leads the nation subject to certain constitutional checks.
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action are best suited to bring any political motivations to light.  If citizens are unable 
to voice their concerns because doing so would ostensibly undermine national 
security, government policies can no longer be openly questioned.  This situation 
often creates unscrutinized policies that have the false appearance of public approval. 
 Sometimes, self-interest motivates executive action.  But it does not have to, 
legitimate security concerns motivate many actions.  While politically-motivated 
actions are rare, their importance and effect are not diminished, and the overall 
impact upon society is no less relevant.  In reality, anyone can be a victim of politically-
motivated measures: an entire region (Southerners during the Civil War); political 
groups and their affiliates (Federalists during the Quasi-War, Socialists during World 
War I, and ‘Pro-Communists’ during the Cold War); races ( Japanese during World 
War II); and religious groups (Muslims during the War on Terrorism).  Actions 
which result in the suspension of individual liberties must be taken in adherence 
with the rule of law and in a manner that does not conflict with the Constitution.  
 The importance and awareness of civil liberties appears to increase after each 
war.  After the brazen actions taken by the Wilson administration during World 
War I,6 later administrations tried to curtail abuse of First Amendment rights.  If 
it is the glow of success that determines whether certain suspensions of liberties are 
too harsh, it should only be the shadow of failure that justifies the greater suspension 
of civil liberties.  Perhaps it is that administrations change their modus operandi, 
clamping down on dissent by suspending liberties that have gained little attention 
and have not been heavily litigated.  After violations of the First Amendment were 
exhausted, the government turned to the Fourth Amendment.  Just as the Supreme 
Court was reluctant to decide against the Executive in Schenck, Frohwerk, Debs, 
and Abrams,7 a time when executive violations of the First Amendment were in 
their infancy, so too is the Supreme Court currently reluctant to decide against the 
Executive when the Fourth Amendment is concerned.8  Some have argued that such 
systemic oppression has a place in a society facing a national security crisis.  Such 
oppression does not, however, have any place in a society led to believe that they are 
facing a national security crisis.  
 Often, the true motivations behind executive actions are shielded from the 
public; such is the nature of our government.  That there can conceivably be any 
politically-motivated civil liberty violations suggests that liberties are neither as 
esteemed nor as secure as they should be.  Civil liberties are at the mercy of the 
Executive during times of war, and it is not until after the smoke has cleared that the 
necessity of violating those liberties can be determined.  This is not to say that there 
6 The Wilson administration exerted great influence over speech by heightened law enforcement efforts against those who 
felt America’s role in the War was more strategic than necessary.  Under the 1917 Espionage Act and the 1918 Sedition Act, 
dissenters effectively indicted themselves by exercising their First Amendment rights.
7 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Debs v. United States, 
249 U.S. 211 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
8 ACLU, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied by Supreme Court (U.S. Feb 18, 2008) (No. 07-468).
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can never be a situation in which the proper procedure would require civil liberties to 
be suspended, but rather that they should never be suspended for the wrong reason. 
We have only hindsight of past civil liberty transgressions from which to learn, and 
the lessons are first, that the Executive is granted unfettered authority during war, 
and second, that the tendency during war is to overreact.9  Suspension of liberties 
should only be a result of a legitimate national security crisis, and stronger efforts 
should be made to test the proffered justification for their suspension against the 
true intentions of those in power.
Status Quo
 The idea that citizens can abandon skepticism of the government during war 
straddles a line between unwise and foolish.  War provides an opportunity to an 
Executive seeking to consolidate power.  The interaction between all three branches of 
government, suffering from the lack of a well-defined war role, produces inconsistent 
action.
Executive Role
 Many historical examples suggest that the Executive cannot be trusted to enact 
policies in good faith during times of war.  A new dimension is added when delegated 
authority is factored into the equation.  Delegating authority affords the Executive 
the necessary efficiency to implement a successful and uniform policy, which is 
particularly important when trying to promote a unified image during war.  This 
arrangement, however, also produces unfortunate consequences.  
 During the Civil War, General Burnside issued General Order Number 38, 
which sought to suppress support for the Confederacy in the Department of Ohio. 
Aided by this order, Burnside arrested prominent Democrat and former Ohio 
congressman, Clement Vallandigham.  Burnside’s misuse of President Lincoln’s 
broad authorization left the President “embarrassed by [the] arrest of Vallandigham, 
about which [he] learned from the newspapers . . . [but felt] that more damage 
would be done by repudiating Burnside than by upholding him.”10 Civil wars are 
unique because there are no covert politically-motivated actions—the underlying 
reasons for civil wars are openly political.  The American Civil War was no different. 
The goal of the Civil War was to suppress the insurgency growing in the South in 
order to maintain the existence of the Union.  Toward this end, President Lincoln 
suspended the writ of habeas corpus in the South at various times during the war. 
However, Lincoln’s usurpation of the legislative authority in suspending the writ and 
allowing General Ambrose Burnside to issue an order which called for punishment 
of those that sympathized with the enemy, did not go unchallenged.  A few days 
before former Congressman Vallandigham was arrested under this order, he urged a 
9 For a general overview of liberties during wartime, see Geoffrey R. Stone, Perioulous Times: Free Speech in 
Wartime from the Sedition Act of 1798 to the War on Terrorism (W.W. Norton, 2005).
10  James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era 597 (OUP 2003).
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crowd to “hurl ‘King Lincoln’ from his throne.”11    
 Who, then, is accountable?  A concept such as employer liability gives the consumer 
compensation for acts of an employee, but there is no equal concept that gives the 
citizen direct compensation for abuses suffered at the hands of the government. 
Executive officials are shielded by absolute immunity or qualified immunity from 
claims.  In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,12 the companion case to Nixon v. Fitzgerald,13 the 
Supreme Court held that certain executive officials have at least qualified immunity 
against an action for damages.  Though less protection than absolute immunity, the 
qualified immunity defense remains controversial because citizens are unable to 
obtain a remedy for past liberty violations for “reasonable” actions.  To enable those 
who suffer liberty violations during war to seek reparations from executive officials 
enacting war policy would not only bankrupt the treasury, but would give executive 
officials pause before carrying out their duties, undermining attempts to secure 
the nation.  On the other hand, this immunity gives executive officials “reasonable” 
unfettered authority.  
 What constitutes a “reasonable” action during war when executive power is at its 
greatest is certain to be interpreted more broadly than at any other time.  Although 
the Supreme Court, in the seminal decision of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents 
of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, held that damages could be awarded against a 
federal officer who had violated the liberties of a plaintiff, the damages award was, 
and is often, blocked by the application of good faith immunity.14  In addition, the 
Court noted that “special factors counseling hesitation” would provide an exception 
to the Bivens rule.  With the subsequent retreat from Bivens, the vague nature of its 
exception, and the applicability of immunities it will be rare to find a court awarding 
damages to those whose constitutional rights have been violated by a federal official 
during war.  Indeed, as recently as 2007, in In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees 
Litigation, the D.C. District Court held that decisions executed by the executive 
branch during war were ‘special factors counseling hesitation’ under Bivens, and that 
military personnel, allegedly violating the Fifth and Eighth Amendments, were also 
11 Mount Vernon Speech (May 1, 1863) in Rehnquist, supra note 18, at 66.  It should be noted that Lincoln deferred to 
Congress after he decided to suspend the writ, and was granted retroactive approval.  Acknowledging that the ongoing conflict 
left him little choice, Lincoln addressed Congress saying:  
It was with the deepest regret that the Executive found the duty of employing the war power, in defense of the 
government, forced upon him. He could but perform this duty, or surrender the existence of the government…He 
felt that he had no moral right to shrink; nor even to count the chances of his own life, in what might follow. In full 
view of his great responsibility, he has, so far, done what he has deemed his duty. You will now, according to your 
own judgment, perform yours. 
Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, Special Message to Congress ( July 4, 1861), in Lincoln: Speeches and 
Writings 1859 – 1865 246, 261 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989). 
12 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
13 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
14 403 U.S. 388 (1971); remand to 456 F.2d 1339 (2nd Cir. 1972)(holding that government agents are protected from 
personal liability when acting in good faith to carry out their duties).
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covered by the qualified immunity defense.15  The result of these decisions is that 
there is no legally responsible party.  Why should a national security crisis absolve a 
group of politicians from their actions in toto?  There should be some mechanism by 
which the Executive is brought back into a legal framework during war.     
 It is plausible that the political process was meant to take care of an executive’s 
abuses of power, and when danger is imminent, the Executive is meant to have 
complete discretion to balance national security against civil liberties or override 
them completely.  If a citizen disagrees with the Executive’s determinations, then 
he or she can choose not to reelect the Executive.16  The political process argument 
is powerful, but it rests on two fundamental flaws.  First, the Constitution does not 
envision the political process as the main guarantor of civil liberties.  The Federalists’ 
and Anti-Federalists’ debate over the inclusion of liberties in the Constitution 
supports this conclusion.  Neither viewed the government as having the authority to 
intrude upon liberties, except in specified circumstances involving specified liberties 
(e.g. the Suspension Clause), despite the existence of the political process.  Second, 
policies favoring national security cannot be viewed in a vacuum; the human psyche 
must be taken into account.  Fear brings out an instinct that does not lend itself to 
rational human behavior.  Stone proposed the formula: “A time-honored strategy 
for consolidating power is to inflate the public’s fears, inflame its patriotism, and 
then condemn political opponents as ‘disloyal.’  A national crisis (real, fabricated, or 
imagined) invites this strategy.”17  Use of this method has been evident during every 
major conflict since the turn of the 20th century.  
 The power of the Executive has reached new heights in the last decade.  In 
past wartime situations, the Executive has generally acted in line with Congress’ 
wishes or, as Lincoln had done, sought retroactive approval by Congress.  The Bush 
administration marked a new era in executive audacity by ignoring the warrant 
requirements established by Congress through FISA and claiming authority for 
warrantless wiretaps under Congress’ AUMF and inherent Commander-in-Chief 
power.  Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) in an 
effort to provide a balance between potential executive abuse and swift executive 
action when dealing with potential security crises.18  The FISC allows the Executive 
to obtain a fast-tracked warrant for “all electronic surveillance conducted within the 
15 479 F.Supp.2d 85 (D.D.C. 2007).
16 Indeed, the political process has flushed out administrations in which the electorate had lost faith.  For example, the 
Federalists’ desperate attempts to maintain power during the Quasi-War by weakening the Democratic-Republican voter base 
resulted in their removal from office.  Also, in 1946, the Republicans gained control of Congress for the first time since 1928, 
and passed the Twenty-Second Amendment setting Presidential term limits—a direct attack on Roosevelt’s four terms in 
office.  Midterm elections also make the political process effective.  As the 1946 midterm elections illustrate, a change in 
Congress can greatly affect an administration’s ability to enact certain policies.  In 1954, the situation was repeated in the 
midterm elections when the Democrats took control in the Senate, albeit by one seat, after the McCarthy era.
17 Stone, supra note 9, at 74. 
18 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§1801-1871 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004), amended by Protect 
America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552.
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United States for foreign intelligence purposes.”19  From 1978 through 2007, the 
FISC rejected only nine of 25,000 applications for surveillance.20 
 If the Executive refuses to follow legislation, and the courts refuse to sufficiently 
check executive power, there is no adherence to the rule of law.  If there is one principle 
upon which democratic governments are founded, it is the rule of law—that no one 
is above the law.  When there are insufficient checks on a branch of government, the 
risk of abusing power is too high.  History provides a litany of examples of rulers, 
decidedly above the law, who abused their powers for their own advantage.  The rule 
of law is meant to be constant; the founding fathers envisioned no situation in which 
the suspension of the rule of law could be justified.21    
 With the War on Terrorism, the check on executive power has fallen into the 
hands of the Judiciary.  In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Justice O’Connor noted that “a state 
of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the 
Nation’s citizens … whatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the 
Executive … it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual 
liberties are at stake.”22  This is a promising statement from a court that has historically 
played a subservient role to the Executive during times of war (it is worth noting 
that there was no majority in Hamdi).  In 2008, the Supreme Court made another 
bold decision in Boumediene v. Bush, allowing Fifth Amendment habeas review of 
Guantanamo Bay detainees by federal courts.23  If the Court maintains this trend, 
an important check which had been lost in previous administrations may be placed 
back on the Executive. 
   
Legislative Role
 Although Congress acts as a mouthpiece for the people, it does not necessarily 
double as a guarantor of the people’s liberties.  The expected response to any attack 
is fear, while the appropriate response to an initiation of arms is skepticism.  How is 
it possible for a society to be duped into allowing the suspension of its own liberties 
by supporting a war where there is no threat of imminent danger?  Robert Briffault 
19 S. Rep. No. 95-701, at 9 (1978).
20 Statistics available from Electronic Privacy Information Center at: http://epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa_stats.
html.  Despite the ease with which warrants are obtained, the Bush administration danced around the lax FISA requirements 
arguing that its NSA Terrorist Surveillance Program was authorized by the congressional AUMF and the Executive’s inherent 
powers as Commander-in-Chief under Article II of the Constitution.  The erosion of Fourth Amendment rights under the 
Bush administration has been seen before under the Nixon administration.  Whether history will repeat itself and Congress 
will again establish a new procedure more formal and onerous than FISA remains to be seen, but it is clear that Fourth 
Amendment rights require greater protection from politically-motivated actions. *NB: This article was written prior to the 
change in administration from President Bush to President Obama.
21  See Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always be Constitutional, 112 Y.L.J.  
1011-1134 (2003) for the idea that emergency measures should be viewed outside the realm of the rule of law;  See Carl 
Scmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (George Schwab trans., University of 
Chicago Press 2006) (1922) illustrating more than the incompatibility of emergency measures and the rule of law; See William 
E. Scheuerman, Survey Article: Emergency Powers and the Rule of Law After 9/11, 14 J. Pol. Phil. 61-84 (2006) for an overview.
22 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004).
23 Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
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once wrote (as was later famously summarized in 1947 by Winston Churchill):
Democracy is the worst form of government.  It is the most inefficient, the 
most clumsy, the most unpractical . . . it reduces wisdom to impotence and 
secures the triumph of folly, ignorance, clap-trap, and demagogy . . . yet 
democracy is the only form of social order that is admissible, because it is 
the only one consistent with justice.24
Democracy boiled down to its element is mob rule; whoever controls the mob, 
controls the nation.  
 Although a democracy is a better safeguard to individual freedoms than other 
forms of government, there is a serious hidden danger—the presumption that actions 
taken by a democratic government are legitimate actions because they theoretically 
conform to public desire.  The ease with which the public can be manipulated, 
particularly when safety is at risk, combined with the greater legitimacy attributed 
to democratic governments, makes for an extremely vulnerable situation in which 
an abuse of power is effortless.  A cunning politician is able to manipulate public 
opinion during war to advance their political agenda.  Allowing the Executive to 
violate civil liberties in order to suppress opposition and keep the public uninformed, 
or worse, misinformed, is a perversion of the Constitution.     
 Once fear has been incited in the public, it can be a slippery slope from 
democracy to what is essentially a police state shielded by a democracy.  During the 
Cold War, when anti-Communism fever took hold of the country, Michigan Senator 
Arthur Vandenberg told President Truman to “make a personal appearance before 
Congress and scare the hell out of the country” in order to unite America under the 
banner of anti-Communism.25  Congress passed the McCarran Internal Security 
Act 1950, hugely anti-Communist in nature, over Truman’s veto.26  Truman decried 
that “‘instead of striking blows at Communism,’ the Act would ‘strike blows at our 
liberties.’”27  Congress, responding to public fear, had gone farther than the Executive 
intended in taking away liberties.    
 Recently, Congress has come to the aid of the Executive’s suspension of habeas 
review, despite Supreme Court rulings protecting habeas jurisdiction.  In Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld, Justice O’Connor stated that “unless Congress acts to suspend it, the 
Great Writ of habeas corpus allows the Judicial Branch to play a necessary role in 
maintaining this delicate balance of governance, serving as an important judicial 
24 Robert Briffault, Rational Evolution (The Making of Humanity) Ch. 15 (Macmillan 1930), quoted in  
Fred R. Shapiro & Joseph Epstein, The Yale Book of Quotations 103 (Yale University Press 2006).  Although 
the United States is not technically a true democracy, I do not believe the distinction between a democracy (particularly a 
representative democracy) and the United States’ constitutional republic has any merit as applied to this article.  
25 Eric F. Goldman, The Crucial Decade 59 (Vintage 1960) as cited in Nelson W. Polsby, Political Innovation 
in America: The Politics of Policy Initiation 86 (Yale University Press 1984).
26 Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat 987.
27 Stone, supra note 9, at 335, quoting Veto Message from the President of the United States, 81st Cong, 2d Sess, in 96 
Cong Rec H 15629-32 (Sept. 22, 1950).
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check on the Executive’s discretion in the realm of detentions.”28  Congress responded 
by enacting the Detainee Treatment Act (“DTA”), providing, inter alia, that federal 
courts (with the exception of the D.C. Circuit in limitation) could no longer 
entertain habeas petitions from aliens who were deemed ‘enemy combatants’ by the 
administration.29  The DTA was passed while a related case, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 
was pending in the Supreme Court.  The Court held that the Act was not meant to 
apply retroactively so that Hamdan’s case was allowed determination by the Court. 
Again in response, Congress promulgated the Military Commissions Act of 2006 
(“MCA”) which clarified the intention to suspend federal court habeas review for 
all applicable cases.30  Finally, in Boumediene, the Supreme Court was forced to 
put an end to this legislative and judicial back and forth by deciding whether these 
congressional statutes violated the Constitution—years after the rigmarole began.31 
 Despite Congress’ recent actions, past Congresses have tried to mitigate the 
Executive’s war power by passing legislation such as the War Powers Resolution of 
1973, National Emergencies Act of 1976, and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
of 1978.  The spirit of each, if not the provisions themselves, has been largely ignored 
by the Executive.  
 The likelihood of the Executive’s political party controlling Congress in the United 
States’ two-party system is a factor that should also be taken into account.  Under the 
American electoral system, Congress is often in the pocket of the Executive, making 
it easier for the Executive to enact policies that conform to his particular political 
ideology.  The electoral system’s role in safeguarding liberties is addressed below.  
 It is clear that although Congress is a possible check on executive power, it is not 
a reliable one.  In fact, it could be argued that Congress is the least stable of all three 
branches, particularly during times of war.  Congress has power in numbers and 
the support of the masses, but those masses are extremely susceptible to executive 
influence.  During World War II, the public did not support the internment of 
the West Coast Japanese until many months after the attack on Pearl Harbor.32 
Congress’ role in checking executive authority should clearly not be determinative.
28 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004).
29 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub.L. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, §§ 1001-1006, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739-44 (2005).
30 Pub.L. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
31 Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).  There are also instances in which Congress may not have access to full information, 
or may not have received complete disclosure of information in a war setting.  Some claim that the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 
authorizing military action in Vietnam, rested on premises which “may have been exaggerated or invented by the Johnson 
administration in order to prompt Congress to support the war.”  
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Foreign Relations Law: Cases and Materials 209 (2d ed. 2006).  
Despite Congress’ actions today, past Congresses have tried to mitigate the Executive’s war power by passing legislation such 
as the War Powers Resolution of 1973, National Emergencies Act of 1976, and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. 
The spirit of each, if not the provisions themselves, has been largely ignored by the Executive.  
32 Initially, Attorney General Francis Biddle diligently rooted out those deemed disloyal via individual hearings.  But 
public angst about the Japanese threat rose and peaked in February 1942.  Roosevelt appeased the masses by issuing 
Executive Order 9066 calling for internment.  
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Judicial Role
 Although the Constitution did not carve out a war role for the judiciary per se, 
the courts are meant to interpret and protect the Constitution, including individual 
liberties, at all times.33  The separation of powers principle, however, is often used 
as a scapegoat for judicial deference to the Executive during war times.  This notion 
concedes that the Judiciary has no role in wartime decisions, a role that is textually 
divided between the legislative and executive branches in the Constitution.  As we 
have seen, it is dangerous to rely solely on Congress to curtail executive authority, 
especially when Congress and the presidency are controlled by the same political 
party.  All that is being asked of the Judiciary is that they maintain, not go beyond, 
their role in defending the Constitution regardless of whether we are at war.  
 The Executive has claimed broad war authority under the Article II Commander-
in-Chief power, although the basis for such extensive authority is questionable. 
During the Korean War, Justice Jackson, recognizing the vagueness in the allocation 
of war powers, attempted to make sense of executive power in Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube v. Sawyer.34  Jackson identified three spheres under which certain executive 
actions are legitimate.  The first, where the Executive acts in compliance with 
congressional authorization, places executive authority at its maximum.  For actions 
falling under the third sphere, when the Executive acts contrary to congressional 
will, the action must be supported by explicit constitutional authorization.  Jackson’s 
reasoning in the second sphere is engulfed by ambiguity.  He states that when the 
Executive takes an action on which Congress has been silent, the Executive relies on 
power that has been granted to him either under Article II of the Constitution or 
some congressional act.  The problem is that the interpretation of what constitutes 
congressional silence and what is tantamount to tacit congressional authorization is 
often times ambiguous.35  
 Despite the holding in Youngstown, practice has dictated that both the legislative 
and judicial branches will yield to the Executive during war, and further, that any 
attempt to do otherwise would violate the separation of powers principle upon 
which the United States government so heavily rests (though the idea of checks 
and balances seems forgotten).  Even the courageous action taken by the Supreme 
Court in the Boumediene case highlights the discord among the Court.36  Four of the 
nine justices dissented because of their belief in the separation of powers argument, 
illustrating the depth of the ongoing divide.  
 The judicial branch was meant to be the “least dangerous” branch, exerting 
“neither force nor will, but judgment.”37  After Chief Justice Marshall established 
33 Recall Justice Davis’ quote in Ex parte Milligan, p 3.
34 Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
35 For instance, when Congress issued the AUMF in response to the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration viewed it as 
blanket authorization for all actions taken to achieve a specific end, whereas others, especially those wary of potential executive 
abuse, saw it as general authorization subject to other specific mandates (such as FISA requirements).  
36 Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
37 The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
138 BAKER CENTER JOURNAL OF APPLIED PUBLIC POLICY
judicial review in Marbury v. Madison, judges were given an important role in which 
they could wield their judicial review sword over legislative and executive actions.38 
The exercise of this judgment, however, has rarely extended to times of war.  The 
courts are charged with upholding the Constitution and the liberties that emanate 
from it, and while they should not overemphasize those liberties to the detriment of 
public safety, the public should expect the judiciary to place the same importance on 
these essential liberties as was bestowed upon them by the founding fathers.
 Any uneasiness in leaving fundamental liberties in the hands of a branch that 
is unelected is well-founded, but the independence bestowed upon the judicial 
branch by Article III of the Constitution offers protection from outside influence. 
Chief Justice Warren is an excellent example.  Appointed by Republican President 
Eisenhower, Warren and his Supreme Court became synonymous with liberal ideals. 
Recently, Justice Stevens, also appointed by a Republican (President Gerald Ford) 
said “I don’t think of myself as a liberal at all…I think as part of my general politics, 
I’m pretty darn conservative.”39  Again, he is seen as one of the Court’s more liberal 
justices when it comes to issues involving liberties.  Potentially free from outside 
political influence, a judge has only his or her political convictions to remove from 
the decision-making process.  This, of course, is easier said than done.    
 The Quasi-War between the United States and France from 1798 to 1800 
concluded in time for the presidential election of 1800, and although political 
factions40 were considered undesirable, those aligned with either the Federalists or 
Anti-Federalists comfortably settled into the Federalist and Democratic-Republican 
political parties, respectively.  The tactics used by both parties leading up to the 
election of 1800 manifested the dangers of which Federalist 10 warned—that the 
majority would be able “to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public 
good and the rights of other citizens.”41  
 In an effort to keep the Democratic-Republicans out of office, the Federalists, 
under President John Adams, used inflated executive war powers to push through 
Congress a series of legislation “designed to cripple, if not destroy, the Republican 
party.”42  The Naturalization Act, Alien Friends Act, Alien Enemies Act, and 
particularly the Sedition Act of 1798, which curtailed First Amendment rights, were 
passed to decrease Democratic-Republican support under the pretense of a war 
which never made landfall in either the United States or France.43  These acts gave 
Adams full authority to evict from the United States any immigrant for any cause 
without due process of law.  No aliens were deported though. Commenting on the 
38 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
39 Jeffrey Rosen, The Dissenter, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 2007, at  http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/23/
magazine/23stevens-t.html.
40 As referred to in The Federalist No. 10 ( James Madison).
41 The Federalist No. 10 ( James Madison). For a detailed and insightful account of the elections of 1800, see Charles 
O. Lerche, Jr., Jefferson and the Election of 1800: A Case Study in the Political Smear, 5 Wm. & Mary Q. 467 (1948).
42 Geoffrey R. Stone, War and Liberty 5 (W.W. Norton, 2007).
43 New immigrants at this time, who were the subject of the Alien Acts, tended to favor the Democratic- Republican’s 
cause for decentralization of government power.
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purpose of the Sedition Act of 1798, historian Norman Risjord noted, “The Sedition 
Act was thus intended to silence, or at least intimidate, the Jeffersonian press during 
the presidential election campaign of 1800.  In all, twenty-five newspaper editors 
were arrested, seventeen indicted, and ten convicted.44  Tellingly, of the twenty-five 
arrested, none were Federalists.    
 During this Quasi-War with France, Justice Samuel Chase fell into disrepute 
after a litany of trials highlighted his political partisanship with the Federalists. 
Alexander Hamilton said of Chase before his inappropriate handling of the Quasi-
War cases, that he had “the peculiar privilege of being universally despised.”45  Justice 
Chase ignored criminal law procedures and consistently undermined the defense of 
affluent Democratic-Republicans being tried under the Sedition Act of 1798.46    
 The debate concerning the relative merits of an independent Supreme Court and 
a democratically legitimate Supreme Court is a source of contention.  Although there 
are pros and cons to each, for the purposes of counteracting politically-motivated 
actions during war, independence is essential.  There can be no independence in a 
judiciary that relies on the electorate for its appointment.  Perhaps this independence 
was also a means to guarantee that the courts would be a mouthpiece for the 
Constitution instead of a political party.  Consistency, however, has not been a virtue 
of the Supreme Court when it comes to applying constitutional liberties during war. 
The Hirabayashi and Korematsu cases showed unjustified deference to Roosevelt’s 
policies during World War II, but the Court today has narrowly applied legislation 
affecting habeas review of enemy combatants.47  And although Boumediene was 
decided, the Supreme Court avoided addressing the illegalities of the NSA Terrorist 
Surveillance Program presented in ACLU v. NSA.48  
 It is disconcerting that these issues have not been sufficiently addressed by the 
branch meant to uphold the Constitution and interpret its provisions.  This means 
that at the outset of any national security and civil liberties debate, liberties begin at 
a disadvantage, particularly with an Executive with an agenda. 
Reform
 We revisit the two main problems presented above.  First, how do decision-
makers distinguish political motivation from genuine national security motivation? 
44 Id.
45 Paul D. Carrington, Original Sin and Judicial Independence,15  Duke L. Sch. Legal Stud Paper No. 189 
(February 2008), quoting Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamilton 118 (Penguin Books 2004), at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1099397
46 Id. The potential for political abuse draws attention to the appointment of Supreme Court Justices.  Senate confirmation 
of executive appointments provides a check on executive power, particularly when the administration and Congress are 
controlled by different political parties.  Still, appointments are political in nature, and therefore controversial.  After all, it is 
no coincidence that liberals were concerned when President Bush appointed Samuel Alito and John Roberts to the Supreme 
Court.  On the one hand, the independence of the Supreme Court potentially counters political legislation and political 
policies, but on the other, the nominations themselves are hugely political.
47 Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).    
48 ACLU, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied by Supreme Court (U.S. Feb 18, 2008) (No. 07-468).
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Second, does an attempt to remove the political factor inadvertently undermine 
national security?  
 Halperin stands for the notion that politically-motivated actions may be 
acceptable if it is objectively reasonable to conclude the action was also taken for 
national security purposes.  The accident of suspending liberties for the wrong 
purpose should not simply be a side-effect of war, especially when the debate is easily 
affected by politically-motivated actions.  The risk of suspending individual liberties 
for an illegitimate purpose is too great.  The telling fact is this: the United States 
government has never risked the security of the nation because it did not suspend 
civil liberties.  This is not a call for a revolution, but rather, a simple reminder that it 
is the government, and not the people, that is limited by the Constitution.    
 Almost every generation in the United States has lived through a period of 
war; this is not a modern phenomenon.  Yet the suspension of rights is a defining 
moment in the lives of those that are affected.  Consider President Bush’s decision 
to suspend habeas rights of detainees.  Providing a detainee with a fair trial does not 
automatically mean that a detainee will be released.  But the prolonged incarceration 
of detainees, including those who may be innocent, breeds resentment, anger, and 
mistrust of the entire nation.  The message of the Bush administration was based 
on fear of another terrorist attack.  Those who questioned its actions were branded 
as unpatriotic and were led to believe they were insulting the memory of those who 
died in the 9/11 attacks.  It is the classic formula, as recited by Stone, of inciting 
fear and condemning opponents as disloyal in order to consolidate political power. 
The conflict between national security and civil liberties has presented itself under a 
variety of situations, and it is alarming that the political issue has yet to be resolved.
 The most innovative post-9/11 proposal addressing the national security and 
civil liberties conflict is by Professor Bruce Ackerman.49  Ackerman outlines plans 
for an emergency constitution to be put into effect after the United States has been 
attacked.  The bite of the emergency constitution is in the following three elements: 
1) that the continuance of the emergency constitution is conditional upon the 
increasing consent of Congress; 2) that compensation should be given to those whose 
rights are affected in the name of national security; and 3) that while criminal law 
procedures are suspended during the initial phase of the Emergency Constitution, a 
“rigorous respect for decency” should be exercised by the Judiciary.  From the outset, 
Ackerman concedes that certain regrettable actions are the unfortunate consequence 
of attaining national security—what he calls the “tragic compromise.” But, he argues 
that these actions should be monitored and tolerated only for a finite period.  His plan 
strikes a fairer balance between securing the nation and ensuring that liberties are not 
trampled upon indefinitely than our current system does.  Furthermore, the proposal 
provides compelling ideas that could aid in removing or at least marginalizing the 
49 Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 Y.L.J. 1029 (2004).  
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political factor from the national security and civil liberties debate.50 
Legislative Role – The Supermajoritarian Escalator and Committees
 The first of Ackerman’s proposals is the “supermajoritarian escalator” under 
which repeating and increasing approval by Congress is necessary for the Executive 
to sustain his actions.  The underlying rationale for this requirement is the belief that 
the Executive should not have complete authority for as long as he deems appropriate. 
As Ackerman elucidates, “[T]he ‘war on terrorism’ will never end.  There will always be 
disaffected groups scurrying about seeking terrible weapons from unscrupulous arms 
dealers and rogue states.  There will always be fear-mongering politicians pointing 
with alarm to the storm clouds on the horizon.”51  Under our current system, the 
Executive determines risk.  In Ackerman’s proposal, after a predetermined amount 
of time for the Executive to secure the nation, this decision shifts to Congress.  After 
the initial period, it is only with the approval of Congress that the Executive’s policy 
can continue.  Moreover, the approval percentage continues to escalate each time the 
Executive is forced to seek congressional approval.  
 The supermajoritarian escalator certainly places a check on executive power, but 
history has shown that putting faith in the hands of Congress does little to allay 
concern over political actions.  Any good strategist will know how to manipulate 
people, and by extension, Congress.  In response to Ackerman’s supermajoritartian 
escalator, law professors Laurence Tribe and Patrick Gudridge recognize another 
inherent danger in relying on the legislative process.  If the Executive was capable 
of genuinely, or through manipulation, capturing the supermajority requisites, the 
result would be at odds with the purpose of Ackerman’s proposal; it would reinforce 
a result that may have been secured through manipulation.  Perhaps it would be 
prudent to consider placing an additional criterion on the supermajorities required. 
The political composite of Congress could be taken into account and a mathematical 
equation used to determine a steeper percentage of approval required when the 
Executive’s political party is dominant in both houses.  The equation would be 
dependent on the number of seats allocated to the party represented by the President. 
Such an equation would counter a situation where Congress is essentially in the 
pocket of the President and would also dilute the importance of political parties.  
 Congressional committees, made up of all parties represented in Congress, can 
also play a key role as agents of the legislative branch.  Such a committee could be 
set up with the goal of stamping out measures that are political in nature.  Working 
in conjunction with other committees on national security, Congress could provide 
a potential bulwark against unjustified executive action.  Such a committee would 
50 Regarding actual execution of the Emergency Constitution, law professors Laurence Tribe and Patrick Gudridge provide 
an excellent review of Ackerman’s proposal in the aptly titled article, The Anti-Emergency Constitution.  Laurence H. Tribe & 
Patrick O. Gudridge, The Anti-Emergency Constitution, 113 Y.L.J. 1801 (2004); For purposes of this article, I comment on the 
idea and not execution of proposals to illustrate a few of the ways balance can be restored during war.    
51 Ackerman, supra note 49, at 1070.
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not infringe upon swift executive action, either, because, by nature, Congress and the 
Judiciary require time for their actions.  These committees, to the extent possible or 
necessary, would call for greater transparency in executive action thereby decreasing 
the potential for politically-motivated actions.
Executive Role – Electoral Systems and Compensation
 Although the political structure of the United States is embedded in the 
Constitution, looking at how fellow democratic countries conduct and regulate 
elections is a worthwhile exercise.  Much of the democratic world uses the 
proportional representation system, a model that has more democratic legitimacy 
than the majoritarian system used in the United States or United Kingdom.  The 
United States’ two-party majoritarian system lends itself to strong executive power 
with relatively weak opposition.  The proportional representation system, which 
mirrors the overall desire of the population more accurately and follows the “one 
person one vote” motto more closely, tends to produce weaker governments with 
stronger oppositions.  The result can be an ineffective government which needs to 
operate in coalition with other political parties, but one that is properly checked by 
other branches and its opposition.  Germany provides a good example.  The coalition 
government combined with a Constitution that tightly secures civil liberties must 
produce one of the least intrusive federal governments seen this century.52  There 
are, however, provisions in such countries’ constitutions enabling them to take swift 
action when appropriate.  It is curious that as the preeminent model of democracy, 
the election system of the United States is, in fact, much less democratic than its 
proportional representation counterparts.
 Another of Ackerman’s proposals, which has been used in the past, calls for 
compensation to those citizens whose liberties have been erroneously violated.  In 
1988, Congress passed the Civil Liberties Act, formally apologizing to those interned 
during WWII and providing $20,000 in compensation for survivors.  Ackerman 
suggests that the compensation be more significant and that funding come directly 
from the ruling administration’s budget.53  This would require that the Executive 
seriously consider his policies in light of the cost to civil liberties.  Particularly, it would 
seem that the Executive would be less likely to take politically-motivated actions 
if his government is financially responsible for the consequences of that decision. 
Of course, the greatest danger occurs when the Executive responds by doing too 
little to secure the nation; the goal is not to stifle executive action.  Furthermore, 
a moratorium on claims for a specified amount of time (for example, one month 
after an attack) would enable the President to take the initial measures he deems 
necessary without financial repercussions. 
52 Some may say the government is nearly in a state of paralysis; see Von Gabor Steingart, Say it Slowly – Zukunftsangst, 
Wall St. J., Sept 15, 2005.
53 Ackerman, supra note 49, at 1065.
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Judicial Role – Active duty and secured liberties
 The judicial branch may be the most appropriate branch of government to 
protect civil liberties.  The Supreme Court has assumed the role of upholding the 
Constitution during times of relative calm, but, as illustrated above, it feels under no 
obligation (and is at times downright reluctant) during times of war.  How can the 
two competing views of the Court’s role be reconciled; are they simply adjudicators 
who advocate judicial restraint or are they defenders of the Constitution who practice 
judicial activism?  Both views fall squarely within the framework set forth under 
Article III.  
 Having detailed the failures of the current system in safeguarding against 
political influence, it is prudent to look at judicially-related mechanisms employed by 
other democratic countries to tackle the issues surrounding liberties and government 
power.  Some countries go to great lengths to secure their liberties.  The underlying 
premise is to protect the people against all conceivable internal powers—all aspects 
of government and even themselves.  Certain rights are deemed so fundamental to 
the ideals promoted by these countries that they are unable to be overridden, and it 
is their courts’ job to protect these rights.    
 Securing liberties is common in countries that have emerged from internal 
conflict; as the constitutions of Germany, South Africa, and Iraq all illustrate. 
Article 1 of the German Constitution is a positive obligation by the government to 
respect and protect human dignity.54  In fact, the German Federal Constitutional 
Court considered a case which paralleled the 9/11 events and questioned whether 
the government would have authority to shoot down an aircraft if it were being used 
as a weapon.55    The Court decided that such an act would violate the human dignity 
principle enshrined in Article I of the Basic Law.56  The Court reasoned that no one 
can assess the value of one life over another, and it is only in cases where there is 
imminent danger to the free democratic basic order or the existence of this order 
is in jeopardy, that any such action can be contemplated.57  The concept of human 
dignity is also shared by the 1996 South African Constitution.  Unlike other South 
African constitutional provisions which can be amended only by approval of two-
thirds of the National Assembly and 6 of 9 provinces, the provision that includes 
human dignity can only be amended by approval of three-fourths of the National 
54 See generally, David P. Currie, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany 1-18 (Univ of Chicago 
Press 1994).
55 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb 15, 2006, 59 Neue Juristische  
Wochenschrift (NJW) 751 (2006) (F.R.G).  For an overview of the case, see Oliver Lepsius, Human Dignity and  the 
Downing of an Aircraft: The German Federal Constitutional Court Strikes Down a Prominent Anti-terrorism  Provision 
in the New Air- Transport Security Act 7 German Law Journal No. 9 (September 2006) at  http://www.germanlawjournal.
com/article.php?id=756.  The Court actually said the statute in question was void  because it violated federalism issues, but 
went on to discuss the relevance of human dignity.
56 Basic Law available in full at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/GG.htm#87.
57  Art 87a(4) Basic Law.  See p. 270 (T2).
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Assembly and 6 of 9 provinces.58  Similarly, the fundamental principles, rights, and 
liberties in the 2005 Iraqi Constitution can only be amended after two Council of 
Representative terms (8 years total) and then by 2/3 of Council and referendum. 
 Because the constitutions of Germany, South Africa, and Iraq were enacted 
relatively recently, and the countries have long histories of government abuse, it 
remains to be seen whether their constitutions will remain intact during times of 
war.  The idea, however, remains relevant: certain liberties are so fundamental to 
the nature of the country that they need to be protected, even from a democratically 
elected government.  Indeed, in his speech introducing the Bill of Rights, Madison 
noted that “The prescriptions in favor of liberty, ought to be leveled against that 
quarter where the greatest danger lies, namely, that which possesses the highest 
prerogative of power: But this [is] not found in either the executive or legislative 
departments of government, but in the body of the people, operating by the majority 
against the minority.”59  
Conclusion
 The emerging idea in academic literature circulating in the wake of 9/11, is 
that the time for action is now.  From the outset of this article, my main concern 
has not been how civil liberties can be better secured, but rather how politically-
motivated actions, which are dangerous and unnecessary, can be removed from the 
Executive’s determination of how to respond to situations affecting national security. 
I have concluded that any solution adopted will inevitably have the effect of securing 
liberties as well.  In order to achieve security, the Executive does not need to be as 
quick to suspend civil liberties as it has in the past. The initial actions taken by the 
Roosevelt administration surrounding the Pearl Harbor attack are a good example. 
There, the government rounded up those thought to be dangerous and swiftly 
and systematically, via individual hearings, released those deemed innocent.  This 
response took into account both the nature of war and the importance of liberties.    
 The best way to make the debate more legitimate is by initially leveling the playing 
field between national security and civil liberties.  Just as the Executive represents 
national security, so too can the Judiciary resume its role in representing civil liberties 
while Congress, the most impressionable, continues to monitor the democratic will. 
There is, unfortunately, no way to measure the true motivations of an executive 
action.  If war, however, recurs with every generation, we need a consistent method 
of addressing national security that is more legitimate and less subject to the whims 
of a highly political branch.       
 The power of the Executive over the imposition of civil liberties came as no 
surprise to the Founding Fathers.  In Federalist 1, Alexander Hamilton keenly noted: 
58  S. Afr. Const. 1996 s. 74.
59 See supra note 4.
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It will be forgotten, on the one hand, that jealousy is the usual 
concomitant of love, and that the noble enthusiasm of liberty is apt 
to be infected with a spirit of narrow and illiberal distrust. On the 
other hand, it will be equally forgotten that the vigor of government is 
essential to the security of liberty; that, in the contemplation of a sound 
and well-informed judgment, their interest can never be separated; and 
that a dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the specious mask 
of zeal for the rights of the people than under the forbidden appearance 
of zeal for the firmness and efficiency of government. History will 
teach us that the former has been found a much more certain road to 
the introduction of despotism than the latter, and that of those men 
who have overturned the liberties of republics, the greatest number 
have begun their career by paying an obsequious court to the people; 
commencing demagogues, and ending tyrants.60
Hamilton understood that although the relationship between the Executive and civil 
liberties could go awry, they are inseparable.  We face the same dilemma over 200 
years later.  If the conflict had a concrete and easy resolution, our nation’s collective 
energies would surely have reached it by now.  The opportunities have been ample, 
but the desire has been merely cyclical dependent upon war.  
 In my view, there are three options for balancing national security and civil 
liberties during war.  The first is to leave the system as it is and let the situation play out 
as determined on a case-by-case, or rather war-by-war basis, by the administration 
in power, the political composite of the sitting Supreme Court, and the zeal or 
complacency of the generation.  The combinations of these three factors are too many 
to speculate on a certain future for the national security and civil liberty conflict. 
The second option is to create an atmosphere in which the debate is made more 
legitimate.  Any action taken for this purpose inevitably emphasizes the importance 
of civil liberties, which is the goal of the third option—securing our civil liberties in 
a fashion similar to other countries’ constitutions.  This curious collision between the 
second and third option both placing greater importance on civil liberties illustrates 
to me what has been lacking for so long in our nation’s history.  Civil liberties during 
war in the United States have long been neglected; securing their rightful place in 
our society is the only way to ensure that the Executive stays within its boundaries.  
  This conclusion is also in line with an advanced democratic society.  At some 
point, personal values need to be assessed.  Liberties were important to the Founding 
Founders because the freedom of men from other men was an idea valued by them. 
The same spirit has been reflected many times over in various countries emerging 
from war.  We see liberties being secured in the German 1949 Constitution (as 
later amended) which counteracts against sudden rises in power as demonstrated 
60 The Federalist No. 1 (Alexander Hamilton).
146 BAKER CENTER JOURNAL OF APPLIED PUBLIC POLICY
by Hitler; in the South Africa 1996 Constitution which counteracts democracy 
gone awry as demonstrated by the Apartheid era; and we see it in the Iraqi 2005 
Constitution which counteracts power-hungry leaders like Saddam Hussein who 
sought to silence opposition.  I have no doubt that had any of these situations 
occurred in the United States, we too would learn a valuable lesson and understand 
why liberties should be as important to us as they were to the Founding Fathers.  I 
hope it is not an episode akin to the experience of one of these countries that forces 
us to realize the inclusion of the Bill of Rights was taken for a specific purpose, and 
that it is high time we heed its importance.
147
The United States and Spain:
Changes and Development in Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy
Emily Stulce
 The United States and Spain have very different histories that have led them 
to the political systems in place today.  However, each has known the tragedy and 
devastation of being attacked on one’s homeland.  While both countries have had 
policies for combating terrorism in place for decades, the terror attacks of September 
11, 2001 in the United States and March 11, 2004 have implicated significant 
changes in how both countries are attempting to combat terrorism both at home 
and abroad.  
While 9/11 does stand out in the world’s history as one of the most notable 
terrorist attacks that spawned a collaborative effort on the parts of many nations 
including Spain and the United States, Spain had long been accustomed to the 
threat and attacks of the Basque separatist group, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)1. 
Spanish response to a 1973 ETA attack that killed a prominent military and 
government leader, Luis Carrero Blanco, ultimately led to the creation of the 1975 
Ley Contra el Terrorismo, or Law Against Terrorism2.  This law helped to lay the 
foundation for today’s Spanish policy in the global effort to combat terror.  Although 
the United States has not had to deal with a prominent separatist group within its 
own borders, its history is checkered with multiple attempts and perceived threats 
on national security that have helped to develop a more concrete policy towards 
fighting terrorism.
In beginning to understand how the United States and Spain have arrived at 
their current policies, it is of utmost importance to look back at each country’s 
history in terms of attacks on national security and responsive legislation.  Author 
James Beckman cites Bruce Maxwell in claiming that the first national security-type 
attack on United States soil occurred as early as 1607 on the Jamestown settlement 
in Virginia.3  James Kennedy, one of the Jamestown colony leaders, was tried and 
hanged for somehow threatening the colony.  Maxwell notes that the charges were 
unclear but that Kennedy was “executed because the jury believed that he threatened 
the security of the precarious ‘homeland’ established at Jamestown.”4 While this 
incident may seem far removed from today’s preoccupations with terrorist attacks, 
it does demonstrate that the eventual United States was highly conscientious of 
securing its territory even while in its colonial stage.
The first significant set of laws that Congress passed dealing with national 
security was the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798.5  Although these laws were passed 
1 Vicente Cantarino, Civilización y Cultura de España 402 (1999)
2 Id. at 402.
3 James Beckman, Comparative Legal Approaches to Homeland Security and Anti-Terrorism 13 (2007). 
See also Bruce Maxwell, Homeland Security: A Documentary History (2004).
4 Beckman, supra note 3, at 13 (quoting Bruce Maxwell, Homeland Security: A Documentary History (2004)).
5 Beckman, supra note 3, at 13.
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after the First Amendment, as Beckman suggests, they “very quickly undermined 
any notion of the First Amendment and free speech being absolute.”6  The purpose 
of these laws was to contend with any potential for any domestic turmoil triggered 
by immigrants that were new to the United States and a main focus was to alter 
immigration and deportation proceedings. 7  Under the Alien Acts, the President 
had the authority “to detain and deport any alien deemed dangerous, both in war and 
peacetime” and “to detain and/or deport any alien who originated from a country 
in which the United States was engaged in hostilities.” 8  The Naturalization Act, 
passed at the same time as the Alien Acts, served to extend the waiting period for 
citizenship in the United States from five to fourteen years.9  In essence, under the 
combination of these two acts, a non-citizen could be subject to detainment and/
or deportation for up to fourteen years and could theoretically be expelled during 
that period if that person were to become involved in an activity considered to be 
dangerous by the executive.10
The Sedition Act of 1798 in effect considered criticisms of the government to be a 
crime that was punishable by a fine of up to two-thousand dollars and imprisonment 
of up to two years.11  This act did not cover the Vice-President therefore allowing 
criticism of the Vice-President with impunity, but not the President.12  In 1801, these 
laws expired pursuant to their own terms and Congress repealed the Naturalization 
Act in 1802.13  A century would pass before more national security legislation was 
passed within the United States.  
Beckman suggests that in the years leading up to the Espionage and Sedition 
Acts of 1917 and 1918, “the United States absorbed a huge influx of European 
immigrants, many of which came from the Eastern European countries of Russia 
and Italy” and “brought some of the novel political concepts blossoming in Europe 
– political philosophies such as socialism, communism and anarchy.”14  While many 
of these immigrants assimilated into society without incident, there were others 
that held onto these newer ideas and suspicion of these immigrants and ideas was 
compounded by several other events at the time.15  The assassination of President 
McKinley in 1901 by an avowed anarchist and the Bolshevik and Marxist revolutions 
that broke out in Russia, Italy, and Spain did nothing but fuel suspicion of these new 
ideas thus creating a sense of threat that the United States felt that it must respond 
to through legislation.16
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 14.
10 Id. at 14.
11 Beckman, supra note 3, at 14.
12 Id. at 15.
13 Id. at 15.
14 Id. at 16.
15 Id. at 16.
16 Beckman, supra note 3, at 16.
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In the meantime, the United States had entered World War I and had an interest 
in suppressing any opposition to the war effort.17  The combination of the rising 
suspicion against immigrants and quashing opposition of the war effort culminated 
in the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918.18  The Espionage Act 
dealt with the disclosure and diffusion of sensitive information relating to the war and 
the military and “also outlawed all intentional attempts at causing insubordination, 
disloyalty, mutiny, or the refusal to serve among members of the United States 
Army.”19  Many United States citizens were prosecuted under this Act and it gave rise 
to several notable United States Supreme Court cases including Gitlow v. New York, 
Schenck v. United States, and Abrams v. United States.20  The Sedition Act, like its 1798 
predecessor, made it a crime to speak out against the United States government.21 
Although these Acts most certainly had First Amendment implications, there was a 
strong majority in the United States that favored these laws along with the Supreme 
Court.22
The year 1940 saw the advent of the Alien Registration Act (also known as the 
Smith Act, named for the sedition portion’s author, Congressman Howard Smith) 
whose policy basis was in national security as well.23  The Smith Act carried a 
potential incarceration of twenty years for violators and “made it criminal to publish, 
advocate, or teach with the intention to seek the overthrow or destruction of the 
United State, or any of its various governments (federally or on the state level).24  The 
Smith Act became the operative statute that was used during the McCarthyism Era 
to take legal action against many suspected communists in the 1950s and 1960s.25 
However, its most prominent use came during World War II with the Japanese 
Internment camps authorized by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in Executive 
Order 9066 (Authorizing Secretary of War to Prescribe Military Areas) in response 
to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.26  This order permitted the Secretary of War 
and subordinate military commanders to delineate certain areas from which “any 
and all persons may be excluded.”27  Over 120,000 individuals of Japanese descent 
were ultimately re-located to these camps, guarded by military police, surrounded 
17 Id. at 16.
18 Id. at 16.
19 Id. at 16.
20 Id. at 16.  See generally Schenck v. United States 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (allowing criminalization of words and finding no 
First Amendment violation if the utterance had a tendency to create harm or was intended to create harm), Abrams v. United 
States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) ( Justice Holmes’ dissent creating new test whereby Congress should only criminalize speech when 
words would “imminently and immediately” threaten the country), and Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (holding that 
New York sedition laws must comply with freedom of speech and press protections of the First Amendment, but that the bad 
tendency test applied in this case and that Gitlow’s words alone raised a “clear and present danger”).
21 Beckman, supra note 3, at 17.
22 Id. at 18.
23 Id. at 20.
24 Id. at 20.
25 Id. at 20.
26  Beckman, supra note 3, at 20.  
27  Id. at 21.
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by barbed wire, and remained there until the order was lifted in January of 1945.28 
While the executive order did not specifically state that persons of Asian, and more 
specifically, Japanese descent were of high suspicion, racial profiling of this ethnic 
group is what ultimately took place and President Ford later noted in 1976 that 
these camps were a “national mistake.”29 
The “Red Scare” brought on even more national security legislation in an effort 
to combat the anxiety over terrorism, including the Internal Security Act of 1950 
and the Communist Control Act of 1956.30  However, the Smith Act continued to 
be the source of suspected communist prosecution until the Supreme Court decided 
the case of Yates v. United States in 1957 where it narrowed the requirements for 
prosecution.31  The most significant case in terms of today’s policy is Bradenburg v. 
Ohio from 1969 where the Court determined that the uttering or publishing words 
hostile to the United States or its government “must be coupled with the likelihood 
of imminent/immediate lawless action in order for the words to be subject to 
criminal prosecution.”32  According to Beckman, this decision remains the main test 
for the constitutionality of the “abridgement of freedom of expression in the name 
of protecting the homeland and preventing harm by those who are intent on causing 
damage to the United States.”33
As the United States moved further into the technological age, Congress 
responded with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.34  Also known as 
FISA, this act created a secret court made up of a several federal district court judges 
whose role is to oversee requests to conduct electronic surveillance of telephone 
taps (now includes email and physical searches).35  As many as 2,072 wiretaps were 
approved by the FISA court in 2005 thus raising some criticism over the frequency 
of FISA wiretapping, but the law continues to allow surveillance today.36 
Although the United States had consistently feared terrorist attacks abroad 
prior to and during the 1990’s, there was still a misconception that these attacks 
were beyond United States borders.37  The World Trade Center Attack in 1993 
and the Alfred P. Murrah Building bombing in Oklahoma City in 1995 began to 
change American perspective on terrorism.38  The Anti-Terrorism and Effective 
28 Id. at 21.  See also Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 C.F.R. 1407 (1942).  See also Korematsu v. United States 323 U.S. 214 (1944) 
(upholding Executive Order 9066 because of the “definite and close relationship to the prevention of espionage and sabotage”).
29 Id. at 21 (internal quotation omitted).
30 Id. at 22.
31 Beckman, supra note 3, at 23.  See generally Yates v. United States 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (overturning convictions of 
multiple people convicted of being communists because the Court stopped the prosecutions of individuals for communist 
party membership alone and mandated that the government must show that the “alleged communist had advocated illegal 
action”).
32 Beckman, supra note 3, at 23.  See also Brandenburg v. Ohio 395 U.S. 444, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 23 L.Ed.2d 430, (1969).  
33 Id. at 23.
34 Id. at 24.
35 Id. at 24.
36 Id. at 24.
37 Beckman, supra note 3, at 24.  
38 Id. at 25.
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Death Penalty Act of 1996, according to Beckman, was the first attempt to 
comprehensively deal with anti-terrorism.39  Under this legislation, the Secretary of 
State gained the power to label groups as “terrorist organizations” if the activities of 
that particular group threatened the security and peace of the United States, or the 
United States itself, individuals are prohibited from financing terrorist organizations 
including humanitarian assistance, and financial institutions are obligated to notify 
the Secretary of State if they are holding terrorist funds or accounts.40  In terms 
of immigration procedures, the Act allows the Immigration and Naturalization 
Services to deny asylum or citizenship requests from any member of a terrorist 
organization even if that individual could show that he never acted in furtherance of 
the group’s goals.41  Perhaps most significantly, the legislation created a new special 
federal court that would rule on deportation proceedings and could employ secret 
evidence to do so.42  
Beckman notes that the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
also restated the Congressional view that the President has the power to “use all 
necessary means, including covert action and military force, to destroy international 
infrastructure used by international terrorists.”43  The President may also withhold 
aid and assistance to any governments that proclaim they are engaging in terrorism 
sponsored by the state.44  The Act also served as an amendment to Foreign Sovereign 
Immunity Act now permitting “private litigants to sue a foreign government for 
monetary damages in the United States federal court when the government has 
engaged in state sponsored terrorism.”45
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 evoked a major legislative response 
by expanding federal government powers with respect to terrorism.  A little over one 
month after the attacks, Congress passed and President Bush signed into law the 
USA Patriot Act (“Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism”) which maintains as its 
objective providing federal law enforcement the ability to seek out and prevent 
terrorist attacks.46  While the law does amend several laws dealing with intelligence 
gathering and the communications between intelligence agencies, conceivably of 
utmost importance is its amendment of 18 U.S. Code section 2331 to include acts 
that may be considered domestic terrorism.47
39 Id. at 25.
40 Id. at 26.
41 Id. at 26.
42 Beckman, supra note 3, at 23.  This federal court was to be made up of five district court judges selected from five 
different districts by the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
43 Id. at 26.  See also Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Beckman, supra note 3, at 27.  
47 Id. at 27.  Domestic Terrorism: (A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the 
United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended – i. to intimidate or coerce a civilian population ii. to influence the 
policy of a government by intimidation or coercion iii. to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, 
or kidnapping; and (C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
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The Patriot Act also expanded the definition of “terrorist organization” to 
include “any group of two or more people (organized or not) who commit a terrorist 
act with the intent to cause death or serious injury, or plans such terrorist activities” 
and created new political offenses dealing with the harboring and assisting of others 
who may want to commit terrorist acts.48  The Department of Justice was given the 
power to investigate all powers relating to terrorism and the federal government’s 
power to conduct criminal investigations was significantly enlarged.49  Federal 
law enforcement may now collect and review individuals’ records held by third 
parties through a process incorporating administrative subpoena without judicial 
oversight.50  Criticism of the administrative subpoena process has resulted in a 2006 
amendment to the Patriot Act that requires the frequency of these requests to be 
reported to Congress on a regular basis.51
In terms of Immigration law, the Patriot Act intensifies law enforcement 
power in deportation proceedings by restraining aliens from imploring funds for a 
terrorist organization or providing material support for those organizations.52  Law 
enforcement may deny entry to aliens that participate in activities such as these, 
and they may be removed from the United States if they are participating in these 
activities and are already legally within the country.53  The Attorney General also 
has the power to “order apprehension and physical custody of any alien the Attorney 
General has ‘reasonable grounds to believe was engaged in any set of activities deemed 
dangerous to national security.’”54  While the Patriot Act has been highly criticized, it 
continues to survive as national security law in the United States.
Law enforcement structure in the United States has also undergone some 
changes since the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  The Homeland Security Bill of 2002 
merged the activities and jurisdictions of several federal agencies and provided for 
a significant reorganization of federal law enforcement.55  Sine 1878, the United 
States has largely rejected the idea of military soldiers in place as internal and local 
law enforcement, unlike Spain and several other countries.56  Following post-Civil 
48 Id. at 28.
49 Id. at 28.  Section 213 of the Patriot Act gave law enforcement the authority to conduct “sneak and peek” warrants, 
which consist in a search involving a delay delivering notice of the execution of a search warrant.  This section grants federal 
law enforcement authority to enter the premises secretly without notifying the occupant until some “reasonable” time after the 
search if “providing immediate notice would have an adverse result in the investigation.”
50 Id. at 29.  These records that the federal law enforcement may collect and review include medical records, library records, 
and bookstore purchases.  Subpoenas are delivered via United States mail and the recipient is told that the information is 
sought pursuant to a security investigation.  Additionally, this information must be provided to law enforcement and that 
this disclosure is secret.  Recipients may not attempt to judicially quash the subpoena before turning over the requested 
information.  No judicial warrant or involvement is necessary for law enforcement to issue one of these requests.
51 Beckman, supra note 3, at 29.  
52 Id. at 30.
53 Id. at 30.
54 Id. at 30.
55 Id. at 34.  The reorganized departments include, inter alia, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Customs, Coast 
Guard, Justice, Treasury, Energy, and Agriculture.
56 Beckman, supra note 3, at 35.  Other countries utilizing military law enforcement include Russia and Israel.  
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War Reconstruction, the Posse Comitatus Act was enacted which “prohibited use of 
military forces in domestic policy within the United States except as authorized by 
the Constitution or as a subsequent Congressional Act.”57  The law is still in effect 
today and maintains a two-pronged policy: the prevention of overburdening troops 
and the maintenance of the view of the United States as “the land of the free” as 
opposed to a “police state.”58
The United States’ most recent response to terrorist attacks has thus far proven 
to be fairly effective.  Since the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington D.C., 
nearly seven years have passed without catastrophic damage to the United States 
and its people in its own territory.  While the United States has continued to fight 
the so-called “War on Terror” in Iraq and Afghanistan, it has also had a great deal 
of help from other nations in terms of political and military support, most notably 
Great Britain and Spain.  Although Spain is a much older nation, modern Spanish 
terrorism policy has a shorter history than that of the United States.  Perhaps this 
is due to the fact that the Spanish have consistently dealt with the threat of invasion 
and conquest for much of documented history.  Within the last hundred years, the 
Spanish political structure has overcome a dictatorship that effectively plunged the 
country into isolation and emerged with a constitutional monarchy that has become 
a valuable contributor to world affairs and collaborator in fighting against terrorism 
both on the Iberian Peninsula and abroad.
As previously noted, Spain has had to deal with invasions by outsiders for over 
two-thousand years, but it has been relatively recent that the Spanish government has 
formulated explicit laws, policies, and alliances with respect to combating terrorism 
both on Spanish soil and abroad.  Anti-terrorism laws were promulgated as early as 
1894, condemning attempts involving explosives against persons or things and, in 
1896, also condemning underlying political motives.59  Spain’s own political turmoil 
of the twentieth century made it somewhat difficult to establish solid policies in 
terms of national security and outside cooperation until toward the end of Francisco 
Franco’s dictatorship that ended at his death in 1975.60  Franco’s dictatorship created 
a sense of seclusion for Spain that focused on its own economic reconstruction in 
the wake of its civil war rather than participation in World War II.61  However, the 
Allies still condemned the Spanish government due to Franco’s shared ideology with 
Hitler and Mussolini.62  
In 1945, at the Potsdam Conference, England, Russia, and the United States 
57 Id. at 35.
58 Id. at 35.  There are three exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act: the President may use troops in times of declared 
emergency, National Guard units under state governors’ command, and the use of military (Navy) in drug interventions off the 
U.S. coasts. 
59 See El Anarquismo y los Medios de Represion [Anarchy and Methods of Repression] (L.E. Crim. 1894), http://
fama2.us.es/fde/ocr/2006/anarquismo.pdf.  See Represion de los Atentados Anarquistas [Repression of Anarchist Attempts] 
(L.E.Crim. 1896), http://bib.us.es/derecho/servicios/common/Ley18960902RepresionAtentadosAnarquistas.pdf. 
60 Cantarino, supra note 1, at 402.
61 Id. at 396.
62 Id. at 396.
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declared their opposition to Spain’s potential membership into the United Nations 
and, as a result of this, Spain was also excluded from the Marshall Plan.63  Spain 
began to reconcile with Europe and the rest of the world in 1948 once the relations 
between the Allies and Russia began to deteriorate.64  Due to the cold war with Russia 
and the recognition of western Germany by the Allies, the United States began to see 
the advantages of Franco’s anti-communist regime.65  As a result, the United States 
began lending funds to Spain and convinced the United Nations to lift the sanctions 
on the Spanish government.66  Under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the United 
States and Spain signed a pact dealing with military assistance in 1953.67  Under the 
Madrid Pact, the United States was permitted to build and maintain military bases 
within Spain in exchange for monetary and military aid, however, these bases were 
subject to shared use, be under Spanish direction and to fly the Spanish flag.68  Spain 
was admitted to the European national community and to the United Nations in 
1955.69
Franco’s regime strove for national unity and a desire to return to the Spanish 
Golden Age of Catholicism of the fifteenth century.  As part of this plan for national 
unity, Franco sought to eliminate any language other than Castilian Spanish and to 
repress any outward expression of any nationality or ethnicity other than Spanish. 
In the face of this repression, the Basque separatist organization, ETA, grew out of a 
group of university students who first met as a discussion group in Bilbao in 1952.70 
Seven years later, the group officially became known as ETA and began to formulate 
its ideology based on establishing itself as an independent nation rather than simply 
a separate ethnicity.71  
In the 1960s, ETA demonstrated its new strategy by rejecting the Francoist state 
by way of “lucha armada” (armed struggle) and “guerra revolucionaria” (revolutionary 
war).72  ETA sought to achieve this strategy through the action-repression spiral 
theory whose:
fundamental principle…was that ETA could control the pace 
and the dynamic of the struggle against the Francoist state 
by intervening in popular causes, such as labor disturbances 
and, by means of carefully selected violent attacks, provoke 
the Spanish government into repressive acts that would land 
indiscriminately on ETA and non-ETA Basques alike.  With 
63 Id. at 397.
64 Id. at 397.
65 Cantarino, supra note 1, at 397.
66 Id. at 397.
67 Id. at 397.
68 Id. at 397.  See also U.S. Pact Makes Spain a Key to NATO Defense, N.Y. Times, October 4, 1953, at E3.
69 Id. at 397.
70 Robert P. Clark, Negotiating with ETA, Obstacles to Peace in the Basque Country 1975-1988, 8 (1990).
71 Id. at 8-9.
72 Id. at 8.
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each attack and repressive response, the violence would spiral 
upward until finally the masses would rise spontaneously in 
an army of national liberation and, in the conflagration of a 
renewed civil war, the Basques would seize the opportunity to 
secede from Spain.73
This strategy’s first realization occurred after the death of ETA activist Xabi 
Etxebarrieta at a police roadblock.74  In retaliation, ETA assassinated police inspector 
Melitón Manzanas in 1968 which resulted in what may be considered one of the first 
manifestations of Franco’s reaction to domestic terrorism.75  While no formal decree 
or law was issued, Franco punished the Basque Country by putting the entire area 
under siege and then torturing, jailing, and exiling thousands of Basques.76  Franco’s 
strategy managed to repress the ETA movement for a few years, but ETA struck 
again in December 1973 with a car bomb attack that killed Admiral Luis Carrero 
Blanco who was to be Franco’s successor and President of the government.77  It was 
this attack that led to the Ley sobre la prevención del terrorismo or the Law for the 
Prevention of Terrorism promulgated on August 25, 1975.78
 The Law for the Prevention of Terrorism is the first formal manifestation of 
an articulated attempt to combat terrorism in twentieth century Spain.  A 1971 
amendment to the Ley de Orden Público (Law of Public Order) and the 1973 
Código Penal (Penal Code) acknowledge attacks by organized groups and express 
their illegality, but the 1975 law deals explicitly with the concept of terrorism that 
is maintained today.79  While the law does not mention ETA outright, it does make 
clear that the Spain is reacting “energetically” to attacks by groups such as ETA and 
acknowledges global terrorism as a rising threat.80  The law notes that it is a reaction 
to acts that put citizens’ lives, public order, and social harmony at risk, and that its 
goal is to harmonize the efficacy of, the prevention of, and the judgment of terrorist 
attacks with minimal disturbance to citizens’ rights.81  Article I states that the law’s 
purpose is to prevent and bring to justice acts of terrorism as defined in the Penal 
Code and the Code of Military Justice.82  Article 294 of the Code of Military Justice, 
73 Id. at 9.  
74 Id. at 9.
75 Clark, supra note 70, at 9.
76 Id. at 9.  This period of punishment ended with the 1970 Burgos trial where 15 ETA leaders were sentenced to long 
prison terms.
77 Id. at 9.  
78 See also Sobre prevención del terrorismo [Law for Prevention of Terrorism] (B.O.E. 1975, 18072). 
79 See Por la que se adicionan determinados artículos al Código de Justicia Militar [Through which certain articles are 
added to the Code of Military Justice] (B.O.E. 1971, 01452).  See also Sobre Reforma del Código Penal [On Reform of the 
Penal Code] (B.O.E. 1971, 01454).
80 See also Law for Prevention of Terrorism (B.O.E. 1975, 18072).
81 Law for the Prevention of Terrorism supra note 78. 
82  Id. at Artículo Primero [Article I].  “Las disposiciones del presente Decreto-ley serán de aplicación a la prevención y 
enjuiciamiento de los delitos del terrorismo definidos en los artículos…del Código Penal y…del Código del Justicia Militar….”
156 BAKER CENTER JOURNAL OF APPLIED PUBLIC POLICY
signed into law in 1971, designates those who will be punished for terrorist acts as 
those who:
Perteneciendo o actuando al servicio de organizaciones o 
grupos cuya finalidad sea la de atentar contra la unidad de la 
Patria, la integridad de sus territorios o el orden institucional, 
alterasen la paz pública mediante la provocación de explosiones, 
incendios, naufragios, descarrilamientos, perturbación de 
comunicaciones, derrumbamientos, inundaciones o voladuras 
u otros hechos análogos o emplearan cualesquiera medios o 
artificios que puedan ocasionar graves estragos….83
 Most significant in the variety of punishments that included fines and imprisonment 
for up to thirty years under the 1975 anti-terrorism law, was the death penalty for acts 
of terrorism that resulted in the death of any of the following persons: the Authority 
(presumably law enforcement authority), agents of the authority, members of the 
Armed Forces, and members of State Security.84  The death penalty could also be 
applied to terrorist kidnappings that resulted in mutilation or death.85 
 As previously noted, ETA is not explicitly mentioned, however it is evident that 
the organization could be included in the fourth article of the law which states:
Declarados fuera de la Ley los grupos u organizaciones…
separatistas y aquellos otros que preconicen o empleen la 
violencia como instrumento de acción política os social, los que 
organizaren o dirigieren estos grupos, los meros afiliados y los 
que, mediante su aportaciones en dinero, medios materiales, o 
de cualquier otra manera auxiliaren al grupo u organización, 
incurrirán respectivamente en el grado máximo de las penas 
previstas en el Código Penal para las asociaciones ilícitas de 
aquella naturaleza.86 
83 Código Justicia Militar [Code of Military Justice] Art. 294(a) (B.O.E. 1971, 274).  “Those who, belong to or work for 
the service of organizations or groups whose objective is that of an attempt against the unity of the Country, the integrity of 
its territories or the institutional order, disturb the public peace by means of causing explosions, fires, shipwrecks, derailments, 
disturbances in communication, collapses, floods or blasts or other similar acts or use whatever methods or devices that can 
cause serious devastation, will be punished.”  (Author’s translation).   
84 Law for Prevention of Terrorism supra note 78 at Artículo Primero [Article I] (2), (3).  “Dos.  Cuando los delitos a que se 
refiere el párrafo anterior se cometieren contra la Autoridad, Agentes de la autoridad, miembros de las Fuerzas Armadas y de 
Seguridad del Estado y demás funcionarios públicos se aplicaran, en su grado máximo, las penas señaladas en sus respectivos 
casos.  Tres.  Si del atentado terrorista resultare muerte de alguna de las personas mencionadas, se impondrá la pena de muerte.” 
See generally Law for the Prevention of Terrorism, supra note 78.
85 Id. at Artículo Segundo [Article II].
86 Id. at Artículo Cuarto [Article IV].  “Declared outside of the law, the…separatist groups or organizations and those 
others that preconceive or employ violence as an instrument of political or social action, those that organize or direct these 
groups, those merely affiliated and those that, by means of their support in money, material means or by any other means 
support the group or organization, will respectively incur the maximum grade of the foreseen penalties in the Penal Code for 
the illicit associations of that nature.”  (Author’s translation). 
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ETA was (and still is) considered to be a separatist organization, but this provision 
purports to exclude separatist organizations and place their punishments under the 
provisions in the Penal Code which at that time included sentences ranging from 
thirty years’ imprisonment to death.87  Given Franco’s previous manifestations 
of disdain for ETA and Basque separatism, it is somewhat surprising that this 
law does not include ETA as a terrorist organization.  However, the fact that the 
ultimate punishment of death was available for members of the groups referred to 
in the Law for the Prevention of Terrorism under Law 42/1971 (additions to the 
Code of Military Justice) shows a serious attitude towards removing threats from 
separatist groups in the same way that the 1975 Law for the Prevention of Terrorism 
pledged to remove threats from terrorist groups.88   Although there was no way for 
the Spanish state to have gauged the magnitude of the necessity for strong anti-
terrorism policies in today’s world, the codification of Spain’s anti-terrorist policies 
under Franco demonstrates Spain’s attentiveness to anti-terrorism action that has 
carried the nation forward into today’s anti-terrorism policies.
After Franco’s death in November of 1975, Spanish political life underwent a 
transitional phase that eventually led to the current constitutional monarchy.  Under 
the Law of Succession, the Spanish Congress convened and named Juan Carlos de 
Borbón y Borbón as King of Spain to reign as Juan Carlos I.89  Almost immediately, 
Spanish political life began to change and aim towards a democratic structure. 
Among one of King Juan Carlos’ most significant reforms to the
government was the 1976 legalization of the opposition parties that were banned 
during Franco’s regime as well as the abrogation of the Law on the Prevention of 
Terrorism in February of that year.90  A visit to the United States by the King in 
1976 where he proclaimed the commitment of his regime to democracy also proved 
significant for Spain’s future and for future relations with the United States.91  Internal 
restructuring also occurred in that same year with the Reform Law of 1976, passed 
by national referendum, which provided for the existence of a bicameral legislature 
comprising a 350-member Congress and a 241-member Senate.92
 Perhaps most significant in King Juan Carlos’ tenure is the 1978 Spanish 
Constitution that was made into law on December 27, 1978 after having been 
approved by national referendum.93  The Constitution itself maintains identical aims 
to those of the United States Constitution in that it seeks to incorporate fundamental 
rights and liberties of the Spanish people in a democratic system.94  However, the 
most glaring difference from the United States is the set up of a parliamentary 
87 See generally Código Justicia Militar [Code of Military Justice] (B.O.E. 1971, 274).
88 Id. 
89 Cantarino, supra note 1, at 430.
90 Id. at 431. Legalized parties included the Communist Party, the People’s Socialist Party, the Socialist Alliance, and the 
Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE).  Clark, supra note 70, at 38.
91 Id. at 431.
92 Id.  Of the 431 members of the Senate, 207 members were elected and 41 were designated by the King. 
93 Id. at 434.
94 Id. at 433.  See also generally Constitución Española [Spanish Constitution].
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monarchy, how the Constitution provides for a President, elected every four years, 
responsible for a bicameral legislature representing the Spanish people made up of 
the Congress and the Senate.95  The King is designated as the Head of State and 
takes on a role with responsibilities including: sanctioning and promulgating the 
laws, summoning and dissolving the legislature, calling for elections and referenda, 
proposing a candidate for President of the Government, appointing and dismissing 
members of the Government on the President’s approval, issuing the decrees 
approved in the Council of Ministers, staying abreast of state affairs, and exercising 
supreme command of the military forces.96  Also incumbent upon the King is the 
responsibility to express the State’s assent to international commitments through 
treaties and, following authorization from the Congress, to declare war and make 
peace.97  While the King’s powers are quite strong, his acts must be counter-signed 
by the President of the Government and, when appropriate, by competent ministers, 
and the nomination of the President and dissolution of Congress are to be counter-
signed by the speaker of Congress.98
 The role of the Spanish President is somewhat ambiguous in the constitutional 
provisions with respect to responsibilities outside dissolving the Congress when 
necessary: “El Presidente dirige la acción del Gobierno y coordina las funciones de 
los demás miembros del mismo, sin perjuicio de la competencia y responsabilidad 
directa de éstos en su gestión.”99  The King nominates the President after each 
renewal of Congress and the Congress must approve the candidate by an overall 
majority after the candidate has submitted his/her platform to the Congress.100  The 
Spanish King and President seem to share the role that has been combined in the 
United States Executive Branch with respect to dealing with legislation and policy 
for the Spanish state.
 The Spanish law enforcement structure differs from that of the United States 
in that the Spanish system provides for a military element that the Posse Comitatus 
Act prohibits.  Spanish law enforcement is made up of three entities: the Guardia 
Civil, the Cuerpo Nacional de Policía, and the Policía Municipal.101  The Guardia 
Civil is considered to be a part of the army and its main responsibilities comprise: 
“policing the rural parts of Spain, patrolling the highways between cities, controlling 
firearms and explosives, guarding certain installations, and protecting such areas as 
95 C.E. Título Preliminar §1.  C.E. Título III, Capítulo Primero, Art. 66 §1, 2.  Section 68 provides that a minimum of 300 
members and a maximum of 400 members are elected to the Cortes every four years through universal, free, equal, direct and 
secret suffrage under terms to be laid down by law. 
96 Id. at Título II, Art. 62.
97 Id. at Título II, Art. 63.
98 Id. at Título II, Art. 64.
99 C.E. supra note 95, at Título IV, Art. 98.  “The President shall direct the Governments’ action and coordinate the 
functions of the other members thereof, without prejudice to the competence and direct responsibility of the latter in the 
discharge of their duties.” 
100 Id. at Título IV, Art. 99.
101 Beckman, supra note 3, at 115.
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the coast, frontiers, ports, and airports.”102  The Cuerpo Nacional de Policía has the 
responsibility of monitoring urban areas with populations of over 20,000 and focuses 
on detective and investigatory work along with maintaining private security forces 
and enforcing drug and gambling laws.103  Finally, the Policía Municipal oversees 
minor offenses in cities and take on roles such as guarding buildings and directing 
traffic.104
 Perhaps the most notable section of the Spanish Constitution with respect to 
State response in the face of emergency, is Article 55 which deals with Emergency, 
Siege, and Terrorism and citizens’ rights in these times.105  This Article “provides for 
a process whereby fundamental rights and civil liberties may be suspended during a 
state of emergency, and also in terrorism cases.”106  The Spanish government would 
have to declare a state of emergency for this provision to become applicable, however, 
with the magnitude of terrorist attacks today, the possibility of the use of this 
provision is not too remote.107  Article 55 provides for the suspension of the rights 
of personal liberty, rights to be secure in one’s home from searches and intrusions, 
freedom of movement, freedom of expression, and the right of assembly.108  The 
second paragraph of this Article declares that the government may pass reasonable 
laws to suspend the right of personal liberty, the right to be secure in one’s home 
and free from searches, and permit the government to pass surveillance laws that 
agree to encroach upon these rights: “…para personas determinadas, en relación con 
las investigaciones correspondientes a la actuación de bandas armadas o elementos 
terroristas.”109  This provision allows the government to pass surveillance laws in 
order to keep a close watch on those who are under investigation for activities relating 
to armed gangs or terrorist groups.  However, the final sentence of the Article serves 
as a warning to law enforcement officials that they should abstain from abusive or 
unwarranted use of these powers because they can be held criminally liable.110 
 Section 55 permits the Spanish government to create a law similar to the 
United States’ Patriot Act where the Department of Justice’s powers in criminal 
investigations with terrorist ties are significantly enlarged and citizens’ rights under 
the US Constitution are abridged through provisions such as the “Sneak and Peek” 
warrants which allows for delayed notice in search proceedings during criminal 
102 Beckman, supra note 3, at 115 (citing Phillip Reichel, Comparative Criminal Justice Systems: A Topical 
Approach (2d ed. 2005)). 
103 Beckman, supra note 3, at 115.
104 Id. 
105 C.E., supra note 95, at Título I, Art. 55.
106 Beckman, supra note 3, at 114-15.  The three law enforcement entities are: the Civil Guard, National Police Corps, and 
Municipal Police.  (Author’s translation).
107 Id. at 114.
108 Id. at 114.  See also C.E., supra note 95, at Título I, Art. 55.  
109 Id. at 114.  See also C.E., supra note 95, at Título I, Art. 55.  (“…for specific persons in connection with investigations of 
the activities of armed bands or terrorist groups.”)
110 Id. at 114.  See also C.E., supra note 95, at Título I, Art. 55.
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investigations.111  In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Spanish parliament pushed 
through legislation was in response to the terrorist threat from ETA that was most 
likely enabled by Section 55 of the Constitution.112  A journalist from Bilbao, José 
María Portell, was assassinated on June 28, 1978, apparently by ETA members 
and by July 1 of that same year, Law 21/1978, Measures in Relation to Crimes 
Committed by Armed Groups or Gangs, took effect giving police new powers of 
arrest and detention for terror suspects.113  Although the new Constitution had 
not yet been promulgated, the rights granted under that document almost certainly 
would have been abrogated under this law: terror suspects could be detained for 
more than seventy-two hours without any charges if the courts had been notified, 
judges could stop the detention (this almost never occurred), prisoners could not be 
released on bond before trial, and police had the right to intercept mail and telephone 
messages received by suspected terrorists.114
 Law 56/1978 supplemented Law 21/1978 in December of 1978 and was known 
as Special Measures toward Crimes of Terrorism Committed by Armed Groups.115 
Under this law, suspects could be held for up to ten days with the court’s permission 
and could be denied contact with family members or attorneys during the detention 
period.116  The third decree-law was promulgated by King Juan Carlos on January 
26, 1979 and was titled On the Protection of Citizen Security.117  Its most notable 
provisions outlined criminal penalties for anything that could be construed as a 
defense of a terrorist group, increased the penalties for terrorist crimes, gave the 
national police charge of the security prisons, and limited the right of the accused 
to request and obtain provisional release from prison.118  These three laws were 
combined to create Organic Law 11/1980 which was passed by an overwhelming 
majority on October 29, 1980 thereby creating an expansion of police power and 
suspending “fundamental constitutional rights for persons suspected of a wide range 
of terrorist acts, including apologia for terrorism or for those persons suspected 
of such crimes.  Preventive detention and holding suspects incommunicado were 
authorized, as were telephone taps, mail interception, and police invasion of private 
homes without court order.”119  This new law allowed the Spanish government, 
through the efforts of the Guardia Civil, to attempt to severely limit ETA’s power 
111  See also Beckman, supra note 49, at 28.  
112 Clark, supra note 70, at 40.
113 Id. at 41.  See also Sobre Medidas en relación con los delitos cometidos por grupos o bandas armadas (B.O.E. 1978, 
16969).
114 Id. at 41.
115 Id. at 41.  See also De Medidas especiales en relación con los delitos de terrorismo cometidos por grupos armados  (B.O.E. 
1978, 29845).
116 Id. at 41.
117 Clark, supra note 70, at 41.  See also Sobre la protección de seguridad ciudadana [On the Protection of Citizens’ 
Security] (B.O.E. 1979, 03062).
118 Id. at 41.
119 Id. at 42.  See also Ley Orgánica 11/1980: Sobre los supuestos previstos en el artículo 55, 2 de la Constitución [Organic 
Law 11/1980: On the Supposed Provisions in Article 55, 2 of the Constitution] (B.O.E. 1980, 289).
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within the peninsula and resulted in the creation of an anti-terrorist police unit 
comprised of approximately 50 men that sought to infiltrate ETA through spying 
and also compensated informants.120  
A couple of months later, in February of 1980, Spain’s first official counterterrorism 
police units entered into the effort including “the 120-man Special Operations 
Group (GEO), trained for dealing with urban terrorism; and the 450-man Guardia 
Civil detachment, called Rural Antiterrorist Groups (GAR).”121  Joining these 
antiterrorism forces were 12,000 Guardia Civil and 6,000 Policía Nacional thereby 
creating an immense effort against ETA that resulted in double the arrests of the 
previous year.122  The next several years passed continuing these strategies that 
increased arrests and the number of ETA members in prison, however, the Spanish 
government fell under strong criticism that torture was going on in prisons, and ETA 
retaliated with new waves of violence.123  Kidnappings and murders of some higher 
profile individuals by ETA, along with an attempted coup by over 100 Guardia Civil 
troops in Madrid led to a revised version of the anti-terrorism legislation.124
The government’s response to ETA’s increased violence and the Guardia Civil 
coup was the May 4, 1981 law known as the Law for the Defense of the Constitution 
which defined terrorism as encompassing any attempt on “the integrity of the 
Spanish nation or any effort to secure the independence of any part of its territory, 
even if nonviolent” thereby allowing any type of separatism to be tried under this 
law.125  This same law also condemned intelligence gathering in support of a terrorist 
organization and explicitly included ETA’s “commandos de información.”126  For the 
first time since ETA’s existence, the organization was explicitly included in an anti-
terrorist provision rather than simply being referred to ambiguously.  
 Another law approved by the Parliament on May 20, 1981 allowed for the 
Council of Ministers to declare a state of alarm without parliamentary approval 
in the event of danger to public order and citizen security.127  Known as the Law 
on the States of Alarm, Exception, and Siege, this measure provided for a three-
level state of emergency and in the first stage permitted the government to control 
“movement of persons and vehicles, to ration essential consumer goods, and to inspect 
private property without prior approval.”128  If the “state of exception” was invoked 
under parliamentary approval, it could last only thirty days, but would allow the 
government to arrest and imprison almost anyone without showing cause.129  Finally, 
120 Clark, supra note 70, at 42.
121 Id. at 42.
122 Id.
123  Id. at 47.
124 Id. at 47.  On February 23, 1981 Guardia Civil troops, under the leadership of a lieutenant colonel, stormed Parliament 
and took the entire Congreso de los Diputados hostage.  Fortunately, the attempt was over within a matter of hours.
125 Clark, supra note 70, at 47 (citation omitted).  
126 Id. at 48.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
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the third level, “state of siege,” could come into play through government request 
and parliamentary approval when there was extreme danger, and would result in 
the country essentially being controlled by martial law with armed forces controlling 
the majority of government functions.130  Although this law has never been invoked, 
given that law enforcement in Spain is largely controlled by the military through the 
Guardia Civil, aside from the relinquishment of rights, perhaps this step would not 
be as foreign a concept as it would be to a citizen in the United States.  The military 
would exert control over other governmental entities, but it does not seem that a 
scenario such as this would be as far-fetched as it would be in the United States.
 The post-9/11 era in Spain has seen some changes in the focus of anti-terrorist 
policy.  While still having to maintain a watchful eye on ETA, the Al-Qaeda threat 
and presence in the region has forced Spain to look more outwardly in terms of 
protecting its people and nation.  
Spain and the United States maintained fairly close relations in the post-Franco 
regime and through Spain’s membership in NATO, however, 9/11 did provoke 
changes for Spain within its borders and in its relationship with the United States.131 
Spain took a tremendous step against ETA in 2002 when it banned Batasuna, 
ETA’s political party through legislation that permitted the government to eliminate 
any political party that advocated “hatred, violence, and social confrontation’ or 
challenged the legitimacy of democratic institutions…or promoted ‘a culture of 
civil confrontation.”132  The validity of the law was upheld in a Tribunal Supremo 
decision on March 27, 2003 and thereby allowed for the freezing of Batasuna’s 
assets and the arrest and incarceration of those who refuse to disavow their loyalty 
to ETA.133  Additionally, Spain’s Audiencia Nacional ordered the Basque newspaper 
Euskaldunon Egunkaria to close because the paper was being used to launder money 
to fund ETA.134  According to Beckman, “efforts by Spanish authorities since 2003 
have largely dismantled the organization and contributed to the overall evisceration 
of the organization’s abilities to conduct operations.”135
Unlike the United States, because Spain had already dealt with homeland 
terrorism and had incorporated punishments for terrorist acts into its criminal 
code, 9/11 did not create an enormous challenge in terms of responsive legislation, 
however, the event did result in expansion of the definitions and scope of terrorism 
offenses.136  In particular, Article 572 of the Código Penal was amended to include 
as terrorists those who “perteneciendo, actuando al servicio o colaborando con 
bandas armadas, organizaciones o grupos cuya finalidad sea la de subvertir el orden 
130 Clark, supra note 70, at 48.
131 Id. at 114.
132 Beckman, supra note 49, at 116, 117.  See also Ley de los partidos politicos [Law of Political Parties] (B.O.E. 2002, 154). 
133 Beckman, supra note 49, at 117.  See J.T.S., Mar. 27, 2003 (E.D.J., No. 278).   See also T.S., July 25, 2003 (B.J.C., No. 
278).   
134 Id. at 117.
135 Id. at 117.
136 Id. at 118. 
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constitucional o alterar gravemente la paz pública….”137  Although no specific “terror 
court” is in place, Spain had already increased the punishment for a terrorist act to a 
sentence of twenty to thirty years in its penal code rather than the typical fifteen to 
twenty years for other crimes that resulted in death.138   Both ETA and Al-Qaeda 
members have been prosecuted under these laws.  However, Aznar and Zapatero’s 
tenures have affected how ETA has responded to potential peace agreements and 
how ETA has been factored into the nation’s anti-terrorism policy.
Since 2002, Spanish anti-terrorist policy has been heavily affected by the 
President of the government representing the majority in the Cortes.  Jose Maria 
Aznar, of the Partido Popular from 1996 to 2004, and Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, 
of the Partido Socialista Obrero Español, from 2004 to the present maintained 
different ideologies in terms of how Spain should contend with ETA and participate 
in the global effort against Al-Qaeda’s terrorism.139    
Aznar’s final two years as President were 2002 until 2004, a critical time for 
post 9/11 reactions.  Aznar’s strategy in the “War on Terror” was to hold fast to 
Washington’s position in supporting the war in Iraq.140  Although Spanish popular 
opinion overwhelmingly opposed the United States attack in Iraq, Aznar and the 
Spanish government held onto the argument that U.N. Security Council 1441 
sufficed to rationalize the use of force in Iraq, and Aznar strongly maintained that 
Iraq and Saddam Hussein had ties with Al Qaeda.141  Aznar further affirmed his 
allegiance to United States policy by urging the Spanish equivalent to the United 
States’ 2002 National Security Strategy advocating precautionary actions in an 
effort to put down security threats which he mainly saw as the threat of weapons of 
mass destruction.142  This approach was unpopular with the Spanish people because 
it favored the United States strategy over European security strategy as outlined in 
the Solana Document or A Secure Europe in a Better World.143  While the United 
States’ approach is much more unilateral and focuses on the prevention of terrorism 
through action, the European strategy concentrates on a multilateral approach, a 
cooperative attitude with other nations, including the United States, in an effort 
to seek peace and cooperation.144  While Spain had long been characterized as a 
137 Delitos contra el orden público [Crimes Against Public Order] (C.P., 572) [“…belonging to, acting in the service of, or 
collaborating with armed gangs, organizations or groups whose objective is that of subverting constitutional order or seriously 
altering the public peace….” (Author’s translation)].  See also id. at 118, 119.
138 Delitos contra el orden público [Crimes Against Public Order] (C.P., 572(1)).  See also Amos Guiora, Legislative and 
Policy Responses to Terrorism, A Global Perspective, 7 San Diego Int’l. L.J. 125, Fall 2005. 
139 Manuel Iglesias-Cavicchioli, A Period of Turbulent Change: Spanish-US Relations Since 2002, The Whitehead Journal of 
Diplomacy and International Relations, Summer/Fall 2007, at 113.
140 Iglesias-Cavicchioli, supra note 131, at 115.
141 Id. at 115, 117.  See also G.A. Res. 1441, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (Nov. 8, 2002), The Situation Between Iraq and 
Kuwait.
142 Id. at 117.
143  Id.   
144  See Iglesias-Cavicchioli, supra note 131, at 115.  See also A Secure Europe in a Better World, (2003), http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsupload/78367.pdf.
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cooperative nation in terms of foreign affairs, Aznar’s changes and strict adherence 
to unpopular United States policies damaged that reputation within the European 
Community.145 
 Al Qaeda’s attacks on the Atocha train station in Madrid on March 11, 2004, 
while not causing any revisions to anti-terrorism legislation, set the stage for a change 
in Spain’s political make-up and resulted in a PSOE victory in the days following 
the bombing with Zapatero later installed as President.146  During his campaign, 
Zapatero had promised that he would withdraw troops from Iraq because of his 
disagreement with the war in Iraq, but he did so two months earlier than had been 
promised in an effort to avoid pressure from the United States that would come 
after the new UN Security Council resolution.147  This action did nothing to better 
relations between Zapatero and President Bush that were already frosty due to 
Zapatero’s widely publicized opposition to Aznar’s government that had extensively 
courted the United States and its policies.148  The United States – Spanish political 
relationship continued on a downward spiral as Zapatero publicly encouraged Tunisia 
to withdraw its troops following Spain’s example and then publicly acknowledged 
his support for John Kerry in the 2004 Presidential elections.149  Finally, increased 
Spanish relations with Venezuela and Cuba under Zapatero have further cemented 
the lack of collaborative effort that existed during Aznar’s tenure.  
 Zapatero’s tenure has been subject to heavy criticism in terms of the lack of a 
solid relationship with the United States and his dealings with ETA.  A July 2007 
report notes that although ETA had appeared to be under control as it announced 
a cease-fire in March of 2006 and the Spanish government had estimated that the 
organization only had about thirty active members, Zapatero acted too quickly in 
willing to have open peace talks without first setting preconditions.150  This violated 
an agreement with the Partido Popular that he had actually proposed in 2000 
whereby there would be no talks with ETA without demanding that they lay down 
their weapons as a precondition.151 Unfortunately for Zapatero, this turned out to be 
a most unfortunate error as ETA violated the cease-fire in December of 2006 with a 
car-bomb detonated in the parking garage of terminal 4 at Madrid’s Barajas Airport 
killing two people.152  
While ETA’s power seems to have shrunk since the 1960’s, it is apparent that 
their presence not be eliminated any time soon.  Now that Spain has had to expand 
its focus to the potential for Al-Qaeda attacks, perhaps not as much energy may be 
145 Id. at 120.
146 See Beckman, supra note 49, at 117.  
147 Iglesias-Cavicchioli, supra note 13,1 at 121.
148 See Iglesias-Cavicchioli, supra note 131, at 121.
149 Iglesias-Cavicchioli, supra note 131, at 121.
150 Scott Kern, Spain’s Counter-Terrorism Policy Under Challenge by Al-Qaeda and ETA, Power and Interest News Report 
( July 6, 2007), http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_printable&report_id=664&language_id=1.
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placed on rooting out ETA.  The Spanish Secret Service sent out a warning in April 
of 2007 that Al-Qaeda most likely has established an active cell within Spain and 
that Spain is their prime target within Europe.153  Al-Qaeda has repeatedly made 
statements that its goal is to recapture Al-Andalus or Moorish Spain that was under 
Islamic control from the years 711 until 1492.154  Spain most certainly is facing a 
dual challenge with policies that have overall proven effective during the past fifty 
years.
 On some levels, it is difficult to compare the challenges that the United States 
and Spain each face today.  While both must deal with the Al-Qaeda threat, ETA’s 
threat is exclusive to Spain.  Although Spain has seen a significant amount of success 
in weeding out ETA and continues to have success doing so, their methods may not 
be as appropriate for the United States because of Constitutional limitations and the 
Posse Comitatus Act.  Spain’s usage of military power in law enforcement has been 
effective with its Guardia Civil, particularly in efforts against ETA, but the United 
States’ system is unlikely to change in such a way as to create a national police force 
through the military because the current system has seen success.  However, Spain 
has been relentless in its pursuit of ETA and this is an example that the United 
States should follow.
 Although ETA and Al-Qaeda are not similar enemies by any means, Spain has 
punished members of both groups under the same provisions in its penal code.  Al-
Qaeda as an enemy for the United States seems to be a much more expansive and 
elusive challenge.  ETA is concentrated within the Iberian Peninsula and maintains 
the Basque Country as a home base while it appears that Al-Qaeda cells may be 
found anywhere in the western world along with their base territories in Afghanistan, 
and now Iraq.  It is fair to say that Spain has been so successful with ETA because 
of its relatively small numbers and localized attacks that occur on a smaller level, and 
while the United States has seen and continues to see some success with Al-Qaeda 
through surveillance as permitted by FISA and the Patriot Act, there is little if any 
chance that the United States would be willing to abridge its citizens rights in the 
way that the Spanish Constitution permits in terms of invasions of privacy.  FISA 
and the Patriot Act seem to have stretched the potential for limitation of rights as far 
as the American public is willing to go, and further than some are willing to go.
 However, it is also fair to say that the measures implemented by the United 
States in the wake of 9/11 have had success in preventing terrorist attacks on 
American soil.  Spain has not been so fortunate, and this could be a result of minimal 
reform in terrorist legislation after 9/11.  Because of the success that Spain had 
found with its policies on ETA, conceivably it was comfortable with its set of laws 
and provisions in the Penal Code pertaining to terrorist activity.  The “newness” of 
a major terrorist attack on home soil could be seen as working to the United States’ 
153 Id.
154 See also Kern, supra note 150.
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advantage in terms of tailoring anti-terrorism policy to the enemy that was at hand. 
The Spanish were accustomed to smaller level attacks that typically took the form 
of assassinations against targeted persons or car bombs in relatively lowly populated 
areas.  Al-Qaeda’s threat took on much more massive levels of attack that sought 
mass casualties and had the overall objective of death to an entire population based 
in radical religious belief.
 The enemies are different and therefore require different methods of preventing 
their attacks and effectively prosecuting offenders.  Spain seems to have focused 
major efforts on putting down ETA, including eliminating threatening political 
parties and newspapers which would certainly have First Amendment implications 
in the United States.  ETA is a much smaller enemy than Al-Qaeda, and Spain’s 
success in reducing their numbers could be attributed to the size of the group and 
its geographical location.  If the United States and its allies could mount an effort 
towards Al-Qaeda that was proportional to the Spanish effort against ETA then 
conceivably Al-Qaeda’s numbers could be reduced down to a more manageable size. 
Unfortunately, these nations do not have the luxury of geographic concentration nor 
a pattern of attacks that is seen with ETA.  However, Spain is an example to follow in 
that has stayed on ETA for the past fifty years and tailored its legislation as necessary 
to deal with newer developments in the group’s tactics.  The United States might 
look at this example and view the Patriot Act, National Security Strategy, and FISA 
as living documents that should be amended as necessary over time to be tailored to 
the ever-changing threats and attacks that come from Al-Qaeda and other extremist 
groups.  Of utmost importance, however, is the maintenance of freedoms guaranteed 
in the United States Constitution when creating anti-terrorism legislation.
 Spain’s presidential change in 2004, while not beneficial for Spanish-United 
States relations, has allowed for a change in the nation’s cooperative policy with 
other world powers.  A return to a multilateral cooperative policy that fits within the 
European community strategy has reinstated Spain as a supportive entity and this is 
what the United States should seriously consider doing in order to have maximum 
success in the “War on Terror.”  While the United States is distinctive as having 
the most powerful military in the world, its anti-terrorism policy seems to have 
pulled the nation away from cooperative measures with allies that could contribute 
valuable resources to the effort.  The “preventative strategy through action” could be 
better supported if other nations were collaborating as much as the United States 
government would like.  However, in order to achieve this level of collaboration, the 
United States must also take a step towards the multilateral cooperative policy and 
place peace as a high priority.  This is not to say that there should not be pre-emptive 
action with respect to Al-Qaeda, but both the United States and its allies could meet 
somewhere in the middle over their respective strategies to create a stronger force 
against the terrorist threat.
 Spanish success with subduing ETA has been impressive, but it must be taken 
into account that ETA is a very different enemy than Al-Qaeda.  Defeating Al-Qaeda 
will require a much more collaborative effort on behalf of the United States and 
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its allies, including Spain.  However, both Spain and the United States have found 
success using their respective anti-terrorist measures given that no major attacks 
have occurred within United States borders since 2001 and 2004 in Spain.  The 
United States should follow Spain’s example in continuing to develop anti-terrorism 
legislation as the effort against Al-Qaeda persists, but without the sacrifice of 
American citizens’ rights.  Both nations should work to repair the relations between 
them and try to harmonize their anti-terrorism policies along with those of other 
allied nations.  Ultimately, every effort must be made to stop attacks by Al-Qaeda, 
ETA, and other terrorist groups against civilized nations and this will only occur 
through cooperative efforts among these nations.     
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Workshop Report:  Formulation of a Bipartisan Energy and 
Climate Policy—Toward and Open and Transparent Process1
Introduction
Background
In January 2009, the Program on Presidential Policy-Making: Formulating 
a Bipartisan Energy and Climate Policy for America was formed. Launched by 
the Howard H. Baker Jr. Center for Public Policy and the Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars, the program’s purpose is to explore approaches 
to improve the process of decision making in the complex world of energy and 
climate policy. The principal goal of the initiative is to assist national policy-makers 
in achieving bipartisan ship, transcending historic barriers, overcoming inter agency 
rivalries, working with Congress and outside groups, and generating public support 
for sweeping new policies in a most divisive but critically important public policy 
arena.  
In the months that followed, the Baker and Wilson Centers jointly sponsored 
two ground-breaking sessions that engaged key political leaders along with experts 
in policy, social sciences, energy and climate science, and systems thinking to examine 
new approaches that could fundamentally change the way America formu lates 
energy and climate policy. What emerged was a clear understanding that the nation 
needs to improve its policy-making process along with an exciting sense of what is 
possible. The political leaders and experts endorsed the need to develop a new, open, 
transparent, and publicly accessible decision-making model. The ex perts also agreed 
that such a process, if implemented by our government, could, in President Obama’s 
visionary terms, transform “business as usual” in Washington and dramatically 
improve national policy making.  
Roundtable on White House Policy-Making 
The first of the sessions highlighted the need for government and congressional 
leaders to view energy and climate policy in the context of the entire system of 
policies, stakeholders, and outcomes. On May 18, 2009, the Roundtable on White 
House Policy-Making was held in Washington, D.C. Organized by former Senate 
Majority Leader, White House Chief of Staff, and U.S. Ambassador to Japan, 
Howard H. Baker, Jr., and former Indiana Congressman and 9/11 Commission 
Co-Chair Lee H. Hamilton, the Roundtable consisted of former high-ranking 
decision makers in the legislative and executive branches of government spanning 
the past 35 years. The Roundtable focused on the nature of various decision-making 
mechanisms and strategies available to White House and lawmakers in addressing 
1  The Workshop was held on June 18-19, 2009 at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, 
D.C.  It was organized jointly by the Wilson Center and the Howard H. Baker Jr. Center for Public Policy at the University 
of Tennessee.  The partnering organizations for the Workshop included Sandia National Laboratory, the George Bush School 
of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.  The list of 
Workshop organizers is provided in Appendix A.  The list of Workshop participants is provided in Appendix B.
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such highly complex and long-standing problems as energy and cli mate.  Among the 
key findings and con clusions reached by the Roundtable are:
•	 The need to consider the multiple viewpoints of all stakeholders and 
constituencies who have a stake in policy outcomes. Failing to account for all 
viewpoints can create unanticipated political conflict or unin tended policy 
consequences;  
•	 The critical importance of identifying and analyzing all of the facts associated 
with any given policy issue. Roundtable members echoed the late Senator 
Patrick Moynihan’s famous observation that “we can each have our own 
opinions but cannot each have our own facts.” 
•	 The need to use a systems approach for better evaluating the facts and 
anticipating policy outcomes. In doing so, the nation should utilize the 
best methodologies and expertise from our academic, national laboratory, 
and private sector to develop and refine energy and climate policy options 
that are eventually presented to the Nation’s elected officials. Roundtable 
participants noted the usefulness of such entities as the now defunct Office of 
Technology Assessment or the current Energy Information Administration 
of the U.S. Department of Energy as critical to compiling and objectively 
analyzing the evidentiary record used in the formulation of policy options 
presented to national decision makers.  
The Workshop on Energy and Climate Policy
Building on these recommendations, a workshop was convened in June 2009 to 
explore how a framework for design and imple mentation of such a national system 
of decision making might be developed, including an in-depth look at how “systems 
thinking” and “modeling approaches” can be used to create an open and transparent 
framework for formulating comprehen sive energy and climate policy.  This report 
summarizes the Workshop presentations, deliberations, and findings.  
A Systems Approach to Energy and Climate Policy-Making
In conceiving the June 18–19 Workshop, the Howard H. Baker Jr. Center for 
Public Policy and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars sought to 
address ways to improve the process by which na tional energy and climate policy had 
been addressed in recent years. Despite the publication of numerous well-received 
studies and reports on energy and climate strategies, little attention had been paid to 
the develop ment of a well-defined framework for modeling and evaluating policies 
— a framework that goes far beyond what policy makers had used in the past. Indeed, 
the successful development and implementation of coherent energy/climate strategy 
based on multiple stakeholder input and a fully developed factual record will require 
knowledge and assessments that go far beyond any one technology or application. 
 The Wilson and Baker centers understood that a successful strategy must 
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assess the entire energy system, including power sources, distribution, end use, 
environmental impact, economics, and social behavior that reflect the broad range of 
stakeholder interests affected by the energy economy and global warming. Accord-
ingly, the June 18–19 Workshop sought participation of leading experts from the 
top universities, national laboratories, and the private sector who have consider-
able knowledge of both energy and climate issues and the use of policy evaluation 
techniques, methodologies, and system models as they apply to contemporary 
pub lic policy challenges. The workshop explored how new information tools and 
networking approaches can be used to increase transparency in the governmental 
deci sion making process; assure that decisions are informed by independent experts 
and a strong factual record; and that multiple stakeholder view points are understood, 
vetted, and incorporated into the policy making process. In this way, a fact-based, 
bipartisan, and thoroughly analyzed set of policy options could be crafted and put 
forth as a possible framework for a well-grounded and vigorous national energy and 
climate debate.
Key Findings
Broadly speaking, the Workshop found that if used ap propriately, a systems 
approach to the foreign energy dependence conundrum and the contentious climate- 
change debate can be extremely effective for national policy makers. Both energy 
and climate policy making requires decision makers to draw on a huge range of 
stakeholders and constituencies in the consideration of various policy options that 
will have a major socioeco nomic, environmental, and national security impact on the 
public at large. To move society forward and to overcome traditional political and 
institutional barriers to political change, institutional leaders not only must commit 
to the process, but they must foster “buy in” from potentially skeptical stakeholders 
and the public. Hence, a decision making framework — such as the systems approach 
— that is based on inclusion, openness and transparency in the consideration and 
refinement of policy options will help secure the necessary stakeholder and public 
support for effective policy development and implementation. The eight key findings 
of the Workshop are as follows: 
1. The energy/climate conundrum is a “three-legged stool”: A critical finding of the 
Workshop is that dependence on foreign sources of energy and the impact of 
global warming in an era of intense global economic competition for scarce 
energy resources go far beyond traditional concerns of economic prosperity 
and environmental protection. Indeed, the energy and climate conundrum 
that faces national policy makers today is, as former Virginia Senator John 
Warner told the Workshop, a “three legged stool.” That stool consists of not 
only major economic and environmental impacts but huge national security 
implications for the United States and large geopolitical ramifications for 
rest of the world. According to this finding, “systems thinking” and “modeling 
approaches” will be even more critical for decision makers because an 
effective energy/ climate policy framework must account not only for the 
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views of traditional economic, social, and environmental stakeholders, but 
those from the national security, homeland security, intelligence, diplomatic, 
and nongovernmental organization establishments as well. Such broadened 
participation reflects the interdepen dent relationship among the three legged 
stool on which the future of the Nation’s prosperity depends and for which 
national policy makers will ultimately be held accountable — economic 
security, environmental stewardship, and national security.
2. The need for systems thinking: The Workshop established the critical need 
to integrate systems thinking into the energy and climate policy-making 
process in the United States. Woodrow Wilson Center President and 
former Indiana Congressman Lee Hamilton referred to systems thinking 
as an “essential but often neglected aspect of our policy-making process.” 
Lance Nobel, Independent Writer and Strategist, stated that integration of 
systems thinking could be very important to “advancing a much better policy 
process in Washington and even more broadly across the globe.” 
3. The way the nation thinks about energy and climate change must be transformed: 
The scale, complexity, and urgency of the energy and climate challenge — 
as shown by the triangular relationship of the economic, environment, and 
security “three legged stool” — can be most effectively addressed by a systemic 
“transformation” in the way the Nation thinks about and approaches the 
debate about the issue. Reliance on traditional methods of policy analysis— 
that is, by simply addressing independent, seemingly autonomous pieces 
of the energy and climate policy puzzle — will not yield the systemic 
transformation needed to break down public misconceptions and historic 
impediments to stakeholder and public support for both energy/climate 
policy outcomes and the process used by decision makers to reach such 
outcomes.
4. Systems thinking is best sited to the transformational process: Because it demands 
broad input from a diverse set of stakeholders, systems thinking is considered 
the most effective means of achieving the systemic “transformation” in the way 
the Nation thinks about and approaches the energy and climate conundrum. 
Indeed, fundamental, systemic transformation of the Nation’s approach will 
require use of a decision making process that accepts broad input, promotes 
dialogue, and develops “buy in” from a broad set of stakeholders, including 
the American public. Expanded stakeholder input and increased dialogue 
needed for such “buy in” are integral components of systems thinking 
approach to public policy challenges. 
5. Broadening the debate and improving the factual record: The Workshop 
agreed that establishing a decision making framework founded on broad 
participation and a fully developed factual record are critical to fostering an 
effective process by which policy decisions are made. The energy and climate 
policy debate is fraught with sectional, socioeconomic, and producer group 
divisions and is often distorted by stakeholder and public misconceptions 
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about the nature of the problem and proposed solutions. As a result, the 
debate is also characterized by deep stakeholder and public mistrust of both 
the policy assumptions and decision making processes used in resolving 
conflict. A systems thinking-oriented decision making framework founded 
on inclusion, openness, and transparency in the formulation, consideration, 
and refinement of policy options is seen as the most effective way of securing 
strong stakeholder and public “buy in” for broad-based policy development 
and implementation. 
6. Systems thinking can simplify highly complex problems/relationships for decision 
makers: The Workshop agreed that a popular aspect of systems thinking in 
government and the private sector is its ability to effectively communicate 
highly complex data and relationships among and between multiple policy 
variables in a simplified model. These simplified models identify and map out 
previously unknown stakeholders and constituencies as well as “unintended 
consequenc es” that can flow from “feedback loops” associated with particular 
policy choices. The variables that make up the complex, intricate web of a 
particular policy environment are not always self-evident under traditional 
models of policy analysis which evaluate individual pieces of the policy 
puzzle without reference to broader context. 
7. The Need to Test Application of Real-Time, Web-Based Virtual Townhall 
Meeting: Creating a viable Decision Making Framework will depend largely 
upon the information technologies and capabilities offered by the 21st Century 
high tech global economy. As demonstrated by the process of globalization 
since the end of the Cold War, such technologies can help bring together 
divergent groups of stakeholders and cross-border constituencies required 
for understanding various points of view that come to bear on the energy 
and climate debate. The use of so-called “jams” have been used with success 
by large, decentralized global organizations in the private (e.g., IBM) and 
not-for profit sector to facilitate stakeholder input to improve organizational 
efficiency and resolve conflict. To highlight the importance of stakeholder 
input and public “buy in” to the process of effective decision making — two 
key attributes of the systems thinking approach — the Workshop agreed 
that the successful application of IBM’s web-based “collaborative innovation” 
jam concept could be used to carry out a systems-based energy and climate 
decision making framework. In this case, stakeholders and members of the 
public with a stake in energy and climate policy outcomes would engage in 
“virtual brainstorming” as a way to educate and forge national consensus on 
outcomes
8. The need for further work in this area: To help foster a viable Decision Making 
Framework in the energy and climate arena, the organizing sponsors must 
expand the program to include additional universities, policy institutes, and 
members of the private sector to reflect the geographic, demographic and 
economic diversity of the Nation. By obtaining input from a broader range 
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of diverse groups, the Workshop can further refine how a systems approach 
can be best applied to the unique economic and geographic attributes of the 
United States at a time of economic uncertainty and global recession.
The Energy and Climate Conundrum:
 “The Three Legged Stool”
Workshop speakers emphasized that a “new ap proach” to energy and climate 
policy is critical because of its broad impact on a number of discrete but equally 
important policy sectors. In his keynote address, Daniel Poneman, Deputy Secretary 
of the U.S. Department of Energy, pointed to the complex ity of the energy and 
climate challenges facing this nation: “We have a problem now… of convergence of 
climatic threats, national security threats, energy secu rity threats, and moving from where 
we are to a clean economy with sustainable sources of energy.” 
Similarly, former Virginia Republican Senator John Warner, one the Nation’s 
foremost leaders in national security as well as co-sponsor of the first climate 
legislation to ever reach the floor of the United States Senate, explained why it is 
so critical for the nation to address a combination of greater energy independence, 
global warming, and their impact on the Nation’s domestic and international security 
commitments. “I say that it is a three legged stool [energy, climate, national security] and 
they are interdependent of one another.” 
Two general observations were made about the rela tionship among energy, 
climate, and security.  First are the conflicting goals of the need by the U.S. and 
its economic competitors for access to viable sources of energy to power global 
economic growth while at the same time responding to public demand to limit 
carbon emissions. This is compounded by the fact of a limited availability of proven 
clean energy tech nologies, when compared to more plentiful carbon emitting, fossil-
fuel energy technologies. Second, to demonstrate the magnitude of continuing global 
dependence on fossil fuels, Senator Warner said that as recently as 2005, the world’s 
population used energy at a rate of 16 terrawatts to meet its heating, cooking, power, 
and transportation needs, with over 80% of that energy coming from fossil fuels, 
which released 28 gigatons of carbon into the atmosphere. Indeed, a persistent theme 
of the Work shop was the international scientific consensus that identifies man-made 
carbon emissions as the likely cause of the observed change in our planet’s climate.
The combination of climate change and world-wide competition for carbon 
emitting fossil fuels is driv ing the United States and many other nations to embark 
on what is perhaps the most significant tran sition mankind has ever faced — the 
transition from burning carbon emitting fossil fuels that powered the Industrial 
Revolution and current globalization to unproven clean energy technologies. The fact 
of the matter is that policy makers will have to con sider the massive socioeconomic 
and demographic impact the transition to the brave, new, uncertain world of clean 
energy will have on every region of the country, every business, and every citizen. 
As noted by Bob Simon, the Staff Director of the Sen ate Committee on Energy 
and Natural Resources, reducing fossil-fuel dependence and carbon emis sions will 
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require a revolutionary transformation of our energy systems. “The science relating 
to climate change is pretty well known as far as the scientists are concerned.[but] the 
public still hasn’t fully come to grips with the scale of the problem or the scale of the 
solution. That fact translates to a substantial challenge for public policy.”
The Obama Administration’s Direction for
Energy and Climate Policy 
Deputy Secretary Poneman affirmed the Obama Administration’s commitment 
to creating a new clean energy economy that it hopes will serve as the basis for 
the Nation’s long-term economic growth. Poneman also shared the President’s 
commitment to sup porting a new way of thinking and approaching the issue. 
Poneman identified three key attributes that will be required for this new approach, 
all of which square nicely with the concept of systems thinking. First, is the “need [for] 
a decision making process that comes out of a much broader set of considerations. 
Second, is the “need to have an open process, a transparent process that allows all 
stakeholders to get their views out.  Third, is the need to “base decisions not on 
preconceptions and biases but on facts and dispassionate analysis.”  Poneman also 
called for modeling and analytical approaches that support the decision making 
process, stating that decision makers need “modeling and simulation that allows 
you to tweak the variables [thereby] providing the analytical base for wise decision 
making but also bring in all the stakeholder communities involved.” 
What is Systems Thinking?
Systems thinking is not new. A large number of private sector entities and 
government agencies both in the U. S. and elsewhere use systems models to help 
develop strategies, identify risks and vulner abilities, and bridge divisions across 
diverse stake holder interests. The methods of systems thinking are grounded 
in decades of academic study and are being continually improved and constantly 
subjected to “real world” empirical testing. 
As a model of policy analysis, a good way of un derstanding the concept of 
systems thinking is to contrast what systems thinking is not. “Traditional” analysis 
exclusively approaches an issue by separat ing the individual pieces of any given policy 
phe nomenon without taking into account the broader environment of which each 
piece is a part. (The word “analysis” actually comes from the root mean ing, “to break 
into constituent parts.”) 
By contrast, systems thinking focuses on how the thing being analyzed interacts 
with the other parts of the system to which it belongs. As one writer put it, “This 
means that instead of isolating smaller and smaller parts of the system being studied, 
systems thinking works by expanding its view to take into account larger and larger 
numbers of interactions as an issue is being studied. This results in sometimes 
strikingly different conclusions than those generated by traditional forms of analysis, 
especially when what is being studied is dynamically complex or has a great deal of 
feedback from other sources, internal or external.”
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In short, according to Dr. John Sterman, Director of MIT Systems Dynamics 
Group and Professor at MIT’s Sloan School of Management, a world-re nowned 
expert in systems approaches who addressed the June 18–19 Workshop, “Systems 
thinking is an iterative learning process in which we replace the reductionist, narrow, 
short-run, static view of the world with a holistic, broad, long-term dynamic view, 
reinventing our policies and institutions accordingly.” 
In describing the nature of systems thinking, Dr. Sterman and Dr. Nick Mabey, 
Executive Director of E3G and formerly Special Advisor to the United Kingdom’s 
Strategy Unit under former Prime Minis ter Tony Blair, identified the phenomenon 
of “feed back loops” in policy systems that decision makers often exclude from their 
analysis. The “feedback loop” produces the law of “unanticipated outcomes,” where 
changes in one variable can indirectly impact seemingly unrelated phenomena, leading 
to unex pected or unanticipated outcomes. Such unanticipat ed outcomes could be 
avoided by adopting a holistic or systemic approach to public policy challenges—
such as systems modeling-where a larger set of variables and the relationship between 
these variables is considered. 
Dr. Sterman demonstrated to the Workshop how seemingly appropriate local 
actions can initiate a cascade of interdependent, collateral events, often resulting 
in unanticipated outcomes that often have an opposite or negative impact on key 
stakeholders in any given policy environment. These feedback loops are often 
characterized by cycles of actions and responses that can serve to amplify and com-
pound a small change in the policy environment. Dr. Mabey added that feedback 
loops are important because behavior does not always follow a logical linear path of 
traditional cause and effect (e.g., A goes to B and B goes to C). Often, such behavior 
is circular in nature, where, for example, the re sponse of B can “feedback” to modify 
the action of A, thus changing its behavior based on the reac tions of B or C. Without 
the ability to identify and understand the nature of feedback loops, it becomes nearly 
impossible for stakeholders to fully assess the anticipated outcome of individual 
actions. The key to better anticipating such outcomes lies in the abil ity to identify 
and understand potential “feedback loops” in the overall policy system, something 
that would be available to decision makers when applying systems thinking. 
Feedback loops are just one of several “learning failures” experienced by decision 
makers who adopt policy recommendations on the basis of traditional, narrow 
“reductionist” world-view thinking. An other such failure is what Dr. Sterman called 
“time delays,” which are characterized by “the mismatch between the time frames [in 
which] people are evaluated and the time frame [in which] the actual events play 
out.” In addition, Dr. Sterman noted that such learning failures are a product of an 
in dividual’s mental model, which humans rely on to predict behavior in a complex 
system, whether it be complicated policy phenomenon faced by govern ment decision 
makers or a child’s behavior faced by concerned parents. Because human beings — 
which include policy analysts and decision makers — tend to rely on the “traditional” 
methods of inquiry and “fall back on rote procedures, habit, rules of thumb, and 
simple mental models,” they are ill equipped for evaluating complex and dynamic 
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systems containing multiple feedback loops and time delays. Indeed, re flecting on 
the importance of systems thinking mod els, Dr. Sterman pointed out that “everybody 
uses models all the time for every single decision they ever make,” but the critical 
question is “how can you use the best model, best suited to your purpose.” 
Dr. Sterman closed his remarks on the definition of systems thinking by sharing 
his key observations on the potential effectiveness of systems models in guiding 
policy-making. Systems thinking models must be 
•	 Driven by policy maker needs;
•	 Developed interactively with policymakers;
•	 Sure to have the full engagement of relevant stakeholders;
•	 Built and run on a time cycle that is relevant to the policy process;
•	 Focused on implementation as well as policy development;
•	 Grounded in the best scientific and expert knowledge.
Policy Makers Need Tools That are “Simple”
but Not “Simplistic”
Nick Mabey, formerly of Prime Minister Blair’s UK Strategy Group and current 
President E3G, dis cussed his views, perspectives, and lessons in apply ing systems 
thinking to real-world policy making. A key principle according to Dr. Mabey is that 
systems thinking must add clarity to the policy discussion, not just more information. 
To make this point, Dr. Mabey cited John Maynard Keynes advice that “There is 
nothing a government hates more than to be well-informed; for it makes the process 
of arriv ing at decisions much more complicated and diffi cult.” In other words, 
according to Dr. Mabey, “The systems model must be simple but not simplistic — 
that is the key intellectual challenge.”
Dr. Mabey cited real-world applications of systems thinking to fisheries, prison 
systems, and political stability. In doing so, he attempted to demonstrate the impact 
that systems thinking can have by bring ing into focus the bigger picture of any given 
policy environment while identifying the cycles of mistrust that occur between key 
stakeholders that ultimately lead to unproductive or counter-productive results. 
Systems thinking can assist policy makers in five key ways. 
•	 Help policy-makers make better decisions;
•	 Map unintended consequences (e.g., the feedback loop);
•	 Counter the inherent tendency toward compartmentalized silo thinking;
•	 Communicate the underlying assumptions of policies that are presented to 
stakeholders, and if done correctly,
•	 Lead to reduced political conflict once political leaders decide on a particular 
course of action. “If the Prime Minister is taking heat on a particular that 
was recommended in the process, I did not do my job,” Mabey stated.
Mabey was emphatic in pointing out the desperate need to apply systems 
thinking to energy and cli mate policy, arguing that the “timeframe for making change 
is too short to wait for [entirely] new ap proaches to simply evolve.” He expressed 
optimism that systems thinking will play a critical role in driving intentional change 
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by engaging the stake holders in structured discussions and creating new institutions 
between existing policy communities. Dr. Mabey concluded by saying that “We 
might not know the future, but if you don’t prepare for futures, you won’t know how 
to manage it.”
Similarly, Lance Knobel, an independent writer and strategist, built on Dr. 
Mabey’s advice regarding the tension between simplicity and complexity. Mr. Kno-
bel implied that “the tension between the complex ity of the issue and the need for 
simplicity in terms of providing a narrative that policy makers can understand and 
the public can understand to galva nize support for change” can be best served by 
the “power of systems thinking [and its ability] to pro vide a visual picture of what 
is going on.” Referring to Dr. Mabey’s relatively simple systems diagram for nation 
stability, Dr. Knobel noted that while a large amount of information went into the 
development of that systems model, “that simple visual reference…. becomes a very 
powerful tool for persuading policy makers that this is an effective approach.” 
Consistent with Dr. Sterman’s notion of “reduc tionist” worldview thinking 
produced by “mental models,” Mr. Nobel noted that unlike “the simple visual systems 
maps” most policy discussions are framed around very complex pieces of legislation 
or lengthy reports. Many people think most effectively in a visual way and that the 
power of the systems approach is its ability capture the behavior of a complex system 
through a relatively simple visual representation.  
Systems Approaches are Effective in
Real World Applications 
Dr. Kristine Poptanich, Chief Risk Integration and Analysis Branch, Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) and Lopez, Director of the New Mexico In terstate 
Stream Commission, discussed the specific application of systems modeling in 
setting priorities and engaging key stakeholder groups. 
High Consequence Systems
 Dr. Poptanich demonstrated to the Workshop the effectiveness of systems 
thinking when applied to DHS’s broad and diverse mission to protect the Nation’s 
homeland security. “We have a very big mission,… protecting everything from 
agriculture and food, banking and finance, commercial facilities, chemical facilities, 
energy, government facilities. . . . All of this is the nation’s infrastructure; it’s the 
backbone of our way of life.” She made two key points about the effectiveness of using 
systems thinking when applied to the home land security policy environment. First 
is its ability to effectively communicate and educate leaders and key stakeholders 
about risks and vulnerabilities. “Helping people understand the interconnectedness 
of these systems [is critical.” Second is the effective ness of taking a broad approach 
to identifying and understanding the relationship between the various elements and 
components within the domestic-security policy system. When DHS was first stood 
up, Poptanich stated, the focus was on the protec tion of individual infrastructure 
assets. “We weren’t thinking about systems, nobody was talking about systems, and 
we had to learn the hard way. … Look ing at these issues from a systemic standpoint 
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we have really had a sea change in our understanding of infrastructure [risks and 
vulnerabilities].” Dr. Poptanich discussed three ways that the department uses 
systems analysis:
1. Setting Priorities:  “We use systems analysis to help set priorities—where should 
we in the federal government best spend our time and attention.” 
2. Developing Strategies: “It’s not good to just identify the highest risks. . . .  We 
need to push to what are the solutions to those problems.”
3. Stakeholder Identification:  Systems thinking has allowed DHS to “identify 
stakeholders that we would not otherwise have thought of . . . that is important 
to help understand the impact of strategies and to help champion those strategies.”
Dr. Poptanich concluded her discussion by pointing out three challenges/
opportunities she sees for the applica tion of systems approaches. First, the tools 
must meet the timeframe of the decision makers — sometimes this can be months, 
but often it is measured in hours. Second, the tools must be designed with the end 
user in mind. Third, system tools have an opportunity to play an important role in 
quantifying uncertainty. 
Building Broad Stakeholder Communities 
Mr. Estevan Lopez, Director of the New Mexico Interstate Stream Commission 
addressed the importance of building broad stakeholder communities as part 
of effective systems modeling as it applied to Middle Rio Grande Collaborative 
Program. That program focused on potentially conflicting objectives of sustaining 
en dangered species versus the management of a water resource critical to a broad 
set of stakeholders in the State of New Mexico and the surrounding territories. The 
stakeholders include: 
•	 Native American pueblos who use water for agriculture and community 
needs;
•	 Nonnative American farmers who depend on water for crop production and 
their livelihoods;
•	 Environmentalists who are interested in the sustainability of the ecology, 
municipalities, and municipal utilities that supply water to all their users;
•	 The Middle Rio Grande Conservancy, which has local jurisdiction over 
water distribution and use;
•	 Multiple state and federal agencies including - the Interstate Stream 
Commission, - the New Mexico Department of Game and Fish, which 
strives to balance the needs of endangered as well as sports fish, - the New 
Mexico Department of Agriculture - the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs;
•	 Adjoining states and government of Mexico, which all share the waters of 
the Rio Grande.
The Middle Rio Grande Collaborative uses a wide range of systems models to 
educate and bring this stakeholder community together, according to Mr. Lopez, 
noting that “much of our success is specifically due to our abil ity to develop and use 
those models.” For example, this wide set of stakeholders “have been able to agree on 
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a minimum set of water flow targets” resulting in great success for the endangered 
species population since it was listed in 1995 while still meeting the needs of the 
communities and the farmers. Not all models have been successful due to the inability 
to “agree on assumptions” that go into the model and to the lack of the “maturity of 
the model itself.” 
Building on Mr. Lopez’s argument about stakeholder engagement, Mr. Lance 
Knobel emphasized the im portance of systems approaches to what are sometimes 
defined as “wicked problems,” which are characterized by being complex, open 
ended, and involving “mul tiple stakeholders who have different and often irreconcil able 
perspectives.” Pointing to the success of systems approaches in engaging multiple 
stakeholder systems, Dr. Knobel concluded that greater integration of such systems 
into traditional policy-making processes could contribute to a much better policy 
process both in the U.S. and globally. 
Key Energy and Climate Stakeholders Embrace a
Systems Approach 
Energy touches nearly every aspect of our society and thus has an extremely 
broad set of stakehold ers with strong vested interests in how the Nation approaches 
future energy and climate policy. The Workshop solicited a range of stakeholder 
per spectives in the field of energy and climate policy. Recognizing that we could not 
fully represent the huge number of stakeholder perspectives on the issue, we focused 
on the perspectives of the policy community, national security, green economy/job 
creation, the environment, and finally, and perhaps most importantly, the perspective 
of the individual citizens as key stakeholders in this process. 
The Policy Perspective
 Bob Simon, the Staff Direc tor of the U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and 
Natural Resources, expressed his views on systems support for energy and climate 
policy formulation. He began by reiterating the importance of scientific models for 
predicting climate change, but pointed out the importance of acknowledging that 
uncertainties remain both in the models and scientific understand ing underpinning 
them. He emphasized the impor tance of recognizing that uncertainties go in both 
directions —“It might not be as bad as you think but it might be a heck of a lot worse 
than you think.” While Dr. Simon identified the need for better systems models 
that would allow greater understanding of the impact of climate change on the 
population, he made clear that “we already know enough to get started.” The rea son 
the Nation must get started as soon as possible is two-fold. First, reducing carbon 
emissions will require a revolutionary transformation of our energy systems. Second, 
because energy infrastructure has a long lifetime, the investments being made now 
are “creating the world of 2050.” Dr. Simon ticked through a number of policy options 
that could be used to ad dress carbon emissions: 
•	 Voluntary measures (“this simply isn’t working”) 
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•	 A carbon tax (“just passing a cost along may not necessarily contribute to lower 
emissions”)
•	 Command and control (“no one is smart enough to know how to control each 
facility”) 
•	 Cap and trade (the only alternative at this time)  Regarding energy policy, 
a number of policy vehicles can be explored, including energy bills, annual 
appropriations bills, the farm bill, and tax codes.
In pointing to the need for taking a systems approach, Dr. Simon stated that, “To get 
our arms around the energy/climate continuum . . . we are trying to influence a whole 
host of activities [that cannot be achieved in] one big bill.”
The National Security Perspective
Sena tor Warner and Sharon Burke, Vice President for Natural Security at The 
Center for a New American Security, emphasized the critical role of the national 
security establishment in the climate and energy debate. According to Dr. Burke, 
the Department of Defense is the Nation’s single largest user of energy and, as one 
of the nation’s most trusted institutions, has an enormous opportunity to help drive 
the Na tion’s energy and climate transition. “The real power of the national security 
community is the Department of Defense itself, as a consumer of energy and as a validator 
on those concerns.” 
Having served as Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee on three 
separate occasions, Senator Warner is intimately familiar with the impact of energy 
shortages and the effects of global warming on the stability of nations and the ability 
of the U.S. military to respond to these changes. Dr. Burke further addressed the 
concerns of the national security community associated with the geopolitical impact 
of energy and climate change, including the effects of competition for energy supplies, 
potential conflict between nations in securing the free flow of such supplies, physical 
vulnerabilities of the energy infrastructure (such as the electric grid), and the impact 
of climate change on geopolitical stability of nations. Ironically, however, Dr. Burke 
noted “The national security community has made a strong distinction between energy 
security and climate change and has not seen them as coherently linked.” 
To prepare for the national security implications of increased energy competition 
and global warming, Senator Warner and Dr. Burke discussed a provision Senator 
Warner inserted into the FY 2008 Defense Authorization Act that instructed the 
Department of Defense to begin to immediately prepare for these contingencies. 
That preparation will be included in the upcoming 2010 Quadrennial Defense 
Review that will, among other things, “look at the linkage between energy use and 
climate change and explicitly tie the two together,” Dr. Burke stated. 
The Green Jobs Perspective 
In discussing the implications for the green economy, Bracken Hen dricks, a 
Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, identified the broad impact 
of the energy and climate debate on all aspects of society, not just on job creation. 
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“Specifically from a systems perspec tive, this [energy and climate issue] is a question of 
markets . . . of geopolitical stability, of ecological systems, and ultimately . . . of cultural 
systems and [of] communi cation challenge[s]” in which people are asked “to take risks 
and make investments in things that haven’t been built,” Hendricks noted. He went 
on to endorse sys tems thinking as an effective approach to the issue because the 
“conversation about systems puts us back to a much more powerful place to take action 
because [of the] need to design a solution at the speed and the scale and the scope worthy 
of the problem.” 
But more than anything, Dr. Hendricks emphasized the critical importance 
of bringing broader systems thinking into context and perspective for individual 
citizens. Policy makers, he argued, must emphasize the importance of connecting 
to the individual’s sense of place; that is, how will this highly complex energy and 
climate system with multiple feedback loops affect me as an individual? Hence, “when 
we are talking about global warming we are talking about people’s homes, their neighbors, 
and their communities . . . [and] we need to put a human face on the problem.” 
In addition, Dr. Hendricks argued that feedback loops must not only be evaluated 
on the “problem” side of the equation but on the “solution” side as well. Among the 
positive feedback loops in the transition to the green economy, Dr. Hendricks stated, 
are “new skills, investment in competitiveness, new market exports, new industries, and 
a leading-edge approach in the domestic economy as well as more healthy and livable 
communities.” Therefore, in addition to designing the systems solutions, policy 
makers must also become proficient at presenting the benefits of those solutions to 
the public. Indeed, according to Dr. Hendricks, if systems thinking can be used to 
design solutions and to demonstrate to individual members of the American public 
the resulting ben efits, “we can actually see a changed political will, which is the real 
barrier” to comprehensively addressing the energy and climate conundrum. 
The Environmental Perspective 
Anthony Janetos, Director of the Joint Global Change Re search Institute, 
distinguished between two stake holder perspectives: those interested in mitigating 
climate change effects on the one hand and those focused on developing solutions 
designed to adapt to those climate changes that can’t be mitigated. These distinctive 
perspectives are important to a large number of stakeholder communities. But 
what is most important, according to Janetos, is that both “have sufficiently robust 
information so that they are comfortable in making decisions.”
In order to illustrate the role of systems model ing in the environmental policy 
arena, Dr. Janetos focused on feedback loops that connect land use to energy and 
climate policy decisions. Here, he described the results of a recent systems study he 
conducted demonstrating the dramatic difference in outcome resulting from a simple 
change in how carbon is “valued” under two different approaches. Both approaches 
set the same atmospheric carbon outcome, but one approach addressed carbon emit-
ted from fossil fuel sources while the other valued all sources of carbon in the system. 
Under the fossil fuel-only approach, it was projected that biofuels would develop to 
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a point where they crowded out forestland and competed intensely with food-based 
agricultural activities in the latter half of 21st cen tury. In contrast, under the all 
carbon-approach, the system achieved a more balanced outcome for land use among 
food-based agriculture, forestland, and biofuel crops. Dr. Janetos concluded, “We 
have a need for a new national dialogue to understand what is hap pening now, what 
are the prospects for the future, and how should people think about this problem. 
Constructing a process that inspires both trust and participation on the part of all 
stakeholder communities has not yet been done successfully.” 
Achieving Fundamental Transformation is a
Challenge Unto Itself
A persistent theme of the Workshop was the need for transformation. This was 
true whether it consti tuted transformation of energy technologies, energy markets, 
the approach to policy development and implementation, or public perspectives and 
views on energy and climate. However, the Workshop made clear that identifying 
the need for transformation as a condition for moving the energy and climate debate 
forward is quite different from the process of actually achieving real transformation. 
Regarding the process of transformation, the Work shop benefited greatly 
from the remarks of Linda Sanford, IBM’s Senior Vice President for Enterprise 
Transformation & Information Technology, IBM Corporation. In her position, 
she is responsible in working with IBM CEO Sam Palmisano in leading corporate-
wide transformation of IBM over the last decade. She cautioned that organizational 
trans formation does not happen overnight, but rather requires time, patience, and 
commitment. In helping lead IBM’s organizational and cultural transforma tion, the 
critical challenge for her is “how do you affect the change [and] get the “buy in” from 
your people and the culture?” 
Ms. Sanford applauded workshop participants for seizing the opportunity to 
transform the energy and climate debate, adding that focusing “on the pro cess of policy 
formulation rather than debating the policy details themselves is a very important 
one.” She noted that the focus on “process and how you get input, feedback, and “buy 
in” from the constitu encies will help ensure the ‘stickiness’ of the chang es.”  Drawing 
on her experience in leading IBM’s transformation efforts, Ms. Sanford outlined five 
principles for change. 
•	 Fundamental change is “democratic” in nature: Soliciting and con sidering 
the view points of all individuals involved is perhaps the most important 
principle. She de scribed IBM’s groundbreaking technology, the IBM “JAM” 
event, which allows thousands of individuals to simultaneously engage in 
a structured, real-time dialogue as way to attain diverse perspectives on 
organizational issues and their potential solution. IBM “JAM” events can be 
thought of as a sort of “21st Century town hall.”
•	 Governance models must provide clear lines of responsibility and authority: The 
governance model must be reassessed on a regular basis to ensure that it 
remains relevant to the task.
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•	 Turn information into insight: Analytical models require and need “decisions 
that are based on facts.” 
•	 Collaboration is critical to achieving true innovation: “Very few systems are the 
responsibility of a single entity or decision maker” because “to be a transformation 
leader you have to be an adept collaborator.”  It is necessary to engage the end 
user in an iterative process in order to assure that the proposed solutions are 
meeting the needs of those closest to the problem. 
•	 Leadership commitment: Leadership is needed “to establish a few high profile 
[leadership-led] initiatives . . . that have the potential of achieving game-changing 
goals.  Without both tops down and bottoms up, no meaningful transformation 
will be possible.”
Ms. Sanford concluded by reiterating her belief that all successful transformations 
are participatory, rely on strong analytics, look beyond the four walls for new ideas, 
and are characterized by senior leadership that is fully commitment to the cause of 
change.  
Summary and Conclusion:  The Way Forward
The Workshop participants grappled with the challenge of trans forming our 
nation’s approach to energy and explored the role of a deliberative process for 
achieving a com prehensive set of national energy security and climate policies. 
They concluded that our ability to achieve this unprecedented national and global 
transformation will be greatly aided if we learn to harness the potential of “systems 
thinking” models that are currently used by our leading universities, government 
laboratories and private sector institutions. They concluded that work ing together 
with leading systems thinkers and policy experts can consolidate the best that 
“systems thinking” has to offer and provide a framework for policy decision support 
that combines the vast resources of our leading public and private educational and 
research institutions. Such a collective effort could inform, guide and help equip the 
nation’s policy makers with a national systems model that is 
•	 Interactive
•	 Transparent,
•	 Accessible and democratic,
•	 Real-time, collaborative
•	 Inclusive of disparate stakeholders, and
•	 Capable of fostering national consensus.
By developing such a systems approach, using the best technologies and 
know-how available today, the nation can effectively evaluate the costs and benefits, 
weigh the expected and unexpected outcomes of particular policy pathways and 
transform the policy-making process.  
•	 In doing so the government can include and engage a wide range of 
stakeholders truly changing “the way we do business in Washington.”  
•	 The national systems model for energy and climate policy can provide a 
fresh, new, neutral, perspective and help resolve the political “log jam” that 
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currently frustrates achieving a national energy and climate policy.
•	 It can provide open access to broad public and can engage and include 
stakeholders’ views toward a workable national consensus on energy and 
climate policy so vital to the Nation’s economic prosperity, natural resources, 
and long-term security.  
Under the leadership of Howard H. Baker, Jr. and the Howard Baker Forum 
in Washington, D.C., and in collaboration with the Howard Baker Center for Public 
Policy at the University of Tennessee, the organizing partners of this timely initiative 
expect to build on the progress created thus far in fostering a new way of de veloping 
policy in the United States. The ultimate goal is to further the momentum needed 
for formal integra tion of systems modeling into the process by which the Nation 
and its elected leaders approach and deliberate on the monumental issue of energy 
and climate policy. Success will depend in large degree on the partici pation of a wide 
cross section of the nation’s best think ers and leading institutions focusing on the 
process (not the policy) and how the process can be dramatically improved, and even 
revolutionized.  
Workshop participants agreed that it should be the first step in what many 
believe to be a major contribution to how the Nation confronts the monumental 
challenge posed by U.S. dependence on foreign energy supplies and the impact of 
climate change on the U.S. economy, environmental stew ardship, national security, 
and society as a whole. By building a strong case for integrating systems modeling 
into the process by which the Nation and its elected leaders approach and deliberate 
on these issues, historical obstacles to policy-making in this contentious area can be 
largely addressed. 
Accordingly, the Howard Baker Forum and the lead organizers plan to enlarge 
the Workshop to a wider cross section of the Nation’s best thinkers and leading 
institutions in fostering greater under standing of the way systems thinking can 
effectively tackle public policy challenges at all levels of gov ernment. The organizers 
will be will be reaching out to the original participants and a host of other indi viduals 
from major national institutions and organi zations who are leading experts in the 
systems think ing community as well as the energy and climate change policy area. 
These experts will be joined with national policy-making experts in government, 
think tanks, research institutions, and opinion-making or ganizations. Together, the 
Howard Baker Forum and lead organizers seek to continue our progress toward a 
new, systems-based, bipartisan, open, and transpar ent policy-making process. 
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Conference Report: Five Public Policy Ideas for Building 
Obama’s New Economy—a report from the Conference on 
Partnering for American Competitiveness1
Introduction 
On December 11, 2008, a group of leading experts from government, academia 
and private industry met in Washington, D.C. for a forum called “Partnering for 
American Competitiveness.”  It was an all-day workshop on government-university-
industry research partnerships for innovation and workforce development, which 
addressed the status of the America Competes Act of 2007 (20 USC 9801) that 
had just celebrated its one-year anniversary.  It also focused on the potential role 
that the federal government, academia, and industry can play in America’s economic 
recovery and long-term economic prosperity through collaborative research partner-
ships.  This report is based on the conference deliberations and offers five public 
policy ideas that can help rebuild the foundation on which President Obama’s New 
Economy will rest.  
In 2005, the groundbreaking report by the National Academies, Rising Above 
the Gathering Storm: Energizing and Employing America for a Brighter Economic Fu-
ture, painted a bleak assessment of American competitiveness. The report called into 
question the ability of the United States to compete successfully in the global mar-
ketplace and provided recommendations on how to improve America’s economic 
and technological competitiveness.  These recommendations included better educa-
tion and training for America’s students in the core disciplines of science, technology, 
engineering and mathematics (STEM) and increased government investment in re-
search and development to spur innovation and create “game changing” technologies. 
On August 9, 2007, Congress and the Bush Administration responded by enacting 
the America Competes Act, which authorized programs to improve STEM educa-
tion and increase funding to help rebuild and regenerate the foundational tools for 
sustaining America’s competitiveness.
Within the next year, the U.S. economy began its steep and sudden decline 
into recession. The length, severity and depth of this recession has not only called 
into question the ability of the United States to recover quickly but has led some to 
question the foundation on which the nation’s economy is based.  Indeed, President 
Obama has characterized the U.S. economy of the last two decades as one based on 
a shaky foundation -- of cheap credit and excess debt that fueled America’s “vora-
cious” consumption of foreign imports. As with the authors of Gathering Storm, 
President Bush’s American Competitiveness Initiative, and the America Competes 
Act of 2007, the Obama Administration called for major reforms in education and 
increased public investment in research and development for the U.S. to develop cut-
1  The Conference took place at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C.  It was co-
hosted by the Howard H. Baker Jr. Center for Public Policy, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Sandia 
National Laboratories, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, The Association of American Universities, National Association of 
State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges and the Task Force on the Future of American Innovation.  The list of conference 
participants in provided in the Appendix.
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ting-edge technologies needed to compete more effectively in the global marketplace. 
Equally important for those with a stake in the debate over American com-
petitiveness, President Obama has articulated a vision of a “new economic founda-
tion” that is based on the economic production of goods and services for domestic 
and international markets.  In a theme that resonates strongly with those of the 
Gathering Storm and the Competes Act, the President articulated a vision for our 
future where “some more scientists and some more engineers are building and mak-
ing things that we can export to other countries” and where “our best and our bright-
est [people] commit themselves to making things -- engineers, scientists, innovators.”
Thus, in December 2008, amid the global financial crisis, experts from across 
the country convened for a “Conference on American Competitiveness” to consider 
strategies for achieving the goals of the America Competes Act, with particular focus 
on the role of collaborative partnerships in the research, development and commer-
cialization of new and innovative “game changing” technologies.  This report captures 
key policy ideas from the Conference that can help enable the nation’s economic 
recovery.  Specifically, the Conference identified the need for full funding of America 
Competes Act and promoted greater integration among higher education, private 
industry and national labs in the formation of research partnerships and “innova-
tion hubs.” Particular attention was given to those areas conducive to clean energy 
initiatives and targeted workforce development programs for skill and knowledge 
development.2
The Obama Vision: Restructuring the American Economy
The Economic Downturn
President Obama took office facing an economic slump that experts agree is far 
worse and may last far longer than normal downturns in the business cycle. The raw 
numbers tell a scary story: 
•	 Unemployment.  As of March 2009, the unemployment rate stood at 8.5 per-
cent, the highest jobless rate since 1982.  Over five million jobs have been lost 
since December 2007, with over 2 million of those jobs lost between January 
and March of 2009.  That brings to 13.2 million the total number of Ameri-
can workers out of work.  During the first three months of 2009, wages and 
salaries shrank at a 4 percent annual rate.  Permanent job losses and a rise in 
the number of people out of work for six months or greater now constitute 
1.9% of the labor force, nearing a post-World War II high.
•	 Housing.  Housing foreclosures have reached record levels in the post-war 
era.  There were 3.1 million foreclosure filings - default notices, auction sale 
notices and bank repossessions - in 2008, an increase of 81 percent from 
2007 and of 225 percent from 2006.  One in 54 homes received at least one 
foreclosure filing in 2008.
2  See http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=events.event_summary&event_id=491992 . 
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•	 Consumer Spending.  In March 2009, consumer retail spending declined by 
3.5 percent from year ago and the producer price index had a year-over-year 
decline of 1.2 percent, suggesting that the nation remains in a vicious defla-
tionary cycle. 
•	 Inventories.  According to March 2009 data, businesses continue to try to 
clear inventories and excess supplies.  Industrial production fell 1.5 percent 
in March 2009 and during the first quarter, output dropped at an annual 
rate of 20 percent,.  Building permits fell to a record low in March while 
housing starts fell 10.8 percent, the second lowest rate since the 1940s.
•	 Lending.  Credit markets remain locked up in several economic sectors, no-
tably the housing and construction industries, which continue to suffer from 
frozen lines of credit.
•	 Retirement.  Retirement savings for individuals and pension plans incurred 
huge losses during the run on the financial markets in 2008 and 2009. 
As devastating as the numbers are, they fail to fully capture the economic dis-
location and pain inflicted on businesses, workers, their families and communities. 
This recession has weakened industrial sectors as companies downsize, consolidate, 
restructure, or close. The severity of the recession means people will be out of work 
for a longer period of time than in previous downturns, with little hope of returning 
to their former places of employment or utilizing skills sets they have learned and 
harnessed for much of their working adult life.  Tellingly, in key industries that paced 
America’s economic growth in recent decades - construction, financial services and 
retail—layoffs have accelerated so quickly in such a short period of time that some 
companies are abandoning whole areas of business.  “We have to seriously look at 
fundamentally rebuilding the economy,” according to Andrew Stettner, deputy direc-
tor of the National Employment Law Project in New York. “You’ve got to use this 
moment to retrain for jobs.”
Obama’s Economic Strategy
The Obama Administration has embarked on a two-fold economic plan.  The 
first step is to stop the current economic bleeding.  The second step is to lay the foun-
dation for a new economy that will provide sustained, long-term economic growth. 
The underlying premise of the strategy is that the American economy be rebuilt on 
something other than easy credit, excess consumer debt, and mass consumption of 
cheap foreign imports.  Critical to forming the foundation for a “New Economy” will 
be government investments in new technologies for clean energy, health care and 
communications, science and technology research and development, STEM educa-
tion, and workforce training and skill development.  
The Short-Term Fix
To stem the immediate economic bleeding, the Administration has embarked on 
a multi-pronged short-term recovery plan that addresses: economic stimulus, bank 
stabilization, non-bank and small business lending, foreclosure mitigation, automo-
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tive restructuring, and global stabilization and stimulus.  In particular, the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment (ARRA) Act of 2009, the $787 billion counter-cycli-
cal spending package aimed at creating jobs and jump starting consumer spending, 
includes investment in clean energy technologies, health information technology, 
broadband deployment, “green collar” workforce skill development programs, and 
partial funding of several STEM and R&D programs authorized by the America 
Competes Act.  In addition, the G-20 partners recently agreed to stabilize the finan-
cial system of the emerging market economies and revive global demand for goods 
and services.
The New Economy
In a highly touted address to Georgetown University on April 14, 2009 titled, 
“The Economy:  A New Foundation,” the President stated:
Most of all, I want every American to know that each action we take and 
each policy we pursue is driven by a larger vision of America’s future—a 
future where sustained economic growth creates good jobs and rising incomes; 
a future where prosperity is fueled not by excessive debt or reckless specula-
tion and fleeting profits, but is instead built by skilled, productive workers, 
by sound investments that will spread opportunity at home and allow this 
nation to lead the world in the technologies and the innovation and the dis-
coveries that will shape the 21st century.
 President Obama outlined the five pillars of the New Economy:
1. Financial Regulatory Reform.  The first pillar is modernization of the na-
tion’s financial regulatory system to conform to prevailing financial prac-
tices and the use of new innovative financial instruments.  
2. Education Reform.  The President’s second pillar is “an education system 
that finally prepares our workers for a 21st-century economy.”  He wants 
America to lead the world in the “production of scientists and engineers,” 
to “compete for the high-wage, high-tech jobs of the 21st century,” and 
“have the highest proportion of college graduates in the world” by 2020. 
3. Clean Energy & Carbon Emissions Limits.  The President’s third pillar is 
the harnessing of “renewable energy that can create millions of new jobs 
and new industries.”  Important investments are being made to upgrade 
the electric grid, improve the energy efficency of the transportation sec-
tor and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
4. Health Care Reform.  The President argues that the “cost of health care 
continues to strangle our economy”, since rising health care costs increas-
ingly consume financial resources that would otherwise be available for 
research and development, capital improvements and other long-term 
investments.
5. Deficit Reduction.  The fifth pillar is deficit reduction and “restoring fiscal 
discipline” after the economy has fully recovered. 
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Characteristics of the New Economy
This report focuses on those key characteristics of the President’s New Economy 
seen as consistent with the findings, observations, and recommendations reached by 
the authors of The Gathering Storm and the American Competes Act.  They are:
1. The shift to clean energy technologies that can reduce the nation’s depen-
dence on foreign oil while fueling domestic prosperity in the development, 
production and sale of new goods and services.
2. New workforce training and skill development for temporary and perma-
nently displaced workers who will need to adapt to the New Economy.
3. Renewed emphasis on STEM education that will provide the technologi-
cal and scientific foundation for new product development, processes, and 
services.
4. Increased federal funding of research and development for technological and 
scientific innovation, including expanded basic research over ten years, new 
research initiatives at American colleges and universities, and making the re-
search and development tax credit permanent to spur industrial investment.
The new Administration and Congress have embarked on an economic pro-
gram that will help accelerate the transition to a New Economy based on clean en-
ergy technologies, the creation of new scientific and engineering talent and a newly 
trained workforce skilled to create the future economy.  
Five Public Policy Ideas for the New Economy
After careful deliberation of the status of the America Competes Act one year 
after its inception and the potential role that the federal government, academia, and 
industry can play in America’s economic recovery and long-term economic prosperi-
ty through collaborative research partnerships, the conference participants produced 
five public policy ideas that can help rebuild the foundation on which President 
Obama’s New Economy will rest.  
Policy Idea One: Provide full funding for the America Competes Act of 2007.
The Competes Act authorized increased federal investment in science, technol-
ogy, engineering and mathematics (STEM) from K-12 through postdoctoral edu-
cation and increased federal research and development in science, technology, and 
engineering through the U.S. Department of Energy, the National Science Founda-
tion, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the national labo-
ratories.  As expressed by Congressman Bart Gordon (D-TN), the Chairman of 
the House Committee on Science and Technology, on the need to fully fund the 
America Competes Act of 2007: “We already have a blueprint; we just need to fund it.” 
Policy Idea Two: Encourage collaboration and integration among government, 
academia, national labs, and the private sector.  
By reducing stovepipes among leading players in the knowledge industry and 
promoting collaboration, academia, the private sector, and the national laborato-
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ries can pool their collective talents and resources to explore, develop and poten-
tially commercialize “game changing” products, processes, services and technolo-
gies that will help America compete in the global marketplace.  
“We need different more fruitful set of activities to occur within the govern-
ment, national laboratories and universities by way or establishing partner-
ing activities between the private sector and public institutions.”  Senator Jeff 
Bingaman on the need for greater collaboration and integration among 
the government, academia, the national labs and the private sector. 
Policy Idea Three: Support and expand research partnerships and innovation hubs 
aligned with the clean energy economy.
Research partnerships and innovation hubs will become critical to developing 
the clean energy technologies and processes on which the New Economy will de-
pend. 
“I am excited about the opportunities for breakthroughs in energy research 
that will allow us to reduced our foreign dependency and create a new green 
energy job bank.” – Congressman Bart Gordon on encouraging research 
partnerships and innovation hubs that are aligned with the goals of the 
clean energy economy.
“On the energy side, given the financial situation and the stimulus, we must 
target and think strategically about how R&D investments can be harnessed 
for big challenges, such as moving to a carbon free environment that our 
future prosperity depends on.”  Deborah Wince Smith on encouraging re-
search partnerships and innovation hubs for the clean energy economy. 
Policy Idea Four: Establish incentives for making partnering easier. 
There exist multiple financial, legal, cultural and institutional barriers to col-
laboration and cooperation among leading players in the knowledge industry.  To 
overcome these barriers, policies such as a permanent and expanded research and 
development tax credit or changes to technology transfer laws would induce greater 
collaboration between universities and the private sector.  In addition, the lack of 
incentives and misalignment of priorities among leading players results in lack of 
commercialization of basic research critical to private sector success in the global 
economy. 
“We must fund a way to get basic science out of the labs and into the work-
place.”  Congresswoman Judy Biggert on the need to establish incentives 
for making partnering easier and for commercializing basic research.
“We should make the R&D tax credit permanent and tailor and expand it to 
boost investment.”  Congressman Chris Van Hollen on the lack of finan-
cial incentives to promote partnering and the need for a permanent and 
expanded research and development tax credit to do so. 
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Policy Idea Five: Engage in workforce development required for providing Ameri-
ca’s workers the skills needed to compete in the New Economy.
The America Competes Act correctly focuses on the need for developing the 
best and brightest for leading cutting-edge scientific and technological research.  In 
addition, “middle skills” workforce development programs are equally important to 
the transition to the New Economy and resources should be dedicated to training 
workers in the new skills and knowledge they will need to succeed.
”We need to rethink our STEM programs.  Only about five to seven percent 
of Americans are scientists and engineers.  Most people don’t need to be 
Ph.D., Masters, or BA scientists.  We should focus on getting kids who are 
inclined to be scientists on the right path.  I am seeking an expansion of math 
and science academies.”  Robert Atkinson, on the need to refine STEM 
and workforce development programs.
 “There is currently a deficit of middle skills workers.  These are positions for 
which workers have to be highly trained, and they are high paid jobs.  They 
can’t be outsourced . . . There is a misalignment with where we spend dollars 
and the demands of industry.”  Deborah Wince Smith.
The Need for New Approaches
Conference participants emphasized that there is a changing global landscape 
and we must advance our ability to accelerate innovations through partnering to 
improve the competitiveness of the United States.  As noted by Dr. William Kirwan: 
We spend $20 billion a year on federally sponsored R&D in college and uni-
versities [and] spend the same amount of money on federal labs.  [We have] 
no consistent federal policy regarding how to tap into R&D . . . Breaking 
down walls between government labs and universities is an important thing 
for us to do.
A similar conclusion was reached in the recent report by the President Bush’s Coun-
cil of Advisors on Science and Technology, which stated that “PCAST believes en-
hancing engagement of the private sector, including companies and foundations, with re-
searchers in academia and government laboratories is increasingly vital to the health of the 
U.S. R&D enterprise and our technology-based economy.”
A major opportunity, especially during this economic downturn, is to accelerate 
the development of new products and creation of new jobs through public-private 
partnerships achieved by radically opening up the national laboratories to partner 
with business and universities.  U.S. business has repeatedly derived advantage by 
having access to the more than 20,000 scientists and engineers in the national labs 
and their world-class computational and experimental facilities.   One example is 
provided in the paper ‘Where Do Innovations Come From?’ by the Information Tech-
nology and Innovation Foundation, which concludes that award-winning innova-
tions (e.g., R&D 100 awards) over the past few decades increasingly stem from col-
laborations between large firms and federal laboratories and/or university spin-offs. 
It also demonstrated the importance of federal funding in enabling partnerships and 
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their resulting innovations.  This competitive advantage needs to be more fully ex-
ploited today.
In addition to enabling economic growth and addressing national challenges, 
public-private partnerships can enhance the development of talent for the future 
S&T workforce.  Employers emphasize that their future scientists and engineers 
will need not only strong technical capabilities in their field, but will also require the 
breadth of knowledge and experience needed to work in and lead collaborative R&D 
teams.  Providing students the opportunity to work in research teams, as part of 
government-university-industry partnerships, will provide a fast track for the team 
development and leadership desperately required by the new economic realities.  In 
short, we can transform science and engineering education through partnership pro-
grams, markedly advancing the prospects for American competitiveness in the fu-
ture.
Foreign Competition and Innovation Hubs
There is a change in the global economy regarding innovations and we must think 
about what it means to the United States in terms of competitiveness.  The idea of 
government sponsored public-private research partnerships is not new throughout 
the world.  There are numerous examples of institutes in Europe and Asia that have 
been successful and new entries are being rapidly added to the scene. The rest of the 
world is developing powerful partnership models and is not sitting back waiting for 
us to get organized and moving. 
	The Interuniversity MicroElectronics Center (IMEC) in Belgium has been 
highly successful in driving innovation in microelectronics.  IMEC is found-
ed on a tightly coupled partnership between academia, national labs, and in-
dustry.  IMEC is a prolific developer of patents and its students are gobbled 
up by industry.  
	MINATEC in Grenoble, France is a new campus for education, research, & 
industrial collaborations that brings together unique government facilities 
with university researchers and industrial needs to drive micro and nano 
technologies in France.
	The China Automotive Energy Research Center at Tsinghua University in 
Beijing was created to conduct multidisciplinary, systematic and in-depth 
research on automotive energy, and to provide comprehensive solutions to 
the transition to sustainable automotive energy systems for China and the 
world.  
	Zhongguancun Haidian Science Park, known as China’s Silicon Valley is 
China’s first state-level high-tech development zone.  (established in 1988) 
with a park size of 133 square kilometers.  Over 10,000 high-tech enter-
prises, in IT, Biotech & New Medicine, New Materials, Energy Saving & 
Environmental Protection, have established their operations in Z-HSP al-
ready, 1,500 of them being foreign-invested.
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	The Korean Institute of Science and Technology (KIST), a 10-year-old Ko-
rean program, drives the Korean economy.  KIST is also a tightly coupled 
partnership between the government, academia and the commercial sector.  
	Japanese institutes such as the National Institute for Materials Science in 
Tsukuba, help keep Japan on the leading edge of science and technology.  
	The Innovation Centre in Singapore is a new effort by the Singapore govern-
ment to develop a partnership between the public and private sector at the 
National Technical University.
The question is not whether it is a good idea to have government-sponsored cen-
ters that bring together students, faculty and industrial scientists and their problems. 
The rest of the world has shown that such centers are invaluable at driving innova-
tion.  The question is whether the U.S. will bring together our formidable resources 
in partnership to maintain its competitive edge.
The Competitiveness Conference heard from Dr. Jean-Charles Guibert, the Di-
rector of MINATEC located in Grenoble, France, on MINATEC’s ability to coor-
dinate and harness the resources of universities, the private sector and government 
in developing and commercializing technologies used for French companies to com-
pete in the global marketplace, such as STMicroelectronics.  Similarly, Dr. Johnsee 
Lee, the President of the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) in Taiwan 
noted that by bringing together government, industry and higher education, ITRI 
has employed 6,000 researchers that produce three to five patents every day, and 
work with 15,000 companies a year: “There are opportunities for national labs in the 
United States.  They could play an important role in linking universities and indus-
try.  They have more capability to build teams.” 
Partnering in the U.S.
Larry Sumney of the Semiconductor Research Center addressed the conference 
on a proven formula for utilizing collaborative university-industry research to extend 
semiconductor growth.  He noted:
Having a research consortium is a good idea now, because it improves the 
effectiveness and efficiency of federal investment.  You get the most value for 
your money invested by focusing research, knowing what you’re looking for, 
having deliverables under contract, delivering those deliverables, and includ-
ing a user perspective on whether research is going in the right direction.  We 
should fully utilize our growing research capability and capacity.
There are many other good U.S. examples of public-private that provide impor-
tant lessons learned for how to proceed.
	SEMATECH was established to reinvigorate the U.S. semiconductor in-
dustry by addressing the technical challenges required for U.S. semiconduc-
tor companies to remain competitive in the global market.  It was successful 
in reducing the risk for individual companies by sharing the costs of moving 
semiconductor technology into the future. 
PATEL 2012010
	The University-Industry Demonstration Project (UIDP), a program un-
der the National Academies’ Government-University-Industry Research 
Roundtable, is trying to improve the ability for industry to more effectively 
collaborate with universities. 
	The Combustion Research Facility (CRF) is a very successful DOE User 
Facility at Sandia National Laboratories (Livermore, CA) that has devel-
oped diagnostic techniques to understand engine combustion, enabling new 
engine designs with improved efficiency.
	Bioenergy Research Centers were established in 2007 by DOE as public-
private partnerships to develop practical solutions to the challenge of pro-
ducing renewable, carbon-neutral energy.  The Bioenergy Research Centers 
are funded by DOE, although industry partners may provide research fund-
ing and in-kind donations 
	The National Institute for Nano-Engineering (NINE) is a prototype na-
tional innovation institute established as a partnership between Sandia 
National Laboratories and a group of leading companies and universities. 
NINE is a research consortium designed to broaden student’s experience 
by working on multi-disciplinary, multi-institutional research teams and 
providing these teams access to top national laboratory facilities.  This type 
of Discovery Science & Engineering Innovation Institute was authorized as 
part of the America Competes Act.
A majority of panelists called for several measures to make it easier for private-
government-university partnerships to form.  These include:
1. Permanent extension of the research and development tax credit, including a 
credit of up to 40 percent credit for private sector expenditures in university 
research for selected research projects. 
“Any expansion of the R&D credit should be collaborative.  It should be a 
40 percent flat credit for collaboration with universities [and other partners].  
Under the current framework, organizations are penalized for collaboration 
and get less funding.” Dr. Robert Atkinson on the lack of financial incen-
tives to promote partnering and the need for a permanent and expanded 
research and development tax credit to do so.
2. Establishing a mission for the national labs to provide access to enable innovation 
hubs.  This role can be an extension to the successful user facility model that 
currently makes access to unique national lab facilities available to universi-
ties and industry. 
“There is a fabulous opportunity to think about how we create a network of 
test beds around problems that bring together [the labs, industry and aca-
demia].  We need to think about the tools of science and industry and how 
we’ll revolutionize the industry through modeling and simulations.  This ca-
pacity resides in national labs and universities.  The question is how to bring 
together partnerships to create a competitive advantage . . . We need to look 
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at how to incentivize and move forward more rapidly.”  Deborah Wince 
Smith
3. Making partnering easier, including updating intellectual property statutes (e.g., 
Bayh-Doyle & Stevenson-Wydler).  In fostering better understanding of this 
issue, it is critical for universities to be better educated on the private sector’s 
need to bring technologies to market quickly to ensure the payoff of their in-
vestments, while the private sector must understand the need for universities 
to publish findings and results well before the patent and commercialization 
process is considered.
“We spend $20 biillion a year on federally sponsored R&D in college 
and universities [and] spend the same amount of money on federal labs.  
[We have] no consistent federal policy regarding how to tap into R&D . 
. . Breaking down walls between government labs and universities is an 
important thing for us to do.”  Dr. William Kirwan, on the need for 
greater collaboration and integration among the government, aca-
demia, the national labs and the private sector.
“[Universities] can be supported by legislation to get technology out of 
universities and into end products that can be used in industry.”  Dr. 
Robert Berdahl, on the need to establish incentives for making part-
nering easier and for commercializing basic research.
 “There is a state role in university and industry collaboration [as] an 
outgrowth of the recession of the late 70s and early 80s in rustbelt states.  
Our economy is changing, and we need to look at how we can take better 
advantage of higher education assets.  We must marry higher education 
and industry.” Daniel Berglund
Providing Today’s Edge
Creating breakthrough innovations and preparing the U.S. workforce to out-
compete the global community in high technology markets require new approaches 
for the long term.  By taking maximum advantage of the existing in the nation’s 
research and development community, innovation can e accelerated in a time frame 
consistent with the current U.S. needs to impact markets, including:   
•	 Transportation: increased energy efficiency, new fuels, increased vehicle 
electrification, automotive, rubber/tires, public transportation
•	 Electric power generation and distribution: renewable sources, energy stor-
age to improve base load capability, flexible and reliable electric grid, lower-
loss distribution
•	 Information technology: hardware, broadband, network and cyber security
•	 Environment: protection of greenhouse emissions, water and other natural 
resources
•	 Electronics and semiconductors: aerospace and defense, products to improve 
energy efficiency, next-generation microelectronics, consumer products 
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•	 Advanced materials and chemicals, including nanotechnologies
•	 Biotech, pharmaceuticals, and medical products
•	 Manufacturing and industrial processes
There is still a stovepiped approach to competitiveness that needs to be broken down, 
as noted by Dr. Robert Atkinson:
We are missing incentives to have universities and their fellowships linked 
to the economic sector.  We must have incentives from the government that 
glue together all the various pieces of [competitiveness] legislation.  We have 
to expand R&D tax credits to tap into universities and industry in differ-
ent ways.  For labs, we should create incentives for energy frontier research 
centers.  They should be modeled in ways that incentivize partnerships . . . 
For universities, fellowships should be tied to support of partnerships and 
consortia. 
The trick is to bring people together to solve problems that really matter. As Dr. 
Richard Stulen, Sandia National Laboratories, commented 
Successful partnerships are outcome focused.  They have developed a clear pic-
ture of why they exist, and know the value they are bringing to the industrial 
sector.  They typically will have roadmaps for where they are and where they 
are trying to go.  An aspect of some partnerships is the combination of federal, 
state and local interests that tend to come together.”
Summary
The ‘Partnering for American Competitiveness’ conference addressed three key 
issues related to U.S. competitiveness: (1) the current state of American innovation 
at a time of economic turmoil in the United States resulting from the global financial 
crisis; (2) the status and implementation of the congressional legislative response to 
concerns about the nation’s competitiveness outlined in a 2005 National Academies’ 
report, Rising Above the Gathering Storm: Energizing and Employing America for 
a Brighter Economic Future; and (3) how public-private research partnerships and 
innovation hubs can help improve U.S. competitiveness.   The workshop identified 
five policy areas that could move the U.S. forward by bringing together the best capa-
bilities of academia, the private sector and government, including the national labs. 
New approaches will be a key to our success in an increasingly competitive world. 
Other nations are developing new approaches to accelerate innovation and the U.S. 
needs to be willing to explore new models and update legislative statutes that create 
barriers to partnering.  
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